Growing Rivalry Between Indonesia's Police and Military

Complex ties between Prabowo and Jokowi play out in competing forces

For a decade under former President Joko Widodo, Indonesia’s police force enjoyed unprecedented privileges and power, with numerous high-ranking police officers appointed to key posts across ministries, state-owned enterprises, and regulatory bodies. The National Police's central role in law enforcement, domestic security, and even political affairs fostered the perception of a mutually beneficial relationship with the institution.

But with Jokowi stepping down and being succeeded by Prabowo Subianto, a retired general and longtime figure of Indonesia’s military elite, many observers believe the police are seeing their influence wane, overshadowed by a resurgent military establishment. Jokowi’s police-centered governance is thus giving way to Prabowo’s military-rooted leadership.

As both institutions grow stronger under their respective patrons, pro-democracy activists warn that the struggle for power between police and military elites carries ominous consequences for democracy and civil liberties. Recently, middle-ranking police students enrolled in the National Police Command and Staff School (Sespimmen) visited Jokowi at his private residence, stirring public speculation over an ongoing power struggle between Jokowi’s loyalists and Prabowo’s military allies although Sufmi Dasco Ahmad, a leader from Prabowo’s Gerindra Party, dismissed the speculation as divisive, saying, “The narrative of Jokowi being close to the police while Prabowo is close to the military is designed to split the nation.”

Nonetheless, competition between the two forces has persisted, sometimes erupting into violent confrontations. In March, for example, three police officers were shot dead by two soldiers during a raid on an illegal cockfighting ring allegedly owned by military personnel in Lampung on the southern tip of Sumatra. A month earlier, dozens of army troops stormed the Tarakan Police Headquarters in North Kalimantan after a nightclub brawl involving local police officers and soldiers from the 614/RJP Infantry Battalion escalated into a full-blown clash. According to the SETARA Institute, a Jakarta-based civil rights watchdog, at least 37 instances of military-police conflict occurred between 2014 and 2024. Beneath the surface, both institutions continue to jostle for influence over the nation’s defense and security architecture.

Khairul Fahmi, a military analyst at the Institute for Security and Strategic Studies (ISESS), attributed the recurring clashes between forces to institutional arrogance, a culture of superiority, sectoral egotism, and festering jealousies, dynamics that have grown unchecked. Much of the rivalry stems from competition for ‘fertile grounds’ of influence across civil society, bureaucracy, and even parliament, using their respective proxies. As a result, these battles for institutional supremacy have also extended into Indonesia’s political arena.

But so far, conflicts remain unresolved. According to Hendardi, a human rights activist and chairman of the SETARA National Council, state intervention in mediating the tensions between the military and police has been largely superficial and elitist, lacking genuine legal accountability. “At the leadership level, any semblance of harmony between the military and police has been artificially maintained through repeated rhetoric of ‘TNI-Polri synergy,’” he remarked.

“The friction between the military and police is no longer confined to low-level personnel conflicts but has escalated into institutional rivalry, where the president, as the central power broker, plays a decisive role,” said Hendardi. “During Jokowi’s presidency, it is hard to deny that the police’s institutional capacity and political reach expanded dramatically. With Prabowo now at the helm, the balance has shifted, and his administration’s power base is heavily rooted in the military rather than the police.”

This realignment, Hendardi noted, is evident in how the military’s role has expanded into previously civilian domains, from the carefully engineered appointment last October of Minister of Defense Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, a onetime member of the Kopassus unit Prabowo once headed, to the growing presence of active and retired military officers in civil posts. Even prosecutors’ offices are now guarded by military troops, authorized under a presidential decree — a move seen as part of Prabowo’s broader effort to consolidate power and dilute Jokowi’s lingering influence in law enforcement institutions.

Under Prabowo’s administration, military veterans dominate ministerial and high-ranking government posts far more than police alumni. Of the 17 ministers, deputy ministers, and agency heads with security backgrounds appointed by Prabowo, 12 hail from the military, while only five are former police officers. A new presidential regulation also subtly restructured the chain of command, removing the police from direct presidential oversight and placing them under the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, alongside the military and the Attorney General’s Office. Some analysts view this as an attempt to equalize the two institutions; others see it as a move to diminish the police’s independent stature.

Further signaling the military’s growing power, a recent revision to the Military Law was rushed through Parliament with minimal public scrutiny. The revised law grants President Prabowo sweeping authority to assign active-duty military officers — especially high-ranking generals — to civilian posts, echoing the controversial “dual function” (Dwifungsi) doctrine that defined Indonesia's military under Suharto’s authoritarian rule. While some analysts suggest the law could ease military-police rivalries, others fear it dangerously revives military political influence long thought dismantled after the fall of Suharto in 1998.

Amnesty International sharply criticized the new legislation, arguing that it not only bypassed public consultation but also entrenched military influence over civilian affairs. Today, military personnel are embedded across various sectors: they oversee food distribution under Prabowo’s flagship Free Nutritious Meal Program, secure infrastructure projects designated as national priorities, and administer self-sufficiency programs in agriculture. Most strikingly, the army recently announced plans to recruit 24,000 new enlisted personnel for the formation of “Territorial Development Battalions,” units tasked not with combat but with agriculture, plantations, livestock, and health services.

“The recruitment plan is completely beyond the military’s primary mission of national defense,” declared the Civil Society Coalition for Security Sector Reform in a public statement.

Army spokesperson Brig. Gen. Wahyu Yudhayana defended the expansion, citing the military’s territorial function, which includes supporting regional development initiatives. He insisted that although soldiers are increasingly involved in domestic programs, their commitment to national defense remains undiminished.

Yet many Indonesians recall with trepidation the nation’s painful history under military rule. For 32 years, Suharto – Prabowo’s former father-in-law – maintained an iron grip on power, propped up by the military’s political machinery. After Suharto's fall in 1998, sweeping reforms dismantled the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI), separating the police and military into distinct entities. Under this post-reform arrangement, the police were charged with maintaining internal security – combating terrorism, separatist movements, and communal conflicts – while the military returned to its barracks, focusing solely on external defense.

The Jokowi Era: Police Dominant

Much like the military’s ascendance under Prabowo, the police enjoyed unparalleled influence during Jokowi’s tenure. Lacking a political party of his own, he often leaned on the police to build his personal power base, entrusting them with sensitive assignments ranging from pandemic management to safeguarding national infrastructure projects and monitoring food distribution.

Under Jokowi’s leadership, the police budget soared from Rp44 trillion (US$2.69 billion) in 2014 to 126 trillion (US$7.72 billion) in 2024. This financial windfall funded not only operations and equipment procurement but also infrastructure development, recruitment drives, training programs, and cutting-edge technology. By contrast, the military’s budget grew from 83.3 trillion rupiah to 139.27 trillion rupiah over the same period, divided among the army, navy, air force, and central military command.

Jokowi’s favoritism toward police officials extended well beyond budget allocations. In 2021, he appointed his former adjutant, Gen. Listyo Sigit Prabowo, as national police chief, a role Listyo has continued to occupy even under Prabowo’s administration. As Jokowi’s presidency drew to a close, the National Police honored the departing leader with its prestigious Loka Praja Samrakshana medal — a gesture that many saw as an expression of gratitude for his decade-long support.

Constitutional law expert Feri Amsari warned that former President Jokowi should refrain from further meddling with the police for personal interests. At the same time, he said, Prabowo must exercise his authority proportionally and impartially. Neither the military nor the police should be reduced to instruments of political power. When they serve the interests of political elites, it is the public who ultimately suffer — through repression, silencing of dissent, and criminalization of opposition voices.