Xi Retains Leadership After Power Struggle
Analysts divided on whether supreme leader is losing power
Xi Jinping remains China’s supreme leader at the end of the Communist Party’s 4th Plenum in Beijing, dispelling speculation that he would step down amid what was called a record purge of Central Committee members, leaving China watchers wrangling over whether Xi’s power has been clipped and will be further reduced, or if he will continue indefinitely as China’s most powerful leader in decades.
The plenum, on October 23, ratified the earlier expulsion of 11 full Central Committee members and four alternates including eight generals, said former South China Morning Post chief editor Wang Xiangwei on Facebook on October 23.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described the 4th Plenum as a conclave, a secretive meeting of the cardinals of the Catholic Church who gather to elect a new pope. The 4th Plenum was likewise secretive, with little substantive announcement until a 5,000-word document was released on the afternoon of October 23, outlining a new 5-year plan and repeating the party’s determination to continue to advance technological progress, security and self-reliance and reaffirming the unity of the party and the entire People’s Liberation Army (PLA) around Xi as “the core.”
The conclave is a meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which is vested with the power to elect a new supreme leader and members of the Central Military Commission (CMC), a handful of the nation’s most powerful military commanders.
“All in all, Xi retains his title until 2027, the 21st Party Congress,” Willy Lam, a senior fellow of the Jamestown Foundation, told Asia Sentinel. There is no sign that Xi’s power is in decline, a Hong Kong analyst told Asia Sentinel. However, another source speculated to Asia Sentinel that the 72-year-old leader will step back from some of his duties by the end of this year, citing health issues.
In a significant move, the report announced the promotion of General Zhang Shengmin to CMC vice chairman as China’s third most powerful commander, behind General Zhang Youxia (no relation to Zhang Shengmin), the second, and Xi, the CMC chairman and supreme leader. Zhang Shengmin replaces General He Weidong, a Xi ally expelled from the party for serious corruption, officially announced on October 17.
Analysts of Cercius Group, a contrarian Canadian consultancy, said they stand by their view that the promotion of a general to CMC vice chairman means Xi’s succession has been delayed, as cited in an October 20 Asia Sentinel article. The analysts pointed out that Zhang Shengmin was not promoted to the politburo, a group of 20-odd CCP members who oversee the party. This effectively decreases the seat number to 23, making some form of collective leadership more viable, the analysts explained.
Some describe Zhang Shengmin as Xi’s enforcer in the military as he is the head of anti-corruption investigations in the PLA, a Malaysian analyst said. But others note that as Zhang was in the Rocket Force for a long time, he inevitably would have cultivated at least a working relationship with Zhang Youxia, formerly in charge of military procurement, the Cercius analyst added. “So it remains unclear if Xi or Zhang Youxia now has the upper hand in the military.”
The choice of Zhang Shengmin as CMC vice chairman seems like a compromise between selecting a pro-Xi and a pro-Zhang Youxia candidate, the analysts said.
Neil Thomas, a fellow of the Asia Society, described the reaffirmation of Xi as leader as a brutal power struggle. “Super-low attendance suggests record purge of Central Committee,” Thomas tweeted on October 23. Only 315 people attended the plenum, the lowest number in at least 15 years, Thomas noted. That is only one-sixth of the original membership of the Central Committee.
Those purged from the Central Committee for corruption include General He Weidong, Admiral Miao Hua, General Lin Xiangyang, as well as civilian officials like Tang Renjian and Jin Xiangjun, according to the plenum report. The plenum report announced yet another general, Zhang Fengzhong, was expelled from the party for serious corruption.
“Zhang Shengmin as with Zhang Youxia, are from the Shaanxi gang that has been working to reduce or replace the influence of Xi’s Fujian cadres (like He and Miao). With Shengmin being the enforcer… Zhang Youxia would have no difficulty using Shengmin as a sledgehammer to crush anyone that shows disloyalty,” said Andre Wheeler, chief executive of Asia Pacific Connex, an Australian consultancy.
The plenum report makes it “very apparent that Xi has maintained his power, particularly as there is no mention of moving the decision-making process from the current centrality of Xi’s power rather than a return to the Deng Xaioping’s ‘collective leadership’,” said Wheeler.
However, the number of generals and admirals ousted, like He Weidong, Mia, and Lin Xiangyang, who were very close to Xi, is an example of the diminution of his power, the work of anti-Xi factions including Zhang Youxia, Lam said.
Zhang Fengzhong was previously the political commissar of the Rocket Force, which includes China’s strategic nuclear missiles. His removal is in line with the dismissal of a large number of former Rocket Forces leaders, Lam added. “You can say Xi harbors suspicion of the Rocket Forces because of their association with Zhang Youxia, (former Defense Minister) Wei Fenghe, and a host of bigwigs.”
As a former member of the Rocket Force, Zhang Fengzhong should have had at least a working relationship with Zhang Youxia (no relation to Zhang Fengzhong), the Malaysian analyst said. “That’s why this round of purges and promotions are confusing. Those associated with Zhang Youxia are alternately promoted or purged.”
As the head of the CMC disciplinary apparatus, the promotion of Zhang Shengmin sends the message that the clean-up in the PLA is not over, Cercius Group analysts predicted.
Objectives
A key purpose of the 4th plenum is to lay out the nation’s next five-year plan for 2026 to 2030, hence the report included economic policy and various objectives including calling for fostering the peaceful development of cross-straits relations between Taiwan and the mainland. However, as Wang Xiangwei noted, “The communiqué introduces a phrase poised to ignite vigorous debate in the near term: ‘to advance the great cause of national reunification.’ This wording was conspicuously absent from the Third Plenum’s communiqué.”
That raises the question of whether Xi will invade Taiwan. As Lam told Asia Sentinel on October 20, the removal of so many senior officers has degraded the PLA’s ability to do so.
In terms of economic policy, Xi’s preference for Soviet-style industrial policy, devoting the bulk of national resources to “better-than-the US” weapons, microchips, and electric vehicles, has been retained, Lam said. The five-year plan contains little in the way of market reforms, consisting mainly of introducing foreign capital and resuscitating the private sector, he added. “The 15th five-year plan has continued with the conservative, Soviet line advocated by Xi in the past seven to eight years.”
Taking a different view, Cercius Group analysts said the five-year plan focuses more on opening and domestic reforms than Xi would have liked. The plenum report advocates for some decentralization, reform, and opening, rather than security, they added, with the word “reform” mentioned eight times.
“Overall, the message is not fully in line with what Xi would prefer, and it suggests he may have had to make extensive compromises to avoid intra-party tensions from spiraling out of control,” a Cercius analyst told Asia Sentinel.