Beijing Seeks to Reshape South Asian Security

China moves in anticipation of New Delhi’s moves to get closer to the US

By: Salman Rafi Sheikh

Among the many outcomes of the short but intense India-Pakistan war is China’s proactive efforts to use it to consolidate a regional bloc in South Asia involving Pakistan, Afghanistan, and China itself in anticipation of New Delhi’s moves to get closer to the US, deepen India’s defense ties with the West and intensify its indirect war in and on the region. For New Delhi, this is essential to counter what became, in the second week of May, a first glimpse of its ‘two-front war’ with Pakistan and China. China’s efforts have to be measured against the US’s own exertions, with President Donald Trump taking credit for mediating the May 19 ceasefire, for which Pakistan expressed gratitude even as India insisted the decision to halt fighting was made without any third-party intervention.

Although Beijing fired no direct shots, its involvement in beefing up Pakistan’s defense capability vis-à-vis India is conspicuous, exemplified by the fact that China-supplied fighter jets are believed to have shot down two Indian ones supplied by the French. Pakistan imports about 80 percent of its defense equipment from China.

For Beijing, it is not just India’s deeper defense ties with the US that matter. More importantly, China (as also Pakistan) anticipates an aggressive Indian proxy war against both states waged within the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Immediately after the India-Pakistan war, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar spoke with Afghanistan’s Amir Khan Muttaqi to ‘thank’ him for Kabul’s condemnation of the Pahalgam attack. The fact that this phone call came only after the war is quite meaningful insofar as it is New Delhi’s intention to capitalize on Pak-Afghanistan tensions to wean Kabul away from Islamabad as much as possible. For Islamabad, India’s indirect presence in Afghanistan is already a problem.

Pakistan has repeatedly claimed that the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) are Indian proxies in the region. In fact, BLA has openly claimed Indian support as well. Pakistan has also repeatedly claimed that these Indian proxies are based primarily in Afghanistan. Other anti-China groups based in Afghanistan include the IS-K and East Turkestan Independence Movement (ETIM). All of these can be exploited in an indirect, proxy war.

To that extent, Pakistan has also often blamed the Taliban regime in Kabul for allowing these outfits to operate unchecked from their territory. Although Beijing’s interests – projects and personnel – haven’t come under direct attacks within Afghanistan in recent months, they have on several occasions in Pakistan. Beijing, therefore, has every reason to take steps that might help minimize the regional space available for such groups to target its interests either in Pakistan or Afghanistan in the months and years ahead.

Preventing this space requires regional calibration. This was the explicit intention of a trilateral meeting held in China in late May involving top level officials from China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Several developments took place expressing a clear intention on Beijing’s part. Most important of these was China’s official invitation to Kabul to join the multibillion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This invitation is part of China’s mediation aimed at normalizing Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan. The first major glimpse of this normalization was China’s success in persuading both countries to agree to exchange ambassadors.

While neither China nor Pakistan have formally recognized the Taliban regime, China has already exchanged its ambassador with Afghanistan. The two countries’ willingness to do the same is a step in the right direction. China made sure to flag its successful mediation. “Afghanistan and Pakistan expressed clear willingness to elevate diplomatic relations and agreed in principle to exchange ambassadors as soon as possible,” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said in a statement released by China’s foreign ministry.

China also reasserted its commitment to collectively opposing all forms of terrorism, a message meant to reiterate to Kabul of the continuing security of Chinese interests in Afghanistan in the wake of the heightened possibility of Indian activity. That message also supported Pakistan’s concerns vis-à-vis Kabul’s alleged support for TTP and BLA.

Afghanistan is, as one could expect, quite willing to jump on any regional bandwagon coming its way. For Pakistan and China, however, a major question is whether Afghanistan has the ability, let alone willingness, to tackle groups like TTP and BLA?

For now, the Taliban is an internally fractured regime. The ongoing marginalization of the once powerful Haqqanis, the flight of Mullah Stanikzai to the UAE due to ‘health issues and internal disagreements on the interpretation and implementation on Shariah rules,’ e.g., those with reference to girls' education, all point out a precarious regime standing on one leg. This regime cannot be expected to take the risk of going against groups like TTP, BLA, ETIM, etc. Such a course of action could multiply Kabul’s challenges and unwittingly contribute to its fall.

Therefore, if Pakistan and China aim to use the Taliban regime to tackle proxy wars, they first need to make the regime strong enough. This, however, does not need (empty) promises of participation in CPEC, which is far from a major success in Pakistan itself.

More than that, Pakistan and China must work out a formula of cooperation in the security field. Pakistan’s war with India showed, without any ambiguity, that security ties with China might be far more important and consequential than economic ties have thus far been.

Security cooperation with the Taliban could take place across a range of domains, from helping the Taliban transform themselves from a loosely connected configuration of different commanders still adhering to tribal and regional loyalties –Kabul vs. Kandahar – into a standing military force as well as equipping the regime with modern weapon systems, which could transform Afghanistan’s regional and domestic standing. Pakistan and China should seriously consider developing an integrated intelligence sharing system, with their military advisors based inside Afghanistan to train Kabul’s military forces. The Taliban will be interested in such a system because they could also use it to track and control groups, such as the IS-K, challenging their authority.

Apart from the fact that the trilateral meeting didn’t directly address the issue of a joint security mechanism, it fell short of formally recognizing the regime as well. Regime recognition is directly connected with the overall security paradigm. An unrecognized regime is more vulnerable to domestic and transnational challenges insofar as its legitimacy remains contested. Such porous political environments allow regime challengers to proliferate and consolidate their influence within their zones of control.

Therefore, by recognizing the regime and, consequently, laying down a comprehensive framework of collective security, China (and Pakistan) can erect sustainable barriers against any possible Indian indirect war. If Kabul remains vulnerable, China and Pakistan cannot be safe either. Both transnational actors and their regional backers will continue to exploit opportunities offered by Kabul’s inherent instability.