US’s New National Defense Strategy Leads World Off a Cliff
Accelerating America’s global isolation
By: Salman Rafi Sheikh
Although the recently released US National Defense Strategy (NDS) aims to restore “peace through strength for a new golden age of America, far from a statement of American strength, it is a roadmap for accelerating America’s global isolation. Rather than repairing the fractures in the US-led order that have become increasingly visible, the document doubles down on coercion, retrenchment and unilateralism. In doing so, it risks transforming allies into reluctant dependents, partners into sceptics and neutral states into future rivals.
At a moment when European and Canadian leaders are openly talking about the “ruptures” in the post-war order, Washington has chosen not to heal those cracks but to widen them. The result is a strategy that creates more geopolitical space for China and Russia, i.e., precisely the outcome the US must prevent.
Strategy Born of Suspicion, Not Repair
The tone is revealing from its opening pages, framing the international environment less as a system to be stabilized than as a contest in which allies, partners, and adversaries alike must be compelled to adjust to American priorities. It declares that the US faces “one of the most dangerous security environments in our nation’s history,” citing not only China and Russia but also failures of allied burden-sharing and “free-riding,” particularly in Europe. It endorses the use of disproportionate violence as the ideal way for the contemporary world. To quote: “In the Middle East, Israel showed that it was able and willing to defend itself after the barbaric attacks of October 7th—in short, that it is a model ally.”
This framing matters. The strategy repeatedly emphasizes that past US administrations “encouraged [allies] to behave as dependents rather than partners, weakening our alliances and leaving us more vulnerable.” The solution proposed, however, is not deeper institutional cooperation or renewed political trust, but pressure. The NDS calls for “increased burden-sharing with US allies and partners” while making clear that American support will be conditional and selective. Although Israel also depends on the US for securing military aid worth several billion dollars annually and for bombing, or threatening to bomb, Iran every now and then, the Trump administration has created a ‘state of exception’ over all other allies. The message for its traditional allies is, thus, to find their own spaces—something that, for instance, Canada recently did by signing a deal with Chiba. The BBC explicitly described the move as a shift away from the US, leading Trump to threaten Canada further with 100 percent tariffs.
Trump can make these threats because the US is also moving very explicitly away from its traditional allies. The rupture is real. Nowhere is this clearer than in the strategy’s approach to Europe. The NDS signals a sharp reallocation of attention and resources away from the continent, stating that the United States will offer only “limited support” as it prioritizes homeland defense and the Indo-Pacific. The logic is blunt: European security is increasingly Europe’s problem. While burden-sharing has long been a US demand, the language here implies not partnership, but disengagement backed by leverage.
From Deterrence to Coercion by Design
Defenders will argue that the NDS doesn’t explicitly endorse coercion. That is true in a narrow textual sense. But strategies do not shape behavior only through explicit commands; they do so by defining incentives, hierarchies and red lines. In this respect, it is structured in a way that pushes US policy towards coercive outcomes, even when dealing with partners. The strategy emphasizes defending the “homeland and hemisphere” and warns that US access to “key terrain like the Panama Canal and Greenland” is “increasingly in doubt.” This language implicitly frames regions such as Latin America and parts of Europe not as cooperative spaces but as arenas of compliance. When combined with the strategy’s praise for the Trump administration’s willingness to use military power to compel outcomes, the message is unmistakable: alignment with US priorities will be enforced, not negotiated.
The NDS celebrates a military rebuilt to be “the world’s absolute best—its most formidable fighting force,” and repeatedly returns to the theme of restoring the “warrior ethos.” Strength is not merely a deterrent but a tool for discipline. The risk is that allies who diverge from Washington’s preferences—on trade, energy, technology, or diplomacy—come to be seen less as partners and more as obstacles.
That is precisely the dynamic that European and Canadian leaders warned against at Davos. Their speeches underscored that the legitimacy of the post-1945 order rested not only on American power but on American restraint, the willingness to lead through institutions rather than dictate through force, at least vis-à-vis allies. The NDS, by contrast, reflects deep skepticism towards multilateralism and little patience for consensus-building. It assumes that pressure will produce alignment. More importantly, it wants traditional US allies to fully comprehend the message.
Strategic Retrenchment, Rival Expansion
Perhaps the most consequential aspect of the 2026 NDS is its implicit acceptance of US retrenchment outside a narrow set of priorities. By diverting resources away from Europe and limiting commitments elsewhere, the strategy seeks to reduce overextension.
The Indo-Pacific—and particularly China—now dominates US strategic thinking. Deterrence there is to be pursued “through strength, not confrontation,” but this focus comes at a cost. As US attention narrows, other regions are left exposed to influence-seeking by rival powers. Russia, already testing the limits of European cohesion, benefits from a weaker US commitment to NATO’s periphery. China, adept at exploiting institutional vacuums, gains opportunities to expand economic and diplomatic influence in regions where US engagement recedes. Ironically, the NDS itself acknowledges that past US policy “ceded influence in our hemisphere” and allowed adversaries to grow stronger. Yet it repeats the same error on a global scale by assuming that power vacuums will remain empty. They never do.
What makes this especially damaging is the signal it sends. When the US signals that its support will be limited, conditional and transactional, partners hedge. They tend to diversify relationships, pursue strategic autonomy and become more receptive to rival powers. This dynamic is already visible in Europe. At Davos, French President Emmanuel Macron remarked that “China is welcome,” reflecting unease with an increasingly unpredictable Washington rather than enthusiasm for Beijing. Germany offers an even starker example: despite US calls for economic “decoupling,” firms such as Volkswagen and BMW have expanded electric-vehicle production and battery supply chains in China, deepening industrial dependence at a moment of transatlantic strain. Beijing has skillfully exploited these openings by offering market access and regulatory flexibility, positioning itself as an indispensable partner as US–EU ties fray. Over time, this pattern of hedging erodes US influence far more effectively than any external challenge ever could.
In short, if the 2026 NDS is a confession of strategic anxiety, the world should brace for its two most likely outcomes: a more interventionist US abroad and a weaker American order at home and globally. The same doctrine that elevates military coercion and conditional alliances also normalizes the use of force as the primary instrument of policy. That makes a US-led intervention in Iran not a remote fantasy but a plausible next chapter, especially as the strategy frames the Middle East as a proving ground for “model allies” and “barbaric” enemies. The paradox is grim: Washington may become more willing to invade, even as the global system that once absorbed and contained American power is falling apart. The future, then, is not merely one of more war or more disorder, but of both unfolding together.
Dr Salman Rafi Sheikh is an Assistant Professor of Politics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) in Pakistan. He is a long-time contributor on diplomatic affairs to Asia Sentinel.