The visit to Washington of Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS, underscores not just how much economic and diplomatic clout the Saudis have in DC, but also how dependent US strategy in the Middle East is on the Saudis and their oil-rich, people-poor Gulf neighbors, the UAE, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrain.
There is a growing feeling that the region is at an inflection point, a shift in regional power dynamics. Israel has demonstrated its regional military dominance, Iran has been defanged, however temporarily,and Syria’s civil war has ended. MBS’s appearance in Washington is a signal that Riyadh is emerging as a more influential diplomatic and economic power, actively seeking solutions to complex issues.
The Arabian Peninsula thus looks to represent a combination of US military, financial, and diplomatic heft which is unparalleled in a fractured region and provides, via US commitments to Israel, cover for much of Israel’s regional dominance.
The warmth of the prince’s welcome despite his direct links to the assassination of Washington Post contributor and MBS critic Adnan Khashoggi reflects partly Trump’s deal-driven approach to international affairs but also a deeper US reliance on Saudi Arabia and its neighboring oil-rich petty states.
Between them, these states, not only by buying quantities of US arms, providing bases for the US and mostly reliable friends in America’s “forever” confrontation with Iran, also provide subsidies to poor neighbors such as Egypt and Jordan to keep them on America’s side as it underwrites Israel and its expansion in the West Bank and possibly Gaza.
New chapter begins
For the longer term, there are two fundamentals which raise the issue of whether the US is investing too much here at the expense of the rest of the eastern Arab world, and Turkey, and makes the ending of its blood feud with Iran all the more difficult. The history of US missteps in the Middle East, often bolstered by ignorance as well as outright lies, is entering another chapter through Trump’s warmth for MBS and efforts to impose a “peace” reflecting US interests and prejudices.
Taking the region as a whole, it is not surprising that the Arabian Peninsula (excluding Yemen) is seen as a place of stability in a region where borders formed by empires a century ago often lack a sense of permanence, let alone logic. Troublesome minorities are everywhere. Yet the foundations of that stability are a wasting asset. The most obvious issue is the future price of oil, with Saudi Arabia already facing budget deficits when the price is below about US$65 a barrel. Sure, there is scope for the Saudis to cut some extravagant projects and buy fewer jets and missiles from the US. But the further the oil price declines (at least in relative terms), the weaker the Saudis and the weaker their ability to buy American equipment. The same may apply in lesser degree to UAE and the other small states.
The oil conundrum
Predicting oil prices is hazardous but recoverable reserves are not yet falling while consumption is forecast to plateau by 2030. Of course, there are many variables in pricing, production, and consumption but the trend to reduced reliance on Arabian oil at prices below US$70 is strong. Other minerals – copper, bauxite, rare earths – may partially compensate, and solar power export may also help. But oil is a declining power.
Oil wealth has also disguised the bizarre demographics of the peninsula, hardly a recipe for longer-term stability. The most populous country is not Saudi Arabia but impoverished, war-torn Yemen at about 40 million. It may get little attention other than for Houthi periodic disruptions of shipping and missile gestures against Israel. But their potential as a threat to Saudis is there, and the past has shown that, despite their weaponry, the Saudis cannot suppress them. (MBS led a 2015 coalition including Egypt to oust the Houthis which failed despite massive air superiority and US intelligence help)
As for Saudi Arabia itself, 40 percent of its population of 37 million is foreign, a reliance on imported expertise which would be a liability should Saudi Arabia face domestic stresses due to economic pressures or perhaps a resurgence of Sunni-Shia tensions. Massive oil money has been a bond for a country created by the wars of Ibn Saud a century ago but MBS’s bold attempts at modernization carry internal risks even if the economy remains on even keel.
Role of demographics
As for the other peninsula states, only Oman has more nationals than foreigners – and also a history of its own external empire in Zanzibar. The riches of the UAE enable it to buy arms and even meddle in some African countries – its apparent support for the RSF (Rapid Support Forces) war against the government in Sudan. With 11 million people the UAE has muscle – except that only about 12 percent are nationals. Despite massive arms purchases and other US favors, and its money power, a foreign population is no basis on which to build a sustainable regional power.
The UAE may have a competent small military force and require military service but it is no Middle East version of Singapore.
Foreign populations of other Gulf states range from 55 percent to 80 percent, the level in super rich Qatar. The states of the peninsula once had fast-growing indigenous populations. But fertility rates have declined to an average of about 2.2, little more than replacement. The only exception is Yemen at 3+.
These tiny local populations, however rich, are scant basis for sustained power. The foreigners, divided among so many nationalities, are unlikely to try to seize control from the local ruling families. The demographics of the foreign communities are dominated by Indians, except in Saudi Arabia where they are marginally outnumbered by Bangladeshis, and Arabs from other countries. All, however, are potentially mobile and can quickly depart if the region becomes unstable. Aden was once the pre-eminent port of the peninsula.
But for the medium term, a much bigger issue could be any major change in Iran – either internally or by western abandonment of the hypocrisy which allows a nuclear Pakistan and Israel but denies it to the region’s oldest civilization. With or without the decline of oil, the business opportunities offered by a semi-industrialized Iran dwarf those of Saudi Arabia.
Iraq is different. While showing a measure of political stability (relative to the recent past), its economic progress remains largely dependent on oil revenues while population, now 45 million, is growing at over 2 percent a year and the fertility rate remains over 3. The Sunni-Shia balance is always uneasy and Kurdish expectations continue to be a source of trouble as they are for Turkey and to a lesser extent Iran. Yet having gone to war with Iraq twice, the US now shows scant interest in the quasi-democratic nation it left behind, mostly fretting at its good relations with its former enemy Iran.
As for Turkey, its central position, size, and economic and post-Ottoman ambitions in the region may need more cultivation by Washington than accorded to the Saudis, even if Erdogan is not the sort of leader to want or need a royal reception by Trump.
Regional priorities
Given America’s abysmal track record in the Middle East, it is perhaps understandable that it makes Saudi Arabia and its rich little neighbors second only to Israel in its regional priorities. They seem to offer stability as well as prosperity. Yet it remains difficult to see MBS buying into the Abraham Accords, at least while Israel continues to flout its side of the deal by seizure of West Bank territory and designs on a ruined Gaza.
Trump may have been smart inviting new Syrian leader Ahmed el-Sharaa to the White House. The enemy’s enemy is your friend, in this case a former al-Qaeda member who had been an American prisoner in Iraq. He now says most of the right things, but his radical Sunni background suggests a greater interest in the Palestinian cause than Assad, from the Alawite minority, ever had. With support from Erdogan and the Saudis, post-Assad Syria, no longer on the Russia-Iran axis, is itself now a small but important player in the region. But its relations with Lebanon are uneasy. As for Israel, the 43-year-old president is unlikely to forget that his grandfather was from Fiq in the now Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.
The demographics angle is what caught my atention. The idea that the UAE is only 12% nationals but trying to wield regional power is kind of absurd when you think about it. Your point about oil trending below $70 making the whole US strategy woblier is something I haven't seen covered much elsewhere. Is there any scenario where the US pivots more toward Turkey or Iran if the petrostates lose their leverage?