China Plays a Canny Game Over Iran

There are times to hit the mute button

Xi in a waiting game

China’s muted response to the Israel/US war on Iran, which began on February 28, is both an illustration of Tehran’s lack of friends and of the sure-footed self-interest guiding Chinese diplomacy.

China has criticized the attacks and the targeted killing of its longtime leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. But these have been formalities compared with the invective that might be expected given the US’s imprecise objectives, clear breaches of international norms and its partnership with an Israel that continues to be a brutal and illegal colonizer of the West Bank, was perpetrator of the recent Gaza massacres and at home operates a system of apartheid, denying equal rights to its two million Palestinians.

Iran is also a member of the China-sponsored Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as is India, which was to endure its own US slap in the face with the sinking by a US submarine of the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena off the southern coast of Sri Lanka, killing dozens of sailors as it headed back to Iran from an official visit to India.

Unwelcome visitor

In one way, it is thus an embarrassment to Xi Jinping to be welcoming US President Donald Trump to Beijing at the end of March, if indeed that visit comes off. But that alone increases China’s bargaining power over both trade and Taiwan. The Iran invasion is so far unpopular at home and abroad, the US Supreme Court has trashed Trump’s tariff policy, and both sides need to shore up trade before war and tariffs create large economic problems for both.

Does Xi need this? © Yonhap / EPA

In its turn, China has little choice but to downplay its relationship with Iran. It has been successfully building relationships with the Saudis and Gulf States and mediating between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which cannot be seen approving Iranian rocket attacks on its neighbors nor abiding in the closing of the Strait of Hormuz, however much it realizes that such actions are its only viable strategic response to US and Israeli air and cyber power.

China needs oil, it needs trade routes and it needs to ensure that whatever happens in Iran, its relations with the Saudis are not too badly strained although the loss won’t affect China’s oil sector that much. Iran accounts for only 14 percent of China’s oil imports, and China has other oil import sources, notably Russia, Malaysia, and the GCC countries, according to Chi Lo, Asia Pacific senior market strategist at BNP Paribas Asset Management. Venezuela accounted for another 4 percent in 2025.

Still immense importance

Iran’s strategic importance vis-à-vis Central Asia and the Indian Ocean is immense although its status as a Shia, non-Arab polity has long limited its relations with its Sunni and Arab neighbors. Pakistan has been quick to remind Iran of its defense pact with Riyadh, and India’s usual anti-colonial rhetoric was forgotten as Prime Minister Modi visited Israel recently despite having long had friendly ties with Iran. Some interpreted Modi’s Israeli visit as in line with his hostility to Islam and to the Mughal Empire when Persian was the court language.

Tehran’s isolation and depth of internal divisions only make expanding that conflict to a wider region, if only with drone attacks, more necessary and more difficult to resolve. The Gulf countries, mainly inhabited by foreigners with limited commitment to the place, are bitter as their wealth is limited protection from regional disorder.

For China, it now makes sense to say the right things but keep a low profile. But what is not clear now is the extent to which Beijing is quietly giving assistance to an Islamic Republic facing internal upheaval as well as foreign aggression. Iran has, for some time, been helped by Chinese purchases of discounted Iranian oil transhipped in Southeast Asian waters. It has supplied Iran with most of its mobile phone system and much surveillance technology and some military hardware.

For a rising China, this was a golden opportunity to increase its influence, an opportunity enhanced by western boycotts of the country due to its nuclear program. As it is, as western nations have backed away, China has become Iran’s top trading partner, buying 80 percent of its crude, as well as acting as a diplomatic counterweight to US and Israeli pressure, often advocating for peaceful resolution through dialogue.

However ruthless and intransigent the Islamic Republic, however much the majority, or at least a large minority would like to see its demise, any successor regime which comes to power thanks to Israel and the US will have weak foundations. The West is generally ignorant about its past interventions in Iran and the resentments they have left.

Iranians haven’t forgotten the 1907 Anglo-Russian entente dividing Iran in zones of influence, the 1914 British government acquisition of the Anglo-Persian oil company, the 1941 British-Russia occupation of Tehran and exile of the modernizing nationalist Shah Pahlavi and replacement by his then 21-year-old son, and how in 1953 a western-sponsored coup overthrew the elected prime minister Mohammed Mosaddeq to prevent nationalization of the oil industry and restore power to the Shah, henceforth the pillar of US regional strategy until his 1979 populist overthrow from which emerged the dominance of ideological Islam.

Iranians of all stripes may wonder at US support for Iraqi Kurds stirring trouble in Iran, a move which cannot be helpful to the stability of Iraq or Turkey but does help sustain Israel’s position as the one over-riding power in the region.

The more Iranians killed by US/Israel in the name of liberation, the more difficult will be the task of any hopes of constructive change in the body politic of its 93 million people. For China, however, the more money, weapons and prestige the US expends on Middle East ventures, the better. Every morsel there means less for East Asia and for its allies there confronting China’s Taiwan and maritime goals.

China has no ideological commitment to the Islamic Republic, and any future pro-US government in Iran would find that trade and investments was more easily attracted from China than the US. Trump, meanwhile, will need to show he has patched up relations with Beijing despite his choice of war against Iran.