Book Review: Lee Kuan Yew's Taming of the Press
|Jan 3, 2013|
From the very first chapter of this book to the last, it is full of detailed and astonishing revelations about the mainstream media in Singapore. It is an incredible resource for those trying to understand the control of the media and Singapore's brand of self-censorship. Indirectly, Cheong Yip Seng's My Straits Times Story is invaluable in helping to explain the dominance of one political party through its "symbiotic" relationship to all the mainstream print media in our country.
The book begins with an account of how Cheong was appointed to his job as editor-in-chief of the Straits Times in 1986. This was not a private dinner with a publisher or a board meeting or even the result of a secret ballot at a conference of editors.
Instead, Cheong describes how he was summoned by Chandra Das, a prominent Singapore politician, on a plane to Burma with the words "The boss wants to see you". Cheong was given a seat in the first-class cabin next to the then-Deputy Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong. Goh wanted him to take over the editorial leadership of the Straits Times from the previous editor, Peter Lim, who had been found wanting.
Apparently Lim's "sin" was that he (and the ST) had during the regional uproar over the Israeli President Chaim Herzog's 1986 visit to Singapore "failed to recognize the educational role of the Straits Times" which infuriated then PM Lee Kuan Yew who believed that the ST coverage "did not help Singaporeans fully understand the facts of regional life and what it took to be an independent sovereign nation."
Apparently Lim had relied too much on the Malaysian English-language media in its coverage of the Malaysian outrage without adequately carrying some of the more rabid reactions from the vernacular media from across the causeway. This was the final straw which led to Lim's firing as the Istana had apparently "reached the point of no return with the Straits Times."
In the months before that, Cheong reveals, the government was planning on a "GTO (government team of officials) moving into Times House" similar to what was done with the bus company. The response by the ST leadership is instructive. Instead of protesting against this attempt at interference in professional journalism, apparently Peter Lim and CEO Nigel Holloway met the PM at the Istana repeatedly to negotiate against the presence of government officials in the newsroom. The solution they negotiated was instead a "monitor at Times House, someone who could watch to see if indeed the newsroom was beyond control". This person was identified by Cheong as (former Singapore president) S R Nathan.
The threat of a GTO together with the presence of a "monitor" made sure that the SPH newspapers toed the party line. This is something that many in civil society in Singapore have suspected for a long time but it is nice to see it confirmed here from the best source possible.
There is more evidence of intimidation documented in this book, mainly from Lee Kuan Yew, who actually endorsed the book prominently. For example, after an early event at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Cheong was threatened by Lee with the words, "If you print this, I will break your neck". Cheong's response to what appears on the surface to be a brutal threat is interesting was: "I was taken aback by his thunderbolt...It was my first taste of Lee Kuan Yew's ways with the media...Thankfully not every encounter would be as bruising as (that)...but there were many occasions when the knuckleduster approach was unmistakable."
Such blatant intimidation is presumably rare in Singapore. The title of the book, however, describes the life of a Singaporean journalist constantly trying to negotiate the "OB" or "Out of Bounds" markers. Cheong explains the origin of the term "OB markers", ascribing it to former minister George Yeo, who described them as "areas of public life that should remain out of bounds to social activism and the media. Otherwise, society paid an unacceptably high price."
Outside of race and religion, the most important OB marker was then PM Lee Kuan Yew's argument that the press could not be a "fourth estate" or center of power because it was not elected.
This is not a valid argument to me as it could be argued that the press are far more accountable than politicians as they have to seek the approval of the newspaper purchasing public every day rather than every four to five years in elections.
Instead, Lee's view of the press was that it was a tool for dissemination and promotion of government policies. One illuminating illustration was a "furious" call from Lee's office that was received by the (now defunct) New Nation Editor David Kraal. The editors were "flummoxed" to discover that the then PM was provoked by a photograph of a large family to illustrate a story of a happy Singapore family. Apparently, this was perceived by the PM as "subtle but effective criticism" of the "Stop at Two campaign" in which Lee sought to limit families to two children.
There are other OB markers which Cheong found "bewildering". These included stories on Stanley Gibbons, a stamp dealer; carpet auctions; monosodium glutamate or MSG; feng shui; unflattering pictures of politicians, and scoops.
I think many Singaporeans too would find it difficult to understand why these "should remain out of bounds to social activism and the media. Otherwise, society paid an unacceptably high price." These are, however, hallmarks of an authoritarian regime which can install boundaries at whim without having them questioned.
Another OB marker was appearing overly critical of local TV programs. George Yeo apparently pointed out that "If the Straits Times created the impression that our TV programs were not worth watching, Singapore would lose an important channel of communications." As a result, even the TV critics were reined in.
The issue of scoops is a recurrent theme. Cheong reports that "Lee Kuan Yew was determined to purge the newsroom of the culture of scoops". He did not want a situation like the Watergate affair in which a dishonest president was exposed by investigative journalists who became cult heroes. Cheong writes that "The PM took the position that Singapore was not America: he had no skeletons in the closet and challenged the press to find one because he wanted to be the first to know..."
But of course, the press could not use investigative journalism to find out - they had to depend on the official version of events. This kind of Alice in Wonderland argument doesn't seem to trouble Cheong or perhaps by re-stating the argument in this context, he is exposing its hollowness.
Cheong actually admits how much of a struggle this was for him as a journalist. He quotes Number 5 Chinese Leader Li Changchun as urging mainland Chinese journalists to go for scoops and explains his predecessor Peter Lim's Faustian bargain for Singapore journalists thus: "it was better to produce the best story than the first story...Finding scoops in Singapore with many OB markers carried a real risk".
Indeed, one gets a sense of how difficult life is for journalists who might inadvertently break a story that covered the sensitive subject of MSG or bad local TV programs or some other OB marker and end up being hauled up by the government.
Cheong makes it clear that while he had hoped that the "knuckleduster era" belonged to the 1970s, it could reappear any time. For example, he describes how while "recovering" from the 2006 general election, he received a phone call in a hotel in Phuket, from Lee Kuan Yew who was "livid" about a "powerfully argued column by Chua Mui Hoong" in which the deputy political editor had questioned the policy of placing opposition wards at the back of the queue for upgrading works. According to Cheong, Lee was "his old 1970s self. If the Straits Times wanted a fight, he was prepared to do it the old way, with knuckledusters on". This is depressing but not surprising to any reader of the ST today.
The extent of micro-management of the local press Cheong reports is amazing. Apparently, Goh Chok Tong had made a suggestion during the launch of The New Paper: "Why not consider a Page 3 girl". Cheong quickly clarifies that Goh was not suggesting topless women that had been made famous by Rupert Murdoch's tabloid The Sun but rather girls that (as Cheong quotes Goh) "can be scantily dressed". The character and direction - and not just the OB markers - of the local press are thus apparently suggested by Singapore's political leadership.
Cheong also provides details about the ST personnel's relationship with the ruling People's Action Party, the PAP. He writes that "senior PAP leaders had been impressed with (columnist Warren Fernandez's) work for us. His columns in particular have been generally supportive of PAP policies." He was about to be selected as a PAP candidate for the 2006 elections.
Cheong then emailed the Prime Minister asking to keep Warren at the ST "unless he was earmarked for higher office. But the PM's response was that he needed Eurasian representation in parliament". Apparently Cheong's email had been circulated to the PAP selection panel before the final interview and Kuan Yew agreed to keep Fernandez out of the PAP slate. Of course, now Fernandez is the Editor of the ST.
Reporting on the "opposition" politicians was even more of a "minefield". Cheong recalls the 1984 elections when "Peter Lim, then editor in chief, was under pressure from James Fu, the PM's press secretary, conveying the PM's request to publish Chiam (See Tong)'s O-Level results....Peter Lim refused: he was convinced it would backfire against the PAP...The result proved him right".
What intrigues me about the incident was not just that the Prime Minister would intervene to try to persuade the national newspaper to publish such data, but rather that the editor-in-chief refused not because of journalistic integrity but rather because he thought it would "backfire against the PAP".
This is typical of what Cheong describes as the "symbiotic relationship" between the ST and the PAP which is in fact enshrined in the editorial policy that Cheong crafted in response to then PM Goh's unhappiness with the local mainstream media. The three pillars of that policy are (1) "Accuracy and objectivity" of coverage (2) The nation-building task of advancing and informing the public as Singapore develops and (3) The symbiotic relationship with the government. Some journalists were unhappy about this relationship but it stayed in the ST editorial policy at Cheong's insistence. This documentation again, is what makes this book valuable to all who read the local press.
There are many revelations in Cheong's book. We learn that the Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts kept a dossier on local press articles which they found offensive. These include not giving enough prominence to ministers' speeches. We also learn that when editors were "called up for meetings" with then PM Lee, they had to send detailed CVs including their O-Level results and their wives' educational qualifications.
Other specific examples of censorship included restrictions on reporting conditions in national service camps in the early days and telling stories of the people who actually lost out through the Housing and Development Board (HDB) construction and resettlement process. The latter is poignant as Cheong describes the contrast between the 30,000 square feet (including a pond and a farm) that a friend living in Kampong Henderson had to give up in exchange for less than $3,000 compensation and a much smaller HDB flat. The ST was not allowed to report on such negative aspects of our "urban renewal" process or the HDB "success story". The threat of the disapproval of the Times House "monitor" which could cost them their jobs through a GTO ensured compliance.
Interestingly, the "foreign investors" whom we religiously try to attract to Singapore are not as keen on press controls as we have been given to believe. According to Cheong, the American Business Council, supported by the US State Department, argued that investors would be deterred without the free flow of information. Cheong reports how the Singapore government stood their ground but paid the price, in his words: "liberal democracies and some members of the Singapore intelligensia saw it as too intolerant for its own good."
Cheong is dismissive of the online alternative media but he devotes a paragraph to responding to Seelan Palay's film "One Nation Under Lee" specifically by explaining that the ISD agents hired by the ST were not sent by the government, they were in fact, according to Cheong, willingly brought in by himself.
Later on, Cheong describes Lee Kuan Yew's response to the online question "Who paid for the flying hospital for his wife" as marking the legitimization of online media. Cheong acknowledges that the days of traditional media are numbered worldwide, even in Singapore. He quotes the current PM Lee Hsien Loong as admitting that he cannot persuade his own daughter to read the news pages of the ST.
The book is not all about the travails of a court announcer trying to keep the king happy. For me, the most promising section was the one describing the ST's finest hour - exposing a scandal involving the National Kidney Foundation. Here is where you get a sense of what might have been should the ST have decided to serve the people of Singapore by performing the task of investigative journalists rather than as disseminators of official information.
Cheong was aware of "strong pro-NKF sentiments in powerful quarters" including two ministers (Lim Hng Kiang and Khaw Boon Wan) as the NKF had taken a tremendous load off the public healthcare sector by keeping alive and healthy 1,800 Singaporeans through its excellent dialysis centers.
He was initially prepared to pay S$20,000 as compensation, publish a statement of clarification about the article by Susan Long, which had the infamous gold taps as part of a "generally laudatory article" and settle the matter out of court. Cheong does not reveal who or what made him change his mind and go against Mrs Goh Chok Tong's efforts to mediate.
T T Durai, then NKF CEO, who was at the center of the controversy, was incensed and accused the media of trying to be the fourth estate, which Cheong had already established was a role that the Singapore mainstream media had given up - except in this case!
Here the ST team excelled themselves - they tracked down the contractor who prepared the gold taps and other witnesses who were prepared to sign affidavits. In other words, good old-fashioned investigative journalism. Like the good journalists that many in the ST are (before they censor themselves), they want their readers to have all the facts, including those below the surface so the readers could make intelligent decisions for themselves.
While the stories in the book are exciting to any media watcher (and there are many more), there are many errors such as the misspelling of my uncle David Tambyah's name and SARS was described incorrectly as occurring in 2002 in one instance (although the proof readers picked out the correct dates for the three subsequent mentions of the outbreak).
Cheong himself acknowledges the problem with the quality of English in the newspaper and says that the ST paid the price for the "neglect" of the teaching of grammar in schools. It got so bad that he had to "scour" the world for good copy editors whom he eventually found in Britain, Australia, New Zealand and India.
For those of us who lament that our education system seems to have switched from teaching life and career skills to teaching what is required to top international standardized tests, that is a statement worth paying attention to.
The question on many Singaporean's minds is: Why did he write this book? Cheong does explicitly reveal this. Near the end, however, he gives a telling account of how journalists found official spokespersons unhelpful as their priority was "reflecting better on the ministers" rather than allowing journalists to do investigative or background work. He describes frustrated journalists recounting their bad experiences in explicit detail - perhaps that is what he is trying to do himself as some kind of catharsis.
Perhaps wistfully, he talks about a time when the ST was indeed the "fourth estate" when it did occasionally demonstrate its independence - although he has to reach as far back as 1956 when the ST condemned the takeover of the Suez Canal by British, French and Israelis. British expats in Singapore were incensed and the managing director of the ST, a member of the British establishment was "spat on in the (then British only) Tanglin Club."
When I asked a prominent civil society figure about the reasons for this book, he pointed out that when authoritarian regimes in Latin America or Eastern Europe were crumbling, "everyone claimed to be a reformer."
I am an optimist. I think that Cheong has seen the signs from the recent general, presidential and by-elections and he knows that the people of Singapore are waking up. Establishment voices are raising questions about some fundamental assumptions.
The first step, as anyone with a serious problem knows, is acknowledging that you have a serious problem. Perhaps this is Cheong's first step. Hopefully for the mainstream media, acknowledging the problem of control and domination will be the first step to the recovery of an independent media which can evolve into a free press, a necessity for democracy for the people of Singapore. The book is a worthy read.
(Another version of this review first appeared on yoursdp.org. Assoc Prof Paul Tambyah is a member of the Singapore Democratic Party's Healthcare Policy Panel. He contributed this in his personal capacity.)