Philip Bowring is correct to argue that Donald Trump’s recent “transactional diplomacy” through the region, starting in Kuala Lumpur, has once more exposed ASEAN’s fundamental disunity and, as a consequence -- again -- forced these regional states into stunningly humiliating, unilateral concessions. That’s like selling the earth beneath their people’s feet to American interests.
Those who have been following ASEAN since its geopolitically-motivated formation in 1967 will tell you, despite ASEAN consistent boasting otherwise, that it is far from unified across all known fronts. Intra-ASEAN relations continue to be plagued by hype and hubris delivered by the hands who govern these states. The entire premise that ASEAN is a politically “neutral” regional organization, consistent with the old Non-Alignment Movement, is entirely delusional. Behind the chimera of handholding on stage lies a smorgasbord of problem too numerous to discuss here.
That said, Bowring’s reasonably compelling narrative, it is however overly deterministic and overlooks a weird sort of strategic agency. The article correctly identifies the immediate, transactional nature of the bilateral agreements, but framing the Southeast Asian countries and Japan and South Korea as passive victims who were simply "picked off" and "bullied" by Trump dismisses the point that ASEAN states individually, especially Malaysia, allowed themselves to be picked off and bullied.
Bowring’s perspective neglects a crucial geopolitical reality: many regional actors, particularly those reliant on both US security and Chinese trade, despite actively seeking to hedge their bets against an increasingly assertive Beijing, allowed themselves to draw closer to swamp of a debased Trumpist Washington. It’s also a clear sign not of an ASEAN seeking to “balance” itself between two so-called superpowers but of an ASEAN pedaling two sampans in deeply troubled waters with one set of oars.
Deals involving large purchases like Boeing aircraft or LNG and investment commitments in critical supply chains like semiconductors and data centers can be viewed not merely as a "surrender" but as a deliberate effort to diversify security partners, on the surface, but embed the U.S. in their economic and geopolitical futures. The only way to do this is for the ASEAN’s leaders to be transactional themselves.
For ‘nations’ (what the heck is a ‘nation’ twenty-five years into the 21st century?), such as Malaysia, committing to U.S. standards or investment is kowtowing at its best but it is also a strategic cost incurred for the long-term benefit of deeper alignment and protection. In that vein, it is a stunningly humiliating defeat on the part of Malaysia and its neighbors who are pretending to carve an independent path towards economic growth and development in accordance with the fallaciousness of ‘free market’ economics.
A few quick conclusions. One, Bowring’s critique of ASEAN’s lack of a united front is structurally sound, though he could have gone much further. ASEAN’s core operating principle of non-interference and consensus inherently privileges national interest and bilateral engagement over bloc-level confrontation.
There has been a great deal of pretense attached to the claim by ASEAN leaders, especially since 1976. Of their “unity”, of their ability to speak with one mind, let alone one mouth. There simply haven’t been any runs on the board to suggest that non-interference and consensus behind the curtains have proven to be materially real or true. ASEAN, as servile as it has always been to the U.S, even allowed Trump to lay claim to winning peace in the Thai-Cambodia conflict without daring to protest. There has been an awful lot of ASEAN political theater to show their domestic audiences, foremost, just how ASEAN deals with differences, let alone perceived challengers and geopolitical enemies – by bowing nice and low to the U.S. and to China for their desperately needed capital investments and markets.
ASEAN could never in its wildest dreams achieve 60% internal trade like the EU. That’s primarily because ASEAN’s structural economic differences and the political realities fundamentally constraint the espoused claims of unity when the domestic structural political constraints impede and substantively undermine that objective. Presenting a "gesture of common interest" is in fact the long-hidden sign of ASEAN’s historical institutional weaknesses.
Two, contrasts drawn between the U.S. as a "wrecking ball" and China as a "bastion of free trade" are too simplistic and laughable. Bowring himself later notes China’s effective use of bilateral pressure to divide the region on issues like the South China Sea. Fact is China's multilateral posturing is always strategic, and its trade practices are hardly free-market driven. Free-markets do not exist. They never have anywhere in the world. So why would it in mercantilist China?
The differential treatment of Japan and South Korea, who faced lower tariffs, likely stems from their distinct leverage, high-value technology industries, and different trade imbalances with the U.S. -- not purely a result of change in U.S. demeanor. Indeed, the challenges facing ASEAN and its dealings with the U.S. and number one enemy China are not embedded on the tired cliché of divided one falls but on strategic calculations made within each of these states and in competition with each other, not to achieve the path to glory but, as has always been glaringly clear all along, for each ASEAN state’s path to political survival.
Philip Bowring is correct to argue that Donald Trump’s recent “transactional diplomacy” through the region, starting in Kuala Lumpur, has once more exposed ASEAN’s fundamental disunity and, as a consequence -- again -- forced these regional states into stunningly humiliating, unilateral concessions. That’s like selling the earth beneath their people’s feet to American interests.
Those who have been following ASEAN since its geopolitically-motivated formation in 1967 will tell you, despite ASEAN consistent boasting otherwise, that it is far from unified across all known fronts. Intra-ASEAN relations continue to be plagued by hype and hubris delivered by the hands who govern these states. The entire premise that ASEAN is a politically “neutral” regional organization, consistent with the old Non-Alignment Movement, is entirely delusional. Behind the chimera of handholding on stage lies a smorgasbord of problem too numerous to discuss here.
That said, Bowring’s reasonably compelling narrative, it is however overly deterministic and overlooks a weird sort of strategic agency. The article correctly identifies the immediate, transactional nature of the bilateral agreements, but framing the Southeast Asian countries and Japan and South Korea as passive victims who were simply "picked off" and "bullied" by Trump dismisses the point that ASEAN states individually, especially Malaysia, allowed themselves to be picked off and bullied.
Bowring’s perspective neglects a crucial geopolitical reality: many regional actors, particularly those reliant on both US security and Chinese trade, despite actively seeking to hedge their bets against an increasingly assertive Beijing, allowed themselves to draw closer to swamp of a debased Trumpist Washington. It’s also a clear sign not of an ASEAN seeking to “balance” itself between two so-called superpowers but of an ASEAN pedaling two sampans in deeply troubled waters with one set of oars.
Deals involving large purchases like Boeing aircraft or LNG and investment commitments in critical supply chains like semiconductors and data centers can be viewed not merely as a "surrender" but as a deliberate effort to diversify security partners, on the surface, but embed the U.S. in their economic and geopolitical futures. The only way to do this is for the ASEAN’s leaders to be transactional themselves.
For ‘nations’ (what the heck is a ‘nation’ twenty-five years into the 21st century?), such as Malaysia, committing to U.S. standards or investment is kowtowing at its best but it is also a strategic cost incurred for the long-term benefit of deeper alignment and protection. In that vein, it is a stunningly humiliating defeat on the part of Malaysia and its neighbors who are pretending to carve an independent path towards economic growth and development in accordance with the fallaciousness of ‘free market’ economics.
A few quick conclusions. One, Bowring’s critique of ASEAN’s lack of a united front is structurally sound, though he could have gone much further. ASEAN’s core operating principle of non-interference and consensus inherently privileges national interest and bilateral engagement over bloc-level confrontation.
There has been a great deal of pretense attached to the claim by ASEAN leaders, especially since 1976. Of their “unity”, of their ability to speak with one mind, let alone one mouth. There simply haven’t been any runs on the board to suggest that non-interference and consensus behind the curtains have proven to be materially real or true. ASEAN, as servile as it has always been to the U.S, even allowed Trump to lay claim to winning peace in the Thai-Cambodia conflict without daring to protest. There has been an awful lot of ASEAN political theater to show their domestic audiences, foremost, just how ASEAN deals with differences, let alone perceived challengers and geopolitical enemies – by bowing nice and low to the U.S. and to China for their desperately needed capital investments and markets.
ASEAN could never in its wildest dreams achieve 60% internal trade like the EU. That’s primarily because ASEAN’s structural economic differences and the political realities fundamentally constraint the espoused claims of unity when the domestic structural political constraints impede and substantively undermine that objective. Presenting a "gesture of common interest" is in fact the long-hidden sign of ASEAN’s historical institutional weaknesses.
Two, contrasts drawn between the U.S. as a "wrecking ball" and China as a "bastion of free trade" are too simplistic and laughable. Bowring himself later notes China’s effective use of bilateral pressure to divide the region on issues like the South China Sea. Fact is China's multilateral posturing is always strategic, and its trade practices are hardly free-market driven. Free-markets do not exist. They never have anywhere in the world. So why would it in mercantilist China?
The differential treatment of Japan and South Korea, who faced lower tariffs, likely stems from their distinct leverage, high-value technology industries, and different trade imbalances with the U.S. -- not purely a result of change in U.S. demeanor. Indeed, the challenges facing ASEAN and its dealings with the U.S. and number one enemy China are not embedded on the tired cliché of divided one falls but on strategic calculations made within each of these states and in competition with each other, not to achieve the path to glory but, as has always been glaringly clear all along, for each ASEAN state’s path to political survival.
The trip may not be the best for all on Asia, but no one ever
argues it is the very Best for America
Words of a lifetime of experience & reflection. Thank you, Mr. Bowring