Trump Goes To China a Supplicant Amid a Distrustful Asia

For many, China is now a more reliable partner

It is more in sorrow than anger that much of East and Southeast Asia perceives the US under Donald Trump to be drifting all too rapidly away. By default, the primary beneficiary is China, though there are some signs that disappointment with the US is strengthening other ties which are not necessarily to China’s advantage.

Trump arrives in China against a backdrop of a war he started but cannot yet finish. Most obviously, he started it without the support of any of the US’s allies and in conjunction with a state, Israel, recently accused of genocide in Gaza and currently engaged in illegal Jewish land grabs in the occupied West Bank. A war waged not only in the face of European opposition but the advice of allies in the Gulf States who immediately became the obvious target for Iranian retaliation. All this, and recent actions in and around Venezuela, have confirmed on a larger scale the contempt for previously agreed rules, procedures, and laws relating to international trade which Trump had shown last year with an ever-changing array of tariffs, sanctions, and other punitive measures as often as not aimed more at supposed allies than rivals. Indeed, he presented the US as a victim of Asian friends’ trade success while quickly succumbing to the rare-minerals counterpunches of the US’s main rival, China.

Instead of looking for support to address China’s massive overcapacity-driven trade surpluses which are hurting much of Asia more than the US, he took aim at weaker supposed friends bullied into signing trade agreements – some such as that forced on Malaysia but now disowned – heavily weighted to US commercial and mineral resource interests.

Given the massive news coverage that the US, and Trump in particular, receives overseas, foreigners had no trouble identifying the trends in the US towards illiberal democracy and the weakening of the balance of power concept between executive, legislature, and judiciary which had long been held up as an example to the world. Add in Trump’s narcissism reminiscent of caricature dictators, and the US presented an image entirely at odds with deeply embedded perceptions of America.

Even in the realm of technology. China’s achievements have rivaled and in some areas exceeded those of the US. While US names such as Google and Meta dominate communication and social media throughout non-Chinese Asia, their dominance has created resentments which have been further fueled by the arrogance of some of their Trump-supporting multi-billionaires.

For many, China is now a more reliable partner. Certainly, only by a slim majority, according to opinion surveys in Southeast Asia. This is not particularly because it is liked but because it is more predictable. The South China Sea remains high up on the list of regional concerns about China, but even on that, the US has lost some of its appeal. Trump’s rejection of international norms makes the rejection of China’s sea claims by the Permanent Court of Arbitration seem less exceptional. And Trump’s unwillingness to give full support to Ukraine’s defence creates doubts about his willingness to face anyone other than relatively weak targets, Venezuela, and, initially, Iran. Doubts about its Taiwan commitment have risen, giving an opening to China to talk more sweetly and persuade the Kuomintang leader to visit the mainland.

Trump also now goes to Beijing knowing that Chinese help is now needed if he is to get out of the Iran mess he has created, without plunging deeper into an unpopular war against an enemy with a high pain threshold.

Aspects of American “soft’ power have also taken a hit. The wholesale attack on immigrants hurts Asian pride as well as opportunities for advancement. The Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) teams have caused more than 2 million people to leave the US, voluntarily or not. Although ICE activities have been mainly focused on Latinos, the arrest of many from Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Philippines has not gone unnoticed in those countries. Meanwhile, student and regular work visas have become harder to acquire. More generally, interest in the region by US academia appears to have withered, and suspicion of Muslims even from such secular countries as Indonesia and Bangladesh has risen, helped along by the self-proclaimed Christian zealots such as Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, sometimes in alliance with advocates of a “white” America. It might be called the Icing of the melting pot.

That said, the erosion of faith in the reliability of the US does not necessarily mean an easy ride for China. South Korea and Japan have clearly come closer together. Japan’s new willingness under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi to widen its defensive posture by taking part in exercises in the Philippines and an effort to sell defensive weapons to the region. China has responded with near hysterical commentaries about the “threat of revived Japanese militarism.” The energy crisis promoted by the Iran invasion has seen efforts by Korea, Australia, and Japan to cooperate in securing energy and rare mineral supplies, albeit from weak positions compared to China long committed to self-reliance. Generally, there has been a coming together of middle powers anxious to retain some freedom of political movement. Indonesia has even deviated a little from its historical non-alignment by enabling US overflights of its territory. Whatever they may say publicly, no ASEAN country is happy with the thought of China controlling Taiwan and its adjacent strait. While the US is politically and diplomatically obsessed with the Middle East, its military in the region remains focused on the seas and straits over which China seeks dominance.

Nor have America’s erstwhile friends and admirers given up on the hope that Trumpism is a passing phase, already meeting growing resistance by the courts and the voters. For sure, it will leave a permanent mark, but that could take the form of greater cohesion among the middle powers fearing Chinese domination. The Iran war will have exposed US weaknesses, but by the same token. As in Europe, raised regional consciousness of the need for cooperation to enhance self-reliance. Nor does a China ruled by an all-powerful leader backed by a Communist Party with tentacles everywhere and self-consciously mono-ethnic really have much appeal to countries, at least in Southeast Asia, with more plural histories and social arrangements.

For sure, Trump and his war of choice may be the mark of an America in decline. But equally, it may mark the peak of Chinese power as its many enemies search for common ground to blunt its trade power and expansionist goals.