Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra overreached himself in trying to use the ballot box and his rural vote to neutralize both King Bhumibol Adulyadej and the Bangkok elite. It may make the king feel good that he has again presided from a distance over an action which is being seen by many as a semi-divine intervention, again saving the nation from greedy and quarrelsome politicians. But it may well be the last time he has the opportunity to play this role.

Even in Thailand, with its ancient monarchy, there is no longer a divine right of kings. Bumibhol has earned his reputation, even if much gilt has been added to it for the benefit not just of the media but the very self-serving generals and politicians who are deemed to be the contrast to a dedicated and wise monarch.

The emphasis is on “earned” through time and practice. The king inherited only a small part of it. So what will the crown prince—assuming he does succeed —inherit? It is unlikely to be this king’s moral authority. Too much is already known about the crown prince’s past behavior and his current marital status to start with a clean sheet. Thais of course are forgiving of sins of the flesh, so past actions may be less of a problem than the simple fact that he is not his father. Any successor to a long-term, much-respected power holder, be he king, president or prime minister, faces such a challenge.

The problem with this coup is that it could well enhance divisions within Thai society that will come into the open when Bumibhol is no longer around to provide a blanket of patriotism, or the sack within which the ferrets can fight. The king may rule the palace but it is a palace riven by factions and where, like so much else, some individuals are as easily influenced by money or the prospect of prestige, as other sections of Thai society.

Thaksin was never able to co-opt enough of the royal entourage to offer a serious challenge to the courtiers. However, court loyalties other than to King Bumibhol are fragile. The crown prince’s own two families provide just the sort of basis for palace infighting that Thailand does not need. Thaksin got close enough to some, and knows where bodies are buried (figuratively speaking).

The alliance of King Bhumibol and the Bangkok bourgeoisie may be able to defeat Thaksin’s populism this week. But what of the future? Deep rifts between metropolitan and provincial interests remain. Will the name of Thaksin continue to haunt Thai politics long after Bumibhol has gone, just as the name Pridi Phanamyong, who plotted to overthrow the absolute monarchy in Siam 75 years ago, continued to cast a spell over Thai politics, a threat to monarchists and militarists alike, long after he had ceased to be a direct player.

If even the corrupt, lazy and incompetent ex-President Joseph Estrada of the Philippines can continue to be a focus of opposition to President Arroyo, it is hard to see Thaksin, a dynamic and astute populist, fading quietly from the scene. Of course, he can be kept out of the country and from competing in the next elections through threats of prosecution. His rural constituency can be shrunk with constitutional gerrymandering, his business and provincial allies bought off with contracts. But do not imagine that he will disappear. With a new monarch, the populist card will be more difficult to trump. And a new monarch may need the support of Thaksin, or an equivalent, to maintain a grip on a fractious palace.

Thais have always worried about what will happen when Bumibhol dies, whether there is anyone to take his place as a unifier as well as covert political player. Now they have more reason than ever to be concerned. The cheering from the Bangkok elite at Thaksin’s downfall, the excuses given for short-circuiting the constitution, are reminders of similar cheering in Manila when army, church, judiciary and big business combined to organize People Power II to subvert a president who, whatever his corruption, had been elected by the people and never impeached by the senate.

The military will install a competent civilian administration of respected top bureaucrats and other trusties. Policies will not change significantly, except perhaps towards the south. Calm will return to the streets and investors. But what seems good in the short term is bad for long term stability and institutional development. Worst of all, it may have set up future conflicts between the palace and large sections of the populace when a lesser person is on the throne. It will not serve Bumibhol’s legacy well, nor the longevity of the Chakri dynasty.