Beyond Optics: US Sends a Message in the South China Sea
Scarborough Shoal’s as good a place as any to reaffirm policy
By: Salman Rafi Sheikh
The apparent US commitment to the Philippines in the South China Sea is probably one key legacy of the Biden administration that the Trump administration has not changed. What’s more, the collision last week between Chinese vessels chasing a Philippine resupply craft near the contested Scarborough Shoal has handed the United States a perfect accident to reassert its military presence.
Framing this as unmistakable evidence of Chinese aggression in the region, the US Navy quickly dispatched two warships, sending a powerful and unambiguous signal not just to Beijing, but to allies wondering whether Washington still has their backs. It was also a rare, visible invocation of the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, which obligates American support in the face of external aggression. The message was clear: the South China Sea may be crowded, but the US isn’t stepping aside.
The legacy was set in the Indo-Pacific Strategy released by the Biden administration in 2022, describing China’s policy as “harmful behavior” that undermines “human rights and international law, including freedom of navigation, as well as other principles that have brought stability and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific.”
Importantly, the document makes explicit the key goals of the strategy: it does not seek to “change” China, rather it seeks to “shape the strategic environment in which it operates, building a balance of influence in the world that is maximally favorable to the United States, our allies and partners, and the interests and values we share.”
In this context, the US decision to send two warships in response to a mere accident that didn’t involve any US ally directly is meant to shape an environment in which China cannot operate on its own terms to capture maximum oceanic space. On the other hand, if the collision had been between a Chinese and a Philippine ship, it would have been a near-perfect scenario for the US to massively up the ante.
Still, the decision to respond swiftly to the accident is deeply significant. Where the Trump administration might differ from the Biden administration vis-à-vis the South China Sea is in its unique ways of using this disputed region as a bargaining chip to sort out other issues, such as trade talks, that continue to prove a hard nut to crack.
How might this happen? Given the Trump administration’s posturing in other conflict zones, i.e., Ukraine/Russia, it is not likely to give up freedom of navigation in the South China Sea for a better trade deal with Beijing. Rather, it is likely to increase American military/naval presence in the region to put more pressure on Beijing for a better trade deal. It is for this reason that the accident was perfectly used to send an appropriate message to Beijing, i.e., China’s actions could draw more deployment from the US. In any subsequent negotiations, the US could use this deployment to offer China a little bit more freedom of navigation in exchange for a suitable trade deal.
Will this strategy work or not is a moot question, however, in the sense that several other factors can combine to mitigate its impact as far as the US position in the region is concerned. For instance, this position might be significantly weakened by the growing distance between the US and its other allies, including Australia. With Canberra’s deal to purchase nuclear submarines from the US under the framework of AUKUS under review, it has recently begun to change its tone towards China.
When China recently hosted Australia’s leader Anthony Albanese, Xi Jinping was reported to have said that China-Australia ties were “turning around” and rising “from setbacks.” “Australia values our relationship with China and will continue to approach it in a calm and consistent manner, guided by our national interest”, Albanese said.
His statements came in the aftermath of the Pentagon’s review of AUKUS, being led by Trump appointee Elbridge Colby, who has previously been critical of AUKUS. In a speech last year, he publicly questioned why the US would give away “this crown jewel asset when we most need it.” Combined with India, Australia is now the second QUAD member getting rattled by Washington in recent months.
Accordingly, in Albanese’s recent meeting with his counterpart from New Zealand, he and Prime Minister Christopher Luxon merely reinforced the need to use “dialogue” with China as their preferred strategy. In fact, Luxon’s statement, as reported in Australian media, made sure to highlight the unique characteristics of their engagement with China.
China, Luxon said, is a significant player in the world and a permanent feature of global affairs. "We have an approach which is about co-operating where we can ... We disagree where we must. We have different systems, different values”. His Australian counterpart echoed this sentiment, showing how fast regional countries might be moving away from a US-dominated approach to dealing with China.
While the Philippines, Japan, and Taiwan are still among some countries with strong military ties with Washington, the extent to which Washington can maneuver in the region and the extent to which regional states – and how many – would extend their support is getting uncertain. Even when it comes to US allies like Japan, etc., their bilateral ties have suffered – and are yet to recover—from tense trade negotiations.
Trump’s trade war, in other words, only showed these countries how vulnerable bilateral ties are and that anyone in power in Washington can upend them without prior notice. Such fears will only make China seem less of a threat and more of a nuisance that can be managed without necessarily requiring US military power.
Dr. Salman Rafi Sheikh is an Assistant Professor of Politics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS). He holds a Ph.D. in Politics and International Studies from SOAS, University of London. He is a longtime regular contributor to Asia Sentinel.