Trump Seeks to Repeat The US’s Afghan Missteps

'Bad things aren't going to happen'

By: Salman Rafi Sheikh

Abandoned US equipment at Bagram

Beneath Donald Trump’s bluster calling on the Taliban to hand over the Bagram airbase, formerly the largest US military base in Afghanistan, lies a troubling indication that Washington’s so-called “new” Afghanistan strategy may be little more than a rebranded version of its old, failed approach, which cost them 20 futile years of war.

By reverting to coercive rhetoric and aggressive posturing toward Afghanistan’s current rulers, who have built their legitimacy on resisting foreign intervention, US policymakers risk once again sleepwalking into disaster – if the Taliban were to hand it over, which they vow they won’t do.

Among US interests is the maintenance of forward capabilities to monitor a highly volatile and strategically vital part of the world: Iran to the west, Pakistan to the south, and China to the east. Afghanistan’s central location once made it a hub for regional intelligence and counterterrorism operations, especially during the two-decade US military presence that followed the 2001 invasion after the 9/11 attacks.

Bagram Airbase, in particular, served as the logistical and operational heart of that effort. Built initially by the Soviets in the 1950s and significantly expanded during their occupation in the 1980s, Bagram evolved into hosting thousands of troops, surveillance aircraft, and high-security detention facilities.

That base was abandoned in July 2021 as part of the US withdrawal, in accordance with conditions set under the February 2020 US-Taliban agreement signed in Doha during Trump’s first presidency. The Doha Agreement stipulated a phased withdrawal of US and NATO forces in exchange for commitments not to allow Afghan territory to be used by terrorist groups hostile to the US or its allies. Notably, the agreement didn’t include any provision for the US to retain or reclaim military installations such as Bagram.

Despite this, Trump recently made a provocative and highly public demand to repossess the base. During a visit to the United Kingdom, he declared: “We’re trying to get it back … It’s one of the biggest airbases in the world; we gave it to them for nothing. We’re trying to get it back,” adding, “One of the reasons we want the base, as you know, is it’s an hour away from where China makes its nuclear weapons.” His statements implied a renewed geostrategic interest in Afghanistan—not primarily for counterterrorism, but for great-power competition with China.

The logic behind this rhetoric appears to disregard several key realities. First, the base was not “given” to the Taliban in any negotiated handover. It was abandoned under the terms of a bilateral agreement his own administration had negotiated. Second, although the base is strategically located, it is not, as Trump’s language suggests, within immediate striking or surveillance distance of China’s nuclear facilities, which are located deep within secure zones of Xinjiang and elsewhere in the Chinese interior. The “one hour away” claim appears to conflate geographic proximity with actionable military advantage, which, in this case, is not supported by operational facts.

Perhaps more significantly, Trump’s comments ignore the symbolic and political meaning of Bagram for the Taliban. For the group, which waged a 20-year insurgency against the US-led NATO coalition, retaking Bagram was not simply a tactical gain. It was a historic marker of their reclamation of sovereignty. When the Taliban regained control of the base in August 2021, it was immediately turned into a potent symbol of their victory over foreign occupiers. In August 2024, the group even used Bagram to stage a military parade marking the third anniversary of that victory.

That demonstration was not performative, it was intended to solidify the regime’s image of legitimacy among its supporters, who view control of such strategic territory as validation of the jihadist resistance.

Consequently, when Trump made his demand for the base’s return, the Taliban rejected it outright, stating that the deal was “not possible.” From the Taliban’s perspective, conceding control of Bagram to a foreign power, especially the very one they fought for two decades, would be tantamount to surrendering sovereignty. Such a concession would not only contradict the ideological foundation of their regime but would likely spark internal dissent among factions within the Taliban leadership.

It could also provoke rival jihadist movements, most notably the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K), which has consistently accused the Taliban of compromising on their Islamist principles. A Taliban decision to return Bagram to US control could serve as a rallying cry for these groups to intensify their campaigns and delegitimize the Taliban as collaborators.

Another complication is the political fallout such a demand could generate within Afghanistan. The Taliban’s rule is already under strain due to economic hardship, international isolation and persistent security threats. Any perceived submission to US pressure would almost certainly be weaponized by opposition elements, and not just by jihadist factions. Nationalist voices, tribal elders, and even segments of the Taliban’s own rank-and-file could view such a move as betrayal.

In the broader Afghan political culture, sovereignty is not merely a legal status but a deeply emotive and existential concept. Giving up control of a base like Bagram is far more than a logistical matter; it is a symbolic defeat.

Equally significant is that Trump’s demand runs afoul of the Doha Agreement itself. Although the Taliban have not fulfilled several of their commitments under the deal – most notably the obligation to prevent international terror groups from operating on Afghan soil – the US has also made commitments, including a pledge not to interfere in Afghan internal affairs. Making public threats to retake a major military installation falls squarely within the definition of such interference.

In fact, in one of his Truth Social posts, Trump wrote: “If Afghanistan doesn’t give Bagram Airbase back to those that built it, the United States of America, BAD THINGS ARE GOING TO HAPPEN!!!” This language, threatening, maximalist, and absent any diplomatic subtlety, is unlikely to produce compliance of a sort that the US might need or could productively use. If anything, it will likely incentivize the Taliban to double down on resistance, not out of strength, but out of political necessity.

From a policy perspective, the US must consider a set of pragmatic alternatives to re-establishing a physical military footprint at Bagram, beginning with a strategic recalibration of its overall relationship with the Taliban-led government in Kabul. This requires abandoning the outdated framing of the Taliban as a purely insurgent or pariah entity and instead acknowledging their de facto status as the governing authority. While the Taliban regime remains internationally unrecognized by most Western powers, it has already secured varying degrees of normalization from key regional actors, most notably Russia, which recently moved toward official recognition, and China, which appointed a full ambassador to Kabul in 2023.

If Washington were to seek to re-enter Afghanistan’s strategic landscape, it must first establish a credible diplomatic channel with the Taliban, grounded in realism rather than conditionality that assumes immediate regime change or ideological transformation.

One potential starting point would be to revisit the status of Afghanistan’s sovereign assets, approximately US$7 billion of which remain frozen in US banks following the Taliban takeover. A phased, monitored release of these funds, tied to specific humanitarian or counterterrorism benchmarks, could serve as both a goodwill gesture and a tool of calibrated leverage.

This diplomatic opening could pave the way for limited, targeted forms of military and intelligence cooperation, particularly around the shared threat posed by the IS-K. Despite their deep-rooted ideological differences, the US and the Taliban cooperated during the final years of the US presence in Afghanistan against the IS-K operations. Reviving such cooperation in the form of intelligence-sharing—within a clearly defined and reciprocal framework—could lay the groundwork for more structured, security-focused dialogue.

Rather than seeking immediate basing rights or permanent installations, a policy of calibrated engagement anchored in discreet cooperation, regional alignment, and functional diplomacy offers a more sustainable and less destabilizing path toward advancing US strategic interests in Afghanistan and its surrounding region.

All that is too subtle and time-consuming for Donald Trump. His current approach, on the contrary, will drive Kabul more towards China and Russia – something that will only make US interests a lot more difficult to achieve.