According to US President Donald Trump on Oct. 14, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs has agreed that the state-run CPC Corporation will invest up to $4.4 billion in the long-stalled Alaska liquefied natural gas (LNG) project and purchase 6 million metric tons of LNG per year for 20 years, possibly starting in 2032.

The news comes agai…

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Indonesia’s stock market suffered a dramatic sell-off on Friday after global index provider Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) proposed removing the country from the global indexes tracked by investors, essentially sending it into the isolated backwater status of a standalone market.

The move would strip the country of its emerg…

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The Philippine government’s latest attempt to accelerate electric vehicle (EV) adoption in Metro Manila is already facing headwinds, prompting regulators to relax restrictions on which vehicles qualify for newly authorized ride-hailing franchises.

The reversal raises a larger question: Is the country’s…

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For decades, the idea of an overland connection between China and Iran existed more on paper than in practice. Freight trains did occasionally make the journey across Central Asia, largely using infrastructure inherited from the Soviet peri…

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Singaporean courts have become a battlefield where commodities trading companies are suing each other for billions of dollars. Multiple creditors have sued Radiant World Corporation, a Singaporean metal and mineral trader, with a US fund accusing Radiant of possibly committing the biggest commodities fraud since the Enron scandal in 2001, when US energy firm Enron suffered one of the biggest US bankruptcies with US$63.4 billion in assets. In turn, Radiant and its associate companies have sued Glencore, an Anglo-Swiss commodities trading and mining company.

Radiant’s website states, “Radiant World and ten other companies have commenced proceedings in the Singapore courts against Glencore International AG and associated companies, arising out of a commercial relationship spanning more than a decade. The claims, which include claims for damages exceeding US$2 billion.”

“Radiant World rejects, in the clearest terms, the allegations of wrongdoing that have been made against it and the companies associated with it,” its website added.

Glencore retorted in a statement on September 15, “Radiant World and Sapphire Minmetals have alleged that they have claims against Glencore for substantial amounts. These claims are meritless and we will contest them vigorously. We have incurred losses and been exposed to risks by Radiant World companies and will take appropriate action.”

“Glencore has confirmed evidence that these companies sent falsified invoices and contracts as well as fabricated emails, which they fraudulently claimed to have received from Glencore personnel, to a number of financial institutions,” the London-listed firm alleged.

“We take these issues seriously and are conducting a review of our historic business activities with Radiant World, Sapphire Minmetals and associated companies. We have stopped doing business with these companies and have exited all obligations,” Glencore added.

In a judgment of the Singapore High Court on September 25, Judge Kristy Tan said, “I do not accept (Radiant World’s) argument that its claim against Glencore for approximately US$2 billion…. should be regarded as a realisable asset. It is pure speculation as to how the claim will fare and that it will be “resolved within 12 months”.”

Tan placed Radiant under the judicial management of several executives of KPMG, a Big Four accounting firm.

“There is an urgent need for interim judicial managers to investigate the Company’s affairs in the light of the prima facie pattern of fraudulent conduct on the part of the Company’s management that has been seen,” Tan explained.

The Singapore High Court judgment concerned a lawsuit by Mizuho Bank against Radiant.

Three statutory demands have been made against Radiant, which it has not satisfied within three weeks thereafter, Tan noted.

On August 17, Mizuho, a Japanese bank, served a statutory demand for US$97.3 million on the company.

On August 21, Deutsche Bank, Singapore Branch (“DBSG”) served a statutory demand for US$102.6 million on the company.

On August 14, Intesa Sanpaolo (“ISP”, an Italian bank) served a statutory demand for US$126.15 million plus interest on the company.

“ISP’s experience prima facie comports with and contributes to the prima facie pattern of fraud seen in Mizuho and DBSG’s experiences with the Company,” Tan said.

On July 30, two of the world’s largest commodities trading companies, Vitol and Cargill, announced they had halted all business with Radiant, said a report by Control Risks, a UK risk consultancy, on September 28. “This was based on concerns that the Singapore-based trading house had provided allegedly falsified trade documents and invoices to its creditor banks.”

In the judgement, Tan noted, “It is again telling that the Company has avoided addressing the specific details of fraud provided by DBSG in respect of the Vitol Transactions and Glencore Transaction.”

Singapore Police, the US Justice Department and the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission announced they were probing transactions related to Radiant, according to Control Risks’ report. Multiple banks froze accounts held by Radiant, while trading houses halted their transactions with the firm and civil lawsuits were filed against Radiant in Singapore by Mizuho and a Singapore trade finance platform, Incomlend, the report added.

In late September, court filings revealed six creditors held a combined US$870 million exposure to Radiant, said Control Risks’ report.

One of the largest frauds in commodities trading since Enron?

On September 14, Mariner Atlantic Multi-Strategy, a New York fund, filed a criminal complaint with the Geneva Public Prosecutor’s Office in Switzerland for fraud and money laundering against Radiant World Corporation SA (Radiant’s Geneva-based subsidiary), Radiant’s founder Pinkesh Nahar and other parties.

Mariner has requested a criminal investigation, searches of premises in Geneva, and the seizure of bank accounts and assets in Switzerland, said a US court document filed in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York on September 29.

According to the US court document, Mariner has requested the New York court to permit Mariner to obtain documentary discovery from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Clearing House Interbank Payments System for use in the legal proceedings in Switzerland.

On June 26, Mariner entered into an agreement with Radiant World Corporation, the Singaporean company, and Radiant World Holding Limited, a related Hong Kong company, under which Mariner made available to these two firms two revolving credit facilities totaling US$50 million. On June 30, Radiant made four drawdown requests totaling US$48.6 million.

“However, after the funds were released, Mariner learned that Radiant systematically had falsified commercial documents in order to simulate transactions and thereby obtain financing from international lenders, including Mariner, through fictitious trades,” Mariner alleged in the US court document.

Several of Radiant’s purported counterparties were entities controlled by Nahar, Mariner alleged. “The scale of this blatant fraud is considerable: the value of the fraudulent invoices issued as collateral could reach US$1 billion, which would make it one of the largest frauds in the commodities trading sector since the Enron scandal.”

“This is just the latest in a series of scandals centred around document fraud involving commodities traders in Singapore,” said Control Risks’ report.

In 2020, a crash in global oil prices exposed two significant trade finance frauds, leading to the spectacular collapse of oil trading companies Hin Leong Trading and ZenRock Commodities, Control Risks’ report cited. Hin Leong’s founder, O.K. Lim, confessed to having concealed over US$800 million in futures losses and directing the forgery of trade documents to secure US$3.85 billion in credit from over 20 banks, while secretly selling off the oil pledged as collateral. Around the same time, ZenRock collapsed under more than US$600 million in debt, after lenders discovered the firm had used fabricated documents and round-tripping transactions to repeatedly pledge the same cargo to different banks.

In 2023, Singapore-headquartered Trafigura uncovered a US$577 million deception, Control Risks’ report cited. The commodities giant discovered that thousands of shipping containers, which had been documented as holding high-grade nickel, were filled with low-value carbon steel, scrap metal and rubble.

“These incidents showed that even the world’s most sophisticated trading desks remain vulnerable to physical substitution fraud when they rely on paper documentation for cargo that is non-existent, substituted or double-pledged,” Control Risks’ report said.

Toh Han Shih is a Singaporean writer in Hong Kong and a regular contributor to Asia Sentinel.

Southeast Asia could face a double energy shock over the coming months as a strengthening El Niño threatens hydropower generation just as the region struggles with elevated and volatile imported energy costs due to energy supply disruptions from the on-again and off-again closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

The …

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Southeast Asia has become one of the most consequential arenas to witness the shifting balance between Chinese and American influence play out. Home to approximately 700 million people an…

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Beijing announced its proposed Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law (ACBCL) in August following a blistering exposé by a US journalism consortium on the overseas lending practices of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the largest Chinese state-owned bank. Given the competition between the US and C…

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In Indonesia under President Prabowo Subianto, political power and private wealth are finding a new point of convergence. Few businessmen illustrate that shift more clearly than Andi Syamsuddin Arsyad, known as Haji Isam, a former truck driver who built a multibillion-dollar business empire and is now at the ce…

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The Philippines has spent years trying to move away from coal for its power sector, but worsening power reliability is forcing Manila to reconsider just how quickly it can afford to do so. The Visayas electrical grid has been repeatedly placed under red and yellow alerts in recent weeks as aging and unavailable generating units leave power …

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Foreign investment from countries including China is driving the rapid growth of Uzbekistan’s economy, but the Central Asian country does not intend to be a doormat for the US and China to fight over its abundant supply of critical minerals.

As the world has come to know, critical minerals are used in a range of products inseparable from the modern age. Central Asia holds huge deposits of critical minerals and rare earths such as manganese (38 percent of global reserves) and chrome (30.7 percent), with the largest reserves in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

US President Donald Trump’s administration wants access to Uzbekistan’s bountiful critical mineral resources. In Washington, a delegation from Tashkent, led by Uzbek Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov, signed a memorandum of understanding with the US on critical minerals and rare earths in February 2026. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio plans to visit Central Asia later this year. In August, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev gifted Trump with a pair of traditional Uzbek ayvans (hand-carved gazebos) that will be installed in West Potomac Park in Washington, the New York Times reported.

“Uzbekistan’s government welcomes foreign direct investment but wants to make sure other countries don’t dictate rules,” Odil Gafarov, deputy director of the Institute of Advanced International Studies in Tashkent, told Asia Sentinel.

“If we depend too much on one power, that superpower might be tempted to think they can do what they want to us,” Gafarov added. “We have to make other countries think twice about doing what they want, whether Russia, US, China or European countries.”

“We are increasing the military capability of our country. It’s not that we want to invade Kazakhstan. The reason is to make sure other countries don’t think of attacking us,” Gafarov stressed. “If we let other countries muscle in on us, then they will muscle in on us. That’s realpolitik.”

Since its independence from the former Soviet Union in 1991, Uzbekistan has deployed a multi-vector foreign policy. “We have strengthened relations with the US. It does not mean we will join with the US against China. It does not mean if we partner with China, it is directed against the US,” former Uzbek Foreign Minister Vladimir Norov told Asia Sentinel.

More investment

“The Trump government says they want to invest in rare earths, but we tell them the US must invest in other sectors as well. We demand joint ventures with US companies,” Gafarov said.

For example, the Uzbek government requires TMK, a 50-50 US-Uzbek joint venture in rare earth mining, to provide training for locals, Gafarov said. “The same goes for China. We buy police equipment from China, but we want China to provide police training.”

“We want Chinese and US companies to not only mine but produce products,” Norov said.

The Uzbek government seeks manufacturing jobs to support the country’s rapidly growing population, said Norov, the founding chief executive officer of Silk Road Advisory, a consultancy that helps Uzbek firms partner with foreign companies.

In 1991, at independence, the Uzbek population was 20 million; that has since doubled to 39.5 million, Norov pointed out. The population of Uzbekistan, the most populous Central Asian country, is expected to hit 60 million in 2060, Norov said.

Chinese companies are leaders in processing rare earths and can use artificial intelligence to mine rare earths, said Norov. It is important for Chinese companies to invest in rare earths in Uzbekistan, added Norov, who was secretary general of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) from January 2019 to December 2021.

The SCO is a Eurasian political, economic and security organization founded in Shanghai in June 2001. It has 10 member countries including China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Iran and India.

Norov also welcomed recent overtures by the US.

In his LinkedIn account, Norov wrote in June 2026, “Marco Rubio’s planned visit to Central Asia in 2026 may become one of the most consequential US diplomatic engagements with the region in recent years.”

Norov waxed enthusiastically about the benefits of Rubio’s visit for Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states. “Washington is elevating Central Asia as a strategic economic and geopolitical partner,” Norov wrote.

“If we develop relations [with the US] it does not mean China will have less opportunity,” Norov told Asia Sentinel. “We seek mutually beneficial cooperations with all countries, including Japan, South Korea and Turkey. Our cooperation with these countries is growing rapidly.”

Access to the sea

As a landlocked nation, it is important for Uzbekistan to have access to seaports, said Norov. “So we want to have relations with Iran and China. The Iran war has a negative impact, but we are interested in developing relations with Iran because we are a landlocked country.”

“We developed pragmatic relations with Afghanistan despite Western sanctions [against Afghanistan],” he added.

This year, trade between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan will rise by $1 billion, while there are over 400 Afghan companies in a free trade zone in Uzbekistan, Norov said.

The Uzbek government wants to build a railway from Uzbekistan through Afghanistan to Peshawar in Pakistan, Norov said. Peshawar already has rail links with the Pakistani port cities of Gwadar and Karachi, so once a Uzbekistan-Peshawar railway is completed, Uzbekistan will have connections to ports in Pakistan, Norov explained, and China is interested in the rail project.

The first Uzbek president, Islam Karimov, was a close ally of the US for several years but that did not benefit the Uzbek economy, because Karimov ran a closed economy, Gafarov said.

When US forces invaded Afghanistan in retaliation for the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001, Karimov sided with the US, allowing American troops to use a base in the country for Afghan war operations. In 2005, when Karimov brutally suppressed an anti-government demonstration in the city of Andijan in Uzbekistan, subsequent Western criticism resulted in Karimov kicking the US military out of his country. This paved the way for China to increase its influence.

The Chinese presence is visible in Uzbekistan, with Chinese-language signs at the airport in the capital Tashkent. During my visit to Tashkent in August, I saw offices for BYD, the leading Chinese maker of electric vehicles, and Chinese workers wearing the uniforms of a Chinese state-owned construction firm.

Robust economic growth

China is the largest foreign investor in Uzbekistan, Norov said. Since the beginning of 2026, Chinese investment has surpassed $8 billion, according to the Uzbek government.

Over the 30 years from 1991, when the Central Asian nations gained independence, up to 2021, trade between China and these countries grew more than 100 times, according to China’s Ministry of Commerce. Trade in goods between China and Central Asia rose 12 percent to $106.3 billion in 2025. China became the largest trading partner of Central Asian countries for the first time in 2025.

China is also the biggest trading partner of Uzbekistan. In the first half of 2026, Uzbekistan was the top Central Asian nation in terms of trade with China, growing 31 percent year-on-year to $8.87 billion, according to the Uzbek government.

“It’s not the correct question to ask how much China has contributed to the Uzbek economy. It’s how much has the Uzbek government opened the economy,” said Gafarov.

Since Mirziyoyev succeeded Karimov as president in December 2016, Uzbekistan’s per capita GDP dropped from $2,271.50 in 2017 to $1,894.10 in 2018, then doubled to $3,968.30 in 2025, according to the World Bank.

Uzbekistan’s GDP grew 7.7 percent in 2025. The IMF expects GDP growth of 6.8 percent in 2026, but Norov predicts GDP growth at over 8 percent in 2026.

I saw signs of rapid progress during my trip to Tashkent. The subway stations and railway station reminded me of those in Beijing 25 years ago, and some neighbourhoods contain old Soviet-era buildings. However, Tashkent also has large shopping malls and new skyscrapers.

Mirziyoyev has reduced the poverty rate by two-thirds in the past 10 years, said Norov, to 5.8 percent in 2025.

About 2,000 Uzbek specialists have visited China to learn from China’s experience in lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, Norov said. “The Uzbek president seeks to eliminate poverty.”

Toh Han Shih is a Singaporean writer in Hong Kong and a regular contributor to Asia Sentinel.

Canada was supposed to be safe.

America’s closest neighbor, a NATO member, a G7 democracy and a critical security partner, Canada is deeply integrated into the US economy. Energy, automobiles, minerals, food and manufactured goods continue to move across the border as parts of a single continental system.

Yet that …

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The disruption of liquefied natural gas (LNG) flows through the Strait of Hormuz has exposed an uncomfortable reality for Taiwan. Its energy imports remain acutely vulnerable to events thousands of kilometers from its shores. However, the more troubling lesson lies much closer to home.

The Middle East crisis offers a glimpse of what could ha…

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Russia and China have recently intensified their respective Arctic convoy sailings along the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Russia has put to sea its largest-ever shadow tanker convoy, with 20 vessels entering Arctic waters as far north as 500 miles shy of the North Pole on eastbound voyages to Chinese refineries. Russia has also appro…

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As escalating hostilities between the US and Iran push crude oil to multi-week highs - with Brent futures surging toward US$98 a barrel - motorists across Asia and other major markets remain trapped paying elevated prices at the pump. While crude had eased since mid-May from its wartime highs, gasoline and diesel costs consistently refused …

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For decades, nuclear power has occupied an uneasy place in Southeast Asia’s energy future. Governments periodically embraced it whenever electricity demand surged or fossil fuel prices spiked, only to retreat as construction costs mounted, financing evaporated, or public opposition resurfaced. Today, however, the conversation has returned with renewed momentum, driven not by conventional gigawatt-scale nuclear plants but by a new generation of small modular reactors (SMRs), championed by Microsoft founder Bill Gates, Rolls Royce, NuScale and a growing list of governments eager to commercialize the technology.

The question is no longer whether Southeast Asia is interested in nuclear power. It clearly is. The more important question is whether enthusiasm is beginning to outrun commercial reality. That matters. Unlike traditional nuclear reactors, SMRs generally produce up to about 300 megawatts (MW) of electricity and are designed to be factory-built before being transported to project sites for assembly. However, a 300 MW nuclear power project is considered small by industry standards. Average-sized nuclear plants generate about 1,000 MW or more. A 300 MW plant is only about one-third the size of a standard reactor and can power around 300,000 homes.

Supporters continue to argue that their smaller footprint, modular construction, and passive safety systems could dramatically reduce both construction risks and upfront capital costs while making nuclear power accessible to countries with smaller electricity grids. The technology also offers greater flexibility, allowing utilities to add generating capacity incrementally rather than committing billions of dollars to a single massive project.

For Southeast Asia, where electricity demand continues to rise alongside industrialization, urbanization, and rapidly expanding middle-class economic expansion and consumption, that proposition is understandably attractive. Coal still dominates much of the region’s electricity generation, while natural gas remains vulnerable to volatile international prices and geopolitical disruptions. Renewable energy is expanding rapidly, but governments continue to wrestle with intermittency, transmission constraints and storage limitations. Against that backdrop, SMRs increasingly appear to offer an enticing middle ground: carbon-free baseload electricity without the enormous financial commitment associated with conventional nuclear plants.

Several governments in the region have already begun exploring precisely that possibility. The Philippines has perhaps moved furthest politically. After decades of debate surrounding the dormant Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, Manila has revived its nuclear ambitions, strengthened its regulatory framework and signed multiple civil nuclear cooperation agreements with international partners. While no SMR project has yet broken ground, policymakers increasingly view smaller reactors as a more practical entry point than conventional nuclear stations, particularly given the country’s archipelagic geography.

Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest economy, has pursued nuclear options for years, but interest has intensified as the country seeks reliable low-carbon electricity for its rapidly expanding economy. Officials have openly discussed SMRs as a better fit for remote islands and industrial clusters where massive conventional reactors would be difficult to justify economically. Meanwhile, Vietnam, after shelving its earlier nuclear program nearly a decade ago, has reopened discussions as electricity demand accelerates and long-term energy security climbs the political agenda. Thailand has also begun studying SMRs as part of its long-term power planning while continuing to evaluate the technology’s commercial viability.

Yet despite the growing excitement, the region should resist assuming that smaller reactors automatically translate into easier deployment because that assumption remains largely untested. Although SMRs have attracted enormous political attention and billions of dollars in research and development, commercial deployment remains limited. Russia and China currently operate the world’s most advanced examples, while several Western designs, including TerraPower’s Natrium reactor backed by Bill Gates, remain under construction or in various stages of regulatory review rather than full commercial operation.

The obstacles facing Southeast Asia extend well beyond reactor design. Every country considering nuclear power must first establish an independent regulator capable of overseeing licensing, operations, inspections and emergency preparedness, while simultaneously building a highly trained workforce of engineers, operators and safety specialists. If they can’t develop the necessary expertise in time, most can’t, then more foreign assistance will be needed. Even more critically, nuclear waste management also remains politically sensitive, while financing continues to present perhaps the greatest hurdle of all. Even if SMRs eventually prove cheaper than conventional reactors, they still require substantial upfront investment, long planning horizons, and strong government commitment before producing a single kilowatt-hour of electricity.

Public confidence also represents another challenge that can’t be overlooked. Although SMR advocates emphasize passive safety features and simplified designs, public opinion throughout Asia continues to be shaped by problematic memories of the Fukushima, Chernobyl and Three Mile Island nuclear disasters. Convincing local communities that smaller reactors are fundamentally different from their larger predecessors will likely require years of regulatory transparency and sustained public engagement rather than engineering improvements alone.

Yet, none of this suggests that SMRs lack promise. Quite the opposite. For many Southeast Asian countries, they may ultimately prove far better suited than traditional nuclear plants. Smaller electricity grids, island geography and steadily rising demand make modular deployment conceptually attractive, particularly in archipelago nations like the Philippines and Indonesia. If construction costs decline through standardized manufacturing, as advocates predict, SMRs could eventually become another important tool alongside renewables, natural gas and energy storage in helping governments balance energy security with decarbonization goals.

However, that future hasn’t arrived yet, while the numbers are telling. Governments across Southeast Asia are increasingly discussing SMRs, signing cooperation agreements and commissioning feasibility studies, but very few projects have advanced beyond planning, regulatory preparation or preliminary site evaluation. Interest is real, political momentum is building, and technological progress continues. Commercial deployment, however, remains several steps behind.

Ultimately, the debate is becoming less about whether small modular reactors can generate electricity and more about whether they can generate investor confidence. Southeast Asia certainly needs additional low-carbon power sources, and SMRs may eventually earn a meaningful place in the region’s energy mix. SMRs may eventually become part of Southeast Asia’s energy future. But for now, governments should view the technology as a promising opportunity rather than an immediate solution.

The crisis in the Middle East has reinforced for China that, amid ongoing geopolitical fragmentation, economic resilience now depends on diversifying across multiple trade routes rather than relying too heavily on any single corridor. The immediate concern, of course, is energy. Prolonged disruption to the Strait of Hormuz, which appea…

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The 27-country European Union has avoided a trade war with China through a conditional truce despite EU complaints over its huge trade deficit with Beijing, giving China, its second biggest trading partner after the US, till October to reduce the deficit, which rose by nearly 20 percent to €360 billion (US$412 billion) in 2025 from 2024,…

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Southeast Asia’s state-owned power utilities are being asked to perform an impossible balancing act. Governments want them to keep electricity cheap for households and industry, maintain reliable supply, absorb rising fuel costs, invest in new electrical grids, buy more renewable power, and prepare for liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports.

That may be politically convenient, but it’s becoming financially unsustainable. The region’s power sector is entering a dangerous phase: electricity demand is rising rapidly as Southeast Asia industrializes, urbanizes, and electrifies, while millions enter middle-class economic status. Concurrently, governments are promising cleaner power systems, more renewable energy, stronger grids, and lower emissions. None of that comes cheaply. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that Southeast Asia will need clean-energy investment to rise to about $190 billion annually by 2035 to meet climate goals, while power-grid investment alone must roughly double.

Many of the state utilities expected to deliver this transition are already financially stretched. In Vietnam, Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) has repeatedly struggled with losses linked to high input costs and politically sensitive electricity prices. Although electricity tariffs were raised twice in 2023, EVN still reported a massive after-tax loss that year. It has since returned to profit, but accumulated losses remain a warning sign.

EVN’s difficulties point to a wider regional problem with the utility expected to support Vietnam’s industrial growth, prevent blackouts, buy power from generators, expand transmission, and integrate renewable energy. Yet it operates in a political environment where electricity prices can’t simply rise whenever costs increase, leaving EVN squeezed between economic reality and political caution.

Vietnam’s electricity system has already shown what happens when policy ambition runs ahead of grid capacity. The country’s earlier unprecedented solar boom made it one of Southeast Asia’s most dynamic renewable markets, but grid bottlenecks soon followed. Developers built projects faster than the transmission system could absorb them. That forced curtailment, payment disputes, and a slowdown in new renewable deployment. The lesson is clear: building renewable capacity is only half the job, but somebody must also pay for the grid that makes it usable.

Indonesia faces a similar dilemma, but on a much larger scale. State-owned PLN remains central to the country’s power sector, serving a vast archipelago and acting as the main buyer, generator, and distributor of electricity. Like EVN, PLN doesn’t act like a normal functioning utility. Far from it. It’s a political instrument, development agency, and utility rolled into one.

Notably, PLN’s finances depend heavily on the Indonesian government. Subsidies and compensation payments are not incidental; they are central to how the system functions. Analysts have noted that PLN’s subsidies and compensation from the government rose from $7.5 trillion in 2022 to $8.7 trillion in 2023. That dependence allows Indonesia to keep electricity affordable, but it also hides the real cost of power from consumers.

This creates a shell game as governments suppress tariffs to protect the middle class and industry. Utilities absorb or defer the costs, while finance ministries later step in through subsidies, compensation, or balance-sheet support. The consumer avoids the full bill today, but the taxpayer pays tomorrow.

The energy transition makes this problem even more acute. Renewable energy is often cheaper over the long term, but integrating it into the system requires upfront spending on transmission, storage, grid management, and backup capacity. LNG adds another layer of risk since Southeast Asian governments still see gas as a transition fuel. However, imported LNG exposes utilities to volatile global prices and foreign-exchange risk. If utilities can’t pass those costs through to consumers, losses reappear somewhere else in the system.

The Philippines offers a different, albeit powerful, warning. Its power sector is more liberalized than Vietnam’s or Indonesia’s, and costs are more visibly passed through to consumers and end users. But there’s a trade-off since the country has one of the highest electricity prices in Southeast Asia, with some of that attributed to decades-old monopolies with immense political power. The result is more financial pain for consumers. This also shows the trade-off facing the region: either consumers pay through higher tariffs, or governments and state utilities absorb the burden through subsidies and debt.

For Southeast Asian governments, cheap electricity has long been part of the social contract. Affordable power supports manufacturing, cushions households, and helps attract foreign investment. Unfortunately, that model becomes harder to sustain as electricity systems become more capital-intensive. Coal plants, however polluting, are relatively straightforward to dispatch. Modern power systems built around renewables, batteries, flexible gas, smarter grids, and cross-border transmission require deeper capital markets, better regulation, and more transparent pricing.

The danger is not that EVN, PLN, or similar utilities will go bankrupt in the conventional sense. Governments will not allow national power companies to collapse or leave factories and households without electricity. The real danger is slower and more damaging: chronic underinvestment, delayed projects, hidden liabilities, sudden tariff shocks, and repeated taxpayer bailouts.

This matters for industrial policy. Southeast Asia wants to attract manufacturers shifting supply chains out of China; however, factories need reliable and competitively priced electricity. If utilities can’t invest fast enough in generation and grids, power shortages could become a constraint on growth. Vietnam has already experienced episodes of electricity stress during periods of high demand and weak hydropower output. Indonesia also faces the challenge of matching power supply to industrial expansion across a geographically complex system.

Ultimately, there’s no easy answer. Raising tariffs too fast risks public anger along with inflation, while holding tariffs too low weakens utilities and discourages investment. Subsidies protect consumers but strain government budgets, renewable energy can reduce fuel import dependence, but only if the grid is strong enough to handle it.

Southeast Asia’s power utilities are therefore becoming a test of whether the region can reconcile three goals at once: affordable electricity, reliable supply, and cleaner energy. Politicians have long pretended that all three can be achieved without forcing consumers or taxpayers to pay the full cost. That illusion is starting to crack.

The coming crisis isn’t bankruptcy per se. It’s financial stress dressed up as public policy. Unless governments allow more realistic electricity pricing, stronger utility balance sheets, and faster grid investment, Southeast Asia’s energy transition may be slowed not by a lack of ambition, but by the fragile finances of the very utilities expected to deliver it.

For years, Asia’s renewable energy transition has been defined by familiar players. China dominates clean-energy manufacturing, India has become a solar powerhouse, and countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia have pursued ambitious energy-transition plans.

Now the Philippines, which relies almost entirely on imported crude oil and refined petroleum – recently exacerbated by skyrocketing fuel prices driven by the Gulf War – is emerging as one of the region’s fastest-growing renewable energy markets. To combat the economic strain, the government recently declared a state of national energy emergency.

Recent data from global energy think tank Ember shows the Philippines has overtaken Pakistan as China’s second-largest export market for solar panels, next to the Netherlands, a key import hub for much of northwest Europe. More than 4,000 megawatts (MW) of Chinese solar panels entered the country during the first four months of 2026 alone, including over 3,000 MW in March and April.

In an analysis released in late May, Ember noted that China has also begun exporting solar cells – the basic building blocks of solar panels – to the Philippines, with imports reaching US$292 million (about P18 billion) from October 2025 to March 2026, up sharply from almost zero in previous periods, based on the latest China trade data cited.

At the same time, the government is pushing one of Asia’s most ambitious offshore wind programs, attracting billions of dollars in prospective investments from international developers.

The surge reflects a combination of economic necessity, energy security concerns, policy reforms, and rapidly declining renewable energy costs.

High power prices drive solar demand

The Philippines has long struggled with some of the highest electricity prices in Southeast Asia. Residential consumers pay roughly ₱12 to ₱15 (US$0.20 – US$0.24) per kilowatt-hour, while businesses face electricity costs that are among the highest in the region. Rising generation charges and dependence on imported fuels have further increased pressure on households and industries. As a result, solar power has become an increasingly attractive investment.

Payback periods for rooftop solar systems have fallen sharply. Commercial establishments can recover their investments in just over two years, while industrial users typically achieve payback within three years, down from about four years previously. The economics are compelling for factories, shopping malls, office buildings, warehouses, schools, and hospitals seeking to reduce operating costs. Under the government’s net metering program, consumers with solar panels can even export excess electricity to the grid in exchange for credits on their power bills.

“The economics of rooftop solar are more attractive than ever, and its rapid rise is inevitable,” Ember chief analyst Dave Jones said in a recent assessment.

Citing the United Nations’ commodity trade statistics database, the Ember report found that solar panel imports into the Philippines grew to $483 million in 2025 from the previous year’s $365 million. Notably, 98 percent of last year’s imports came from China.

“The government has an opportunity to carve its own path on rooftop solar, to bring the Philippines out of fossil dependency, and onto a path of cheap, abundant electricity,” Jones said.

Beyond lower electricity bills, solar power also reduces dependence on imported coal and natural gas, which still account for much of the country’s electricity generation. For policymakers, renewable energy is increasingly viewed not only as a climate solution but also as a means of strengthening energy security.

Economic growth fuels demand

The renewable energy expansion is occurring against the backdrop of robust economic growth, with the Philippines one of Southeast Asia’s fastest-growing economies, supported by a young population, rapid urbanization, and expanding industrial activity. Rising incomes and business investments continue to push electricity demand higher.

Historically, much of that demand would have been met through new coal-fired power plants. Today, government policy is steering investment toward renewable energy instead. Recent reforms have relaxed foreign ownership restrictions on renewable energy projects, introduced competitive auctions, and streamlined permitting processes. These measures have encouraged domestic and foreign investors to commit billions of pesos to new projects. Major developers, including subsidiaries of ACEN, Aboitiz Power, and Meralco PowerGen, are expanding utility-scale solar projects across Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao.

Offshore wind offers bigger opportunity

While solar installations are expanding rapidly, offshore wind could prove even more transformative, with extensive coastline and favorable wind conditions creating some of Asia’s most attractive energy prospects. Government agencies have awarded dozens of offshore wind service contracts covering projects that could eventually generate tens of gigawatts of capacity.

Among the most closely watched proposals are developments in Northern Luzon, Mindoro, and the Guimaras Strait, where international companies are studying multi-billion-dollar investments. European, Middle Eastern, and Asian firms have formed partnerships with Philippine companies to develop these projects, reflecting growing confidence in the country’s renewable energy prospects.

Growing opposition

The renewable energy boom, however, is not without challenges. Several large-scale solar and wind projects have encountered opposition from environmental groups, local communities, church organizations, and indigenous peoples concerned about ecological and social impacts.

In Quezon Province, renewable energy developments near environmentally sensitive areas around Mount Banahaw have raised concerns among conservation advocates over potential impacts on biodiversity and protected ecosystems. Elsewhere, fishing communities have questioned proposed offshore wind projects, citing possible effects on marine habitats and livelihoods.

Large solar farms have also drawn scrutiny over the conversion of agricultural land and concerns about food security. Critics argue that some projects could alter rural landscapes and place additional pressure on farming communities.

The disputes highlight a challenge increasingly faced by governments around the world, balancing the urgent need for clean energy with environmental protection and community interests.

Balancing growth and sustainability

Industry observers say public acceptance may become one of the most important factors determining the pace of the country’s energy transition. Insufficient consultation with affected communities could delay projects and increase costs. At the same time, prolonged regulatory disputes risk slowing efforts to reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels.

The challenge for policymakers is to maintain investor confidence while ensuring that environmental safeguards and community concerns are adequately addressed. How successfully the government manages these competing interests could determine whether the Philippines achieves its renewable energy targets over the next decade.

A regional energy story

Despite these hurdles, the broader trend remains clear. The Philippines’ rise as China’s second-largest solar-panel market reflects a fundamental shift in its energy landscape. High electricity prices, strong economic growth, supportive policies, and energy-security concerns have combined to create one of Asia’s most dynamic renewable energy markets.

The development also underscores a wider lesson for the region. Energy transitions are often driven as much by economics and energy security as by climate policy. If current investment momentum continues and major projects overcome environmental and permitting challenges, the country could emerge as one of Asia’s leading examples of how clean energy, economic growth, and energy security can converge to transform a national power system.