Analysts Speculate Xi is Losing Power
Chinese president’s subordinates assuming more authority
Recent signs indicate the power of Xi Jinping, 72, the most influential Chinese figure since modern China’s first leader Mao Zedong, is being eroded and senior Chinese officials are taking over some of his roles. Multiple sources differ on when or if Xi will step down, but agree that his power, after 13 years of unprecedented sway over the vast country, is waning.
Willy Lam, a senior fellow of the US think tank Jamestown Foundation, said Xi will likely remain China’s leader in the next several years, but will increasingly become more of a figurehead with decreasing power. Many analysts reading the opaque signs emanating from the Zhongnanhai headquarters in Beijing note that Xi has increasingly not shown up at functions where a supreme leader normally appears, some of his allies and associates are being replaced, and there is diminishing mention of Xi in state media of implementing substantive policies. He was largely out of public sight in May and June for unknown reasons, although he appeared in Shanxi province earlier in July.
Other China-watchers are cautious, pointing out that although he has faced problems before, Xi dominates every significant CCP organization. All seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee are either long-time Xi allies or have served him loyally for over a decade, according to an analysis of the reports by the Sydney-based Lowy Institute, Australia’s leading think tank. More than half of the broader Politburo’s 24 members are his protégés, and nearly all the others had direct ties to him prior to their appointments, the report points out.
Nonetheless, the country has faced long-running economic problems stemming from a severe housing downturn arising from massive overbuilding as well as from industrial overproduction to keep the economy humming. Private entrepreneurship has been put on a tight leash while state-owned enterprises have once again taken command of the economy. Lingering weakness in China’s property market has saddled provincial governments with dangerous levels of debt.
His 13-year "tigers and flies" anti-corruption campaign has netted high-ranking military officers, senior executives of state-owned enterprises and national leaders as well as 2.3 million lower-ranking officials, raising considerable antagonism among those still in power. It’s uncertain who is out to get him, but potential rival factions include the so-called “Shanghai clique” once headed by the late leader Jiang Zemin, who died in 2022, and a faction linked to Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao.
At the Sino-US trade talks in London on June 10 and 11, for instance, officials reported not to Xi but to deputy Prime Minister He Lifeng, said a source familiar with the negotiations, with He leading the London talks, while US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick led the US team. Although Xi was not expected to attend the London meeting with a lower-ranking US counterpart, Lutnick, the Chinese officials at the meeting would normally report the meeting to Xi, the source clarified.
“The trade talks are so important it must go the highest level,” a highly-placed source who asked not to be named pointed out. “The question arises as to Xi’s decision-making power. The London meeting represented an opportunity for the Trump administration to observe who is in charge in China and how the Chinese Communist Party’s decision-making process works, in real time. Understanding your adversary's tactics and operations is an important part of the struggle.”
Few details of the London deal were announced in Chinese state media, because it makes China look bad, the source said. “Xi will have difficulty selling it domestically.”
“In the PRC’s most important diplomatic mission this year, Xi apparently failed to demonstrate strong leadership,” the Jamestown Foundation’s Lam reported on June 21. “Following negotiations with the Trump administration in Geneva on May 11–12 and then in London on June 10–11, neither Xi’s name nor Xi Jinping Thought was mentioned in comments from either the Foreign Ministry, the Commerce Ministry, or Vice-Premier He Lifeng (何立峰) – a close Xi ally and lead negotiator with the Americans.”
After the London negotiations, “the PRC side made a limited concession by reopening exports of rare earth materials to the United States. The readout of the framework from the US side – which was not disputed by the Chinese – claimed that Washington would levy 55 percent tariffs on PRC exports while Beijing’s duties on US imports would be set at only 10 percent,” Lam wrote.
Unusual signs
A recent flurry of changes in senior official positions also suggests the possibility that Xi’s power is waning. On July 9, the Chinese government website announced the appointments of Wu Zeng as Deputy Justice minister, Yuan Xiaoming as Assistant Commerce Minister, Li Jinhua as the deputy director of the National Park Administration, Sun Shuopeng as head of the China National Committee on Aging and Yang Weilin as Public Security Vice Minister. On the same day, two Public Security Vice Ministers, Chen Siyuan and Sun Maoli, as well as four other senior officials were removed.
The most recent announcements on the Public Security Ministry’s website mention Wang Xiaohong without his title of Minister of Public Security, which functions as China’s police, raising the question whether Wang will lose his post and whether this will affect Xi’s personal protection. Wang has been a close ally of Xi since they served together as officials in Fuzhou, the capital of Fujian province, during the 1990s, when Wang functioned as Xi’s bodyguard. Unlike Wang, the new Public Security Vice Minister Yang never served with Xi in Fujian or Zhejiang, indicating Yang is not close to Xi.
Around the beginning of this year, Qin Yunbiao, who has no personal ties with Xi, was appointed the head of security of Beijing and vice mayor of the capital, which puts Xi in a precarious situation due to the sensitivity of Qin’s post, Lam said. Both Qin and Yang previously served in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, where a former Public Security Minister, Guo Shengkun, was an official from 2004 to 2012. Guo is linked to Jiang Zemin’s faction, so Qin and Yang are possibly proteges of Guo and thus may belong to Jiang’s rival faction.
On July 4, the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office disclosed that Xu Qifang was appointed its executive deputy director. On May 30, Zhou Ji replaced Zheng Yanxiong as director of the Hong Kong Liaison Office, raising speculation that Xu might replace Xia Baolong, a Xi ally, as head of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, said an analyst who declined to be named.
In another sign of Xi’s waning power, the government website www.gov.cn highlighted Xi in its lead article, but its main news section instead announced policies and activities of other top Chinese officials like Deputy Prime Minister He and Prime Minister Li Qiang, for four consecutive days from July 7 to 10. While government websites still mention Xi, more policies are in the hands of other officials, the analyst said.
But while state media like People’s Daily and Xinhua news agency continue to carry glowing articles on Xi in almost Maoist terms, Lam said, “Appearances on People’s Daily or Xinhua are a poor indication of a leader’s power. Let’s examine the fact of whether Xi is really exercising power on foreign policy, economic policy and domestic policy and also whether his proteges have been removed.”
Prime Minister Li attended the BRICS meeting in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on July 6 and 7, unusual since Xi has attended every meeting every year since 2013 of the conclave, a 10-nation grouping including Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa that is largely the brainchild of Xi and Russian leader Vladimir Putin, who also skipped it. Hu, the Chinese president before Xi, attended the first BRICS meeting in 2009 and all the subsequent BRICS meetings from 2010 to 2012. At the same time, top officials including Cai Qi, foreign minister Wang Yi and Public Security Minister Wang Xiaohong officiated at a ceremony in Beijing on Chinese resistance to Japanese invaders without Xi, who at the time was in an isolated place in Shanxi to commemorate also Chinese resistance. The only senior official with Xi was Deputy Prime Minister He Lifeng.
For the first time, Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee didn’t mention Xi in his speech at the commemoration of Hong Kong’s handover to China on July 1. In all his other speeches on July 1 since July 1, 2022, when he became chief executive, Lee had always mentioned Xi.
On June 5, Asia Sentinel reported infighting within the Central Military Commission, which Xi heads, and which comprises the handful of the most powerful military leaders. Xi is followed by General Zhang Youxia. The third most powerful member of the commission, General He Weidong, has been missing since March. On June 27, the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s Parliament, announced that Admiral Miao Hua has been removed from the Central Military Commission. Admiral Miao and General He were Xi's allies.
People’s Daily published a brief report on the opening of a memorial dedicated to Xi Zhongxun, an important Communist revolutionary, a late deputy prime minister and Xi Jinping’s father, on May 24. However, the memorial was not named after Xi Zhongxun, but was named “Guanzhong Revolutionary Memorial” 关中革命纪念馆.
The memorial is located in Fuping county, Shaanxi, where the elder Xi was born. The state newspaper’s report said officials and others attended the opening of the memorial, but didn’t mention Xi Jinping or any senior official attending, suggesting the Chinese government is downplaying the legacy of Xi senior and by extension his son.