Alex Vatanka is a leading expert on Iranian politics and US-Iran relations. Vatanka is a Senior Fellow and founding Director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C. Born in Tehran, he specializes in Iran’s domestic power struggles, foreign policy, and regional security dynamics, including tensions with the U…

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Moribund markets roared back to life in Southeast Asia with the news on April 7 of a US-Iran two-week ceasefire. Days ahead of the ceasefire, even a hitherto big Donald Trump booster like the Hoover Institution’s Niall Ferguson had concluded: “Time is not on the side of an overstretched hegemon, because the economic costs of war …

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In a moment of mounting global uncertainty marked by intensifying great-power rivalry, persistent conflicts in the Middle East, and the recalibration of alliances across the Indo-Pacific, Indonesia appears to be quietly adjusting the compass of its foreign policy. Under President Prabowo Subianto, Jakarta’s diplomatic posture is showing signs of a subtle but discernible shift toward the United States, even as it maintains formal ties with other major powers, including China and Russia.

The shift is not proclaimed in sweeping speeches or formal declarations. Rather, it emerges through a series of decisions, symbolic gestures and strategic alignments that, taken together, suggest a departure—however incremental—from the more equidistant approach pursued by Prabowo’s predecessor, such as an apparent quiet decision forged between Prabowo and US President Donald Trump to allow overflights of US military craft above Indonesian territory. Where Joko Widodo often leaned toward Beijing, particularly in infrastructure investment and trade, Prabowo appears to be navigating closer to Washington, especially in matters of defense and geopolitical alignment.

This evolving orientation has not gone unnoticed. Analysts, diplomats and critics at home have begun to question whether Indonesia’s long-held doctrine of a “free and active” foreign policy—one that avoids entanglement in major power blocs—may be undergoing a quiet transformation.

A Tale of Two Visits

The contrast was striking. On April 13, 2026, as President Prabowo was received with full honors by Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin in Moscow, his defense minister and close confidant, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, was in Washington holding talks at the Pentagon. The dual-track diplomacy appeared carefully choreographed: engagement with Russia on one hand, and a deepening strategic embrace of the United States on the other.

In Moscow, Prabowo and Putin agreed to expand cooperation across a broad spectrum of sectors, including energy, agriculture, industry, pharmaceuticals and even space exploration. Indonesia, recently welcomed into the BRICS grouping with strong backing from Moscow, expressed gratitude for Russia’s support and signaled its desire to learn from Russia’s resilience in navigating geopolitical turbulence.

“I would like to consult (with President Putin), as the global geopolitical situation is evolving and changing very rapidly,” Prabowo said, in remarks that suggested a search for strategic guidance from a leader long at odds with the West.

Yet, at nearly the same moment, a different narrative was unfolding in Washington.

There, Sjafrie met with the US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to announce a new strategic defense partnership—one that goes beyond symbolic cooperation and ventures into operational, technological and structural collaboration.

The agreement rests on three pillars: strengthening military capacity and institutional frameworks, expanding professional military education and training, and enhancing operational cooperation through joint exercises. More notably, it includes plans to explore advanced defense technologies, such as autonomous systems, next-generation maritime capabilities and asymmetric warfare strategies—areas that place Indonesia more firmly within the orbit of US-led security architecture in the Indo-Pacific.

For a country that has historically guarded its strategic autonomy, the depth of this engagement represents a significant development.

Concerns Over Sovereignty

The defense partnership quickly became the subject of intense domestic scrutiny after reports surfaced of a draft agreement that would allow US military aircraft to access Indonesian airspace with fewer restrictions.

The document, which circulated widely on social media, sparked concern among critics who warned of potential infringements on national sovereignty. While the Defense Ministry did not deny the existence of such discussions, it emphasized that any agreement remained in an early stage and had not been finalized.

Still, the episode underscored a broader anxiety: that Indonesia’s growing alignment with Washington could come at the cost of its independence in strategic decision-making.

Such concerns are amplified by the scale and direction of Prabowo’s diplomatic engagements since taking office. Of his 48 overseas visits as of February, a significant portion –16 – have been to Western countries and their allies, including the United States, Britain and France. In total, Prabowo has spent nearly 39 days in Western countries, including almost two weeks in the United States alone.

By contrast, visits to China and Russia—two central players in the evolving global balance of power—have been relatively limited, with only two trips each. While Indonesia continues to invoke the language of Global South solidarity and South-South cooperation, its diplomatic footprint suggests a persistent, if not strengthening, Western orientation.

The BoP Factor

Perhaps the clearest indication of Indonesia’s shifting alignment came with its decision to join the Board of Peace, an initiative spearheaded by US President Donald J Trump. The government framed its participation as a pragmatic move aimed at accelerating peace efforts in Palestine. But analysts have offered a more skeptical interpretation, pointing to economic considerations—particularly concerns over potential US tariff policies—as a key driver. Membership in the Board of Peace, critics argue, has constrained Indonesia’s ability to take an independent stance on contentious issues involving the United States and its allies.

This tension became evident in Indonesia’s response to the escalating conflict between the United States, Israel and Iran. In the days following the outbreak of hostilities, Prabowo refrained from issuing a strong public statement, even as regional tensions intensified and global reactions mounted.

For some observers, the restraint reflected diplomatic caution. For others, it signaled a troubling erosion of Indonesia’s moral voice in international affairs.

“Indonesia’s foreign policy in the Middle East appears increasingly incoherent,” said Hasril Hasan, an analyst of international political economy at the University of Indonesia. “It lacks a clear concept and direction. Our political image is suffering, and our economic interests are not being optimally achieved.”

Waning Bargaining Position

Indonesia’s perceived alignment with Washington has also affected its standing with other actors, particularly Iran. Despite Prabowo’s offer to act as a mediator—citing his personal rapport with Trump and Indonesia’s shared identity with Iran as a Muslim-majority nation and member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation—the proposal failed to gain traction. Tehran, according to regional observers, appeared unconvinced of Jakarta’s neutrality.

The consequences were not merely symbolic. When Iran allowed certain “friendly” nations, including neighboring Malaysia, to pass through the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz without restriction, Indonesia was notably absent from that list. The episode raised uncomfortable questions about whether Indonesia’s diplomatic capital—long built on its non-aligned stance—was beginning to erode.

Criticism has also mounted over Indonesia’s economic agreements with the United States, particularly the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART), which some analysts describe as disproportionately favorable to Washington.

Under the agreement, tariffs on approximately 99 percent of US goods entering Indonesia could be reduced to zero—a move that economists warn may expose domestic industries to intense competition.

Four civil society organizations—Center of Economic and Law Studies, Aliansi Jurnalis Independen, Indonesia for Global Justice and Perserikatan Solidaritas Perempuan—have filed a legal challenge against the agreement, arguing that it was concluded without adequate consultation with Parliament or the public.

The case, now before the Jakarta Administrative Court, highlights broader concerns about transparency and accountability in the government’s foreign policy decisions.

Muted Voice on Conflict

Indonesia’s cautious approach has also been evident in its response to the deaths of three Indonesian peacekeepers serving under the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon in southern Lebanon.

The soldiers were killed in an artillery strike attributed to Israeli forces in late March. While Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry and its mission to the United Nations issued strong condemnations and called for a thorough investigation, Prabowo’s own statement stopped short of explicitly naming Israel as responsible.

For many Indonesians, the restraint was difficult to reconcile with the country’s longstanding support for Palestinian statehood and its vocal criticism of Israeli military actions. Calls have since grown for Indonesia to withdraw its troops from Lebanon, including from prominent figures such as former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Yet the government has so far resisted such demands.

“There are no plans to withdraw,” said Cabinet Secretary Teddy Indra Wijaya, adding that evaluations were ongoing.

Indonesia’s evolving foreign policy under Prabowo reflects a broader tension between principle and pragmatism—between its historical commitment to non-alignment and the strategic realities of a rapidly changing world. For decades, Indonesia has sought to position itself as a mediator, a bridge-builder and a voice of the Global South. Its “free and active” doctrine allowed it to navigate Cold War divisions without being subsumed into them. Today, however, the lines are less clear.

Hanoi is calling it “new momentum.” As General Secretary and President Tô Lâm arrives in Beijing this week for his first overseas trip after consolidating the top two leadership posts, Vietnamese state media are framing the visit as a triumph of prudent diplomacy. They speak of record bilateral trade reaching US$256 billion in 2025, surging Chinese investment in electronics and electric vehicles, booming tourism, and maritime differences that are supposedly “properly controlled.” In the official narrative, Vietnam is wisely deepening ties with its giant neighbor while cleverly balancing with the West in a fractured world.

This comforting story serves the regime’s domestic needs, but it masks a dangerous reality. Far from creating durable momentum, the visit risks accelerating Vietnam’s structural absorption into China’s orbit at the worst possible moment, precisely when Washington is cracking down on supply-chain circumvention and recalibrating its Indo-Pacific strategy.

The Economic Illusion

Vietnamese officials proudly cite headline trade figures and new Chinese investments. Yet these numbers conceal a fragile asymmetry. Vietnam’s recent growth has relied heavily on exports to the United States, which account for more than 30 percent of its total outbound shipments. A significant portion of those exports consists of Chinese-origin components lightly processed or relabeled in Vietnam — the classic transshipment model.

Even after the US Supreme Court struck down many IEEPA-based reciprocal tariffs on February 20, 2026, American enforcement against circumvention remains aggressive. Customs and Border Protection, Section 301 investigations, and rules-of-origin scrutiny continue to target goods suspected of bypassing higher duties on Chinese products. Similar probes are intensifying in the EU, Canada, and Australia. Penalties for confirmed transshipment can still reach 40 percent under alternative authorities.

If agreements signed in Beijing this week deepen integration into Chinese upstream supply chains — through expanded joint ventures, shared technology standards, or new connectivity projects — Vietnam will be perceived less as an independent manufacturing hub and more as a convenient backdoor for Chinese goods. The consequences would be immediate and painful: stricter inspections, canceled orders, lost market share in the West, and a sharp slowdown in export-driven growth. The very engine that has powered Vietnam’s impressive GDP gains could stall, leaving the country more dependent on Beijing than ever.

Short-term gains in infrastructure or tourism cannot offset this structural vulnerability. Hanoi is betting that deeper economic ties with China will deliver technological upgrading and sustained growth. The evidence suggests the opposite: greater reliance on Chinese inputs risks locking Vietnam into the lower tiers of regional value chains dominated by its northern neighbor.

The Strategic Signal

The optics of the visit compound the risk. Coming immediately after Tô Lâm’s consolidation of party and state power in a configuration reminiscent of Xi Jinping’s model, the warm “comrade and brother” framing in Beijing sends a clear message. In Washington, Tokyo, Canberra, and Brussels, it will be read not as sophisticated bamboo diplomacy but as narrowing strategic autonomy.

Nowhere are the stakes higher than in the South China Sea. Hanoi insists disputes are being “properly controlled,” yet Chinese coast guard and maritime militia vessels continue to harass Vietnamese fishermen and obstruct energy exploration activities. Any new agreements that emphasize bilateral management over firm adherence to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982) and multilateral pressure risk being interpreted as tacit acquiescence. This directly threatens Vietnam’s sovereign rights, fisheries resources, and potential hydrocarbon reserves — assets vital to its energy security and coastal economy.

In the broader context of America’s “maximum pressure” campaign under the VIC framework (Venezuela–Iran–Cuba), such signaling is especially ill-timed. As the United States and its partners actively friend-shore critical supply chains away from China, Vietnam’s attractiveness as a diversified, rules-based alternative diminishes if it appears to be tilting too far toward Beijing.

The Domestic Trade-Off

At home, the visit also serves a clear political purpose: legitimizing recent power centralization. But genuine long-term stability requires more than decisive leadership at the top. It demands robust internal feedback mechanisms capable of detecting and correcting policy errors before they become structural traps. Concentrated authority may speed up decisions, but it often narrows debate and weakens the very institutional resilience a middle power needs when navigating a giant neighbor.

History offers sobering lessons for countries in Vietnam’s position. Over-reliance on a single dominant partner rarely produces sustainable autonomy. Vietnam’s own “bamboo diplomacy” earned international respect precisely because it preserved flexibility and avoided visible over-dependence.

None of this means Vietnam should shun pragmatic engagement with China. Trade and cooperation in non-sensitive areas can and should continue. The issue is the terms and safeguards. Real “new momentum” would require verifiable technology transfer rather than assembly-line dependence, strict compliance with rules of origin to protect Western market access, unambiguous public commitment to UNCLOS, and accelerated diversification of both economic and security partnerships.

If this week’s summit deepens structural integration without parallel safeguards, the celebrated “new momentum” may prove illusory — and costly. The bamboo that has bent without breaking for decades risks becoming entangled in China’s web.

Western policymakers should continue to engage Vietnam as a pivotal middle power in Asia’s supply-chain realignment and maritime balance. But they must do so with clear eyes. Partnership cannot be taken for granted. It must be earned through transparency, compliance, and credible strategic independence.

Hanoi may celebrate another successful summit. The real test will be whether Vietnam emerges stronger and more autonomous — or quietly more constrained.

Khanh Vu Duc is a frequent contributor to Asia Sentinel. He is a lawyer and part-time law professor at the University of Ottawa who researches on Vietnamese politics, international relations, and international law.

Pakistan is once again at the center of a major war it didn’t start. This time, however, it is not as a problem state but as a peace broker. Islamabad is performing a delicate diplomatic balancing act that would have been unthinkable only a few years ago with marathon talks continuing between high-level US and Iranian officials in Islamabad in a bid to end the hostilities in the Strait of Hormuz.

A country long defined in Western policy as a security liability is now being treated as a necessary intermediary in the US-Iran confrontation. That shift is not the result of transformation so much as convergence: war elsewhere, credibility earned in a different conflict, and a regional order running out of neutral spaces.

Pakistan’s current diplomatic visibility represents a notable reversal from its recent international standing. Only a few years ago, it was widely viewed through the narrow lens of counterterrorism and internal instability. Today, it is being described as a “critical interlocutor” between Washington and Tehran, hosting talks and facilitating ceasefire negotiations at the highest level.

This shift is partly structural and partly opportunistic. As the US–Iran conflict escalated in early 2026, traditional mediators such as Oman and Qatar faced limitations—either because of Gulf exposure to Iranian retaliation or because intra-Gulf divisions weakened their consensus position. Pakistan, by contrast, offered a rare combination of attributes: formal ties with Saudi Arabia, functional relations with Iran, and a recently strengthened working relationship with Washington. Ultimately, Islamabad has been explicitly chosen as a venue precisely because it is one of the few states that maintains operational channels with both sides of the conflict. Yet this transformation did not begin in the Gulf. It began much closer to home.

Thanks to India’s war on Pakistan

A critical but often underexamined driver of Pakistan’s diplomatic repositioning lies in its military confrontation with India in May 2025. While details remain contested, Pakistani elites have leveraged its widely acknowledged operational success—particularly in the air domain—to reshape their international narrative from instability to capability. This matters because credibility in international mediation is rarely purely diplomatic. It is also reputational: states are more likely to rely on intermediaries that are seen as strategically relevant and capable of managing escalation risks.

In Pakistan’s case, the post-2025 period saw a visible tightening of civil–military coordination in foreign policy and an expansion of engagement with key global actors, particularly the United States. That shift accelerated after Pakistan publicly credited President Trump for helping broker a ceasefire with India and subsequently deepened engagement with his administration. The result is a recalibrated image: Pakistan is no longer only a “problem space” in global security debates, but increasingly a “functional actor” in crisis containment architectures.

This repositioning has been reinforced by Pakistan’s evolving counterterrorism doctrine, which increasingly avoids the earlier distinction between “good” and “bad” militant groups. Instead, the state has adopted a more unified framing of internal insurgencies, including the TTP and IS-K, aligning its rhetoric more closely with global counterterrorism discourse.

Together, these shifts have created the conditions under which Pakistan could plausibly present itself as a security-relevant diplomatic actor rather than merely a theatre of instability.

Constraints matter more than ambition

Pakistan’s mediation role is also shaped—perhaps more decisively—by constraints rather than ambition. The most immediate is geography. Sharing a long and porous border with Iran while simultaneously maintaining a defense partnership with Saudi Arabia places Islamabad in an inherently delicate position. Any direct Iran–Saudi escalation risks spilling into Pakistan’s internal security environment.

Equally significant is Pakistan’s sectarian composition. As one of the largest Shia-populated countries outside Iran, a direct confrontation with Tehran would risk triggering severe internal fragmentation—something that was visible immediately after Khamenei was killed. This vulnerability is not abstract: it intersects directly with Pakistan’s ongoing counterinsurgency operations against the TTP and Baloch separatist groups, both of which already stretch state capacity.

It is precisely this convergence of external and internal risk that explains Islamabad’s cautious diplomacy during the early phases of the US–Iran conflict. Despite its formal defense commitments to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan avoided any overt activation of the pact and instead pursued a calibrated rhetorical strategy, maintaining communication channels with Tehran while signaling alignment with Gulf partners when necessary.

This balancing act became especially visible when Iranian strikes on Saudi-linked infrastructure forced Islamabad to adopt a more critical public posture toward Tehran, even as backchannel diplomacy continued uninterrupted. In effect, Pakistan’s mediation is not a voluntary projection of power. It is a form of strategic risk management.

Washington, Trump, and the politics of access

The final enabling condition of Pakistan’s mediation role lies in its improved access to the United States under the Trump administration. Following the 2025 India–Pakistan conflict, bilateral engagement intensified significantly. Trump’s personal involvement in ceasefire diplomacy, combined with high-level visits by Pakistan’s military leadership to Washington, created a new channel of elite-level political trust.

This matters because mediation in high-intensity conflicts depends less on formal alliance structures and more on executive-level confidence between actors. Pakistan’s ability to simultaneously communicate with Tehran and Washington—while maintaining credibility in both capitals—has allowed it to occupy a rare intermediary space.

At the same time, Pakistan has also benefited from a vacuum in Gulf mediation capacity. While Oman historically played this role, and Qatar has often been involved in backchannel diplomacy, the current escalation has rendered Gulf states either too exposed or too divided to serve as effective neutral platforms. This vacuum has effectively elevated Pakistan—not as the first-choice mediator, but as the only viable one left.

Strategy, not status

In short, Pakistan’s emergence as a mediator in the US–Iran conflict should not be misread as a linear rise in global status or a permanent shift in geopolitical hierarchy. Instead, it reflects something more contingent: the convergence of war, regional fragmentation, and Pakistan’s own structural vulnerabilities.

Its diplomatic relevance is not grounded in neutrality alone, but in necessity. Pakistan is not mediating because it is universally trusted, but because it is sufficiently connected to all parties while being fully owned by none. That distinction is crucial.

At the same time, this moment reveals a deeper transformation in Pakistan’s external identity. The country is increasingly learning to convert its geopolitical constraints into diplomatic utility. Its proximity to conflict zones, its internal security challenges, and its overlapping alignments are no longer only liabilities—they are also instruments of relevance and leverage.

Yet this is a fragile form of power. Should the US–Iran conflict escalate further, Pakistan’s balancing act could quickly turn from mediation to entanglement. And in that scenario, the very conditions that enabled its rise as a broker could just as easily expose its limits. For now, however, Pakistan sits at a rare intersection of global crisis management—not as a great power, but as an indispensable intermediary in a war it cannot afford to ignore.

Dr Salman Rafi Sheikh is an Assistant Professor of Politics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) in Pakistan. He is a long-time contributor on diplomatic affairs to Asia Sentinel.

On March 25 at 10pm, Thailand’s caretaker government announced a Bt6 per liter increase across all fuel types, effective from 5am the following morning, immediately after Parliament adjourned following its first substantive session on the energy crisis. No cabinet minister was reported to have attended the debate to respond. Citizens …

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Nepal’s new prime minister Balendra Shah is wasting no time, having ordered the arrest of the immediate past premier and others in an action denounced by opponents as executive overreach and which has brought hundreds of protesters from the old regime into the streets. The new government has unveiled a massive 100-point agenda focused on anti-corruption, transparency and meritocracy in public service, offered a formal state apology to the Dalit community for historical discrimination, pledged to focus on job creation to reduce the mass migration of youth seeking work abroad, and said it would prioritize accessible health and education for the poor.

On a geopolitical level, Nepal, population 29.5 million, has long been described as a political football between giant neighbors India and China, a dynamic that appears to have reached a turning point with the introduction of a new generation of leaders focusing on anti-corruption and economic reform rather than ideological loyalty to neighbors. Analysts suggest the new leadership may favor India due to deeper cultural and educational ties. Balendra, for instance, studied and lived in India, potentially providing a “bread and blood” connection that serves as a setback for China’s expansionist regional strategy.

Accordingly, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi quickly lauded the new leadership, with Balendra expressing his eagerness to work closely with New Delhi to advance relations. Chinese premier Li Qiang also congratulated the new government and reaffirmed Beijing’s commitment to strengthening bilateral relations.

Waves of new generation

Balendra’s new Rashtriya Swatantra Party (RSP), founded in 2022, rode the waves of a young generation following an unprecedented welter of violence that drove former premier Khadga Praosad Sharma Oli out of office last September. Mobs burned the 122-year-old palace housing the prime minister’s office as well as the Home, Finance and Health ministries, the Parliament, the Supreme Court, other lower courts, the anti-corruption commission and the offices of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist, or UML), the Nepali Congress and the Maoists.

The 35-year-old Balendra, who won national approval as Kathmandu’s reformist mayor from 2022 to 2026 after a career as an engineer and rapper musician, was sworn in as Nepal’s 40th premier on March 27 after the RSP secured a historic mandate, winning 182 of 275 seats in the House of Representatives. A 15-member cabinet also took the oath of office at a ceremony held at Sheetal Niwas in Kathmandu. Balendra called for a cabinet meeting in the evening hours in which the new government resolved to fully implement the report of an enquiry commission probing the Gen Z movement that killed 76 individuals, including 19 young people, last September. The 907-page report recommended legal action against Oli and others for their collective criminal negligence and recklessness in dealing with the violent uprising.

The next morning, the Kathmandu police picked up Oli, 74, from his residence, followed by the arrest of former home minister and Congress leader Ramesh Lekhak. Another Congress leader and former energy minister Deepak Khadka was arrested on March 29 on alleged money laundering charges. Oli and Khadka were hospitalized. Despite pleas by family members and party workers, the Supreme Court refused to offer relief although the court asked the new government to clarify the grounds for their arrests and submit a written reply. The Kathmandu district court granted a five-day judicial remand for Oli and Lekhak, later extended for two more days.

Hundreds of Oli’s Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) supporters took to the streets demanding his release, launching prolonged protest demonstrations across the country. CPN-UML lawmakers have raised the issue in the Parliament, claiming that Oli didn’t order the security forces to fire on the protesters and labeling the arrests as political revenge. The Congress leaders demanded a fresh and transparent investigation into last year’s agitation, terming the commission as inadequate. The demand was turned down by the newly-appointed home minister Sudhan Gurung, who said no one was above the law.

More troubles await the three former premiers as the Balendra government has launched a high-level probe over money laundering against Congress leader Sher Bahadur Deuba and Marxist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda, who led the decade-long anti-monarchy Maoist movement in Nepal from 1996 to 2006 that resulted in the killing of over 17,000 people including insurgents, security personnel and Nepali citizens.

But legal experts denounced the arrests under the National Criminal Act, which makes them subject to up to 10 years of imprisonment. They argued that an urgent warrant of arrest is meant for anybody who may flee the jurisdiction, and that the accused could simply have been barred from leaving the country. Many critics pointed out that a commission report cannot be accepted as the final piece of evidence and that the recommendations must be authenticated by subsequent investigations.

The new government has made it clear that it will move to clean the system with its reform plan, which also bans party politics on campuses and restricts student-run unions, which will be replaced with nonpartisan Student Councils within three months. Teachers, civil servants and employees are also prohibited from joining in party activities. The government also offered job and rehabilitation facilities to those affected in the anti-government uprising.

The Kathmandu Post editorialized that “the era of the old guard, defined by ego-tussles and a disconnect from the modern world, is hopefully over and the era of the youth has begun.” As Kathmandu’s mayor, the Post said, Balendra’s focus was on clean, effective and hassle-free governance, with the same energy hopefully expected to spread to the national level. Nepal’s modern political history remains rife with examples of government failures due to intraparty feuding. Since the monarchy came under constitutional control in 1990, Nepal has seen the formation of 33 governments, added the editorial, concluding that the challenges ahead for the government remain high, but optimism has been sweeping the country.

With two years to go before the 2028 presidential sweepstakes and the ground stirring under eager hoofs, Philippine Vice President Sara Duterte remains the woman to beat despite facing a second wave of impeachment efforts – which will take all of her cunning to survive – and despite persistent criticism of her leadership competence, unresolved corruption allegations and the controversies surrounding the Duterte political dynasty.

The forces of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr have had their expectations rudely dashed of perpetuating the dynasty via the candidacy of now-disgraced former House Speaker [and Marcos first cousin] Martin Romueldez, laid low by the biggest political scandal in decades over profiting from ghost infrastructure projects. They have yet to rebound into pre-electoral action with a new candidate. The names frequently mentioned in political circles include Interior Secretary Jonvic Remulla, a member of the Cavite state warlord clan who has made a name for himself as interior secretary by focusing internal police reforms, a not-wholly-innocent crusade given that the Duterte family’s political base rests in the national police.

For ordinary Filipinos, watching two of the country’s most powerful political families trade accusations of corruption and abuse of power raises a basic question: Who exactly is looking out for the public interest? Two possible so-called third force candidates have yet to mesh. The powerful old political families (the Arroyos, Aquino-Cojuangcos, the Lopezes and others) have yet to be heard from, along with the newer ones (the Villars, the Binays and others).

Philippine politics rarely rewards complacency, however, and the forces that once propelled Sara Duterte to power may now become the very obstacles that could derail her path to the Malacañang Palace. The political alliance that dominated the 2022 election — the UniTeam between Duterte, 47, and Marcos, 68 – has long since fractured into a bitter rivalry. What was once presented as a grand coalition of North – the Marcos stronghold of Ilocos Norte and the Dutertes South in Davao – turned almost immediately into a proxy war between the Marcos and Duterte camps. They are no longer fighting the “Yellows” or the “Pinks,” shorthand labels for reform-oriented voters associated with accountability and good governance. Instead, they are battering each other.

Part of Duterte’s continued strength lies in the enduring appeal of the take-no-prisoners political brand built by the dynastic paterfamilias, former president Rodrigo Duterte, 81, now detained on crimes against humanity charges in connection to the 6,000 extrajudicial killings – estimated by human rights groups as high as 30, 000 – under his administration’s brutal drug war. Despite that, for millions of Filipinos, the elder Duterte represented a leader who spoke their language, rejected the polish of traditional elites and promised swift action against crime and disorder.

Sara, who on the stump often resorts to her father’s rough-and-rowdy rhetoric, represents the continuation of that same “tough love” style of leadership. Even the shock of her father’s detention by the International Criminal Court in March 2025 hasn’t significantly weakened the Duterte base. If anything, among loyalists, it has reinforced the narrative that the family is being persecuted by powerful enemies.

Yet political loyalty has limits. Being a frontrunner in 2026 is very different from winning in 2028. The most immediate threat comes from the halls of Congress, where the House of Representatives has begun investigating the vice president over questions involving her use of confidential funds in the Office of the Vice President and the Department of Education, and her threats to kill the president during a past-midnight 2025 press conference. Duterte has dismissed the proceedings as political theater.

But the stakes are enormous. If the impeachment process advances and results in a conviction in the Senate, she could be barred from holding public office, effectively ending any presidential bid before it begins – with the common wisdom that the impeachment proceedings are underway for exactly that reason. Even if she survives impeachment, the prolonged spectacle of congressional investigations risks eroding the perception of invincibility that has long surrounded the Duterte name.

“The second round of impeachment tells you Marcos has the levers well in hand and moderates any bogeyman aspects of the Duterte coalition,” said a longtime political maven. “It’s not as scary as it ought to be. You could go down the list of people who led the first impeachment, many of whom were personally targeted by Sara [in 2025 midterm elections] but many of whom survived – to impeach her again.”

The vice president has refused to participate in what has been impolitely described as a dog and pony show, questioning jurisdiction and constitutionality. Lawyers allied with her have petitioned the Supreme Court to stop the House justice committee from producing her bank records and calling witnesses to testify on her alleged unexplained wealth and ties with POGOs, or overseas gaming operations, which became an international scandal during her father’s reign, implicating top members of his regime.

Third force?

The escalating Marcos–Duterte feud has also opened space for a possible “third force” candidate. What the 2022 race won by Marcos revealed was the third force as it is, the pink and yellow survivors, who themselves are their own cult of personality, lack resources but are fairly cohesive. But they matter only in tipping the scale one way or another in the Marcos-Sara fight. Marcos is cultivating them amid the irony that he has become more of an upholder of the post-senior Marcos democratic order than the non-Marcoses.

This wouldn’t necessarily mean a traditional opposition figure. Rather, it could emerge as a middle ground for voters weary of dynastic rivalries and political drama. One name frequently mentioned is Senator Raffy Tulfo, 66, whose popularity stems from his long-running public service media programs where he directly intervenes in disputes involving ordinary citizens. He is a scion of the influential Tulfo TV5 broadcasting family, having parlayed his relationship into the nickname “Idol Raffy,” focusing on protecting the poor, the plight of overseas workers and labor rights, chairing committees on Migrant Workers and Public Services, often using his popular “Raffy Tulfo in Action” platform.

Tulfo ran as an independent and finished third in the 2022 election. He has said he wouldn’t seek the presidency or vice presidency in 2028, opting instead to pursue reelection to the Senate, although that may be political camouflage. His appeal overlaps with Duterte’s populist base, but without the baggage of a deeply entrenched political dynasty, although his family has started building its own with two brothers in the Senate and three other relatives in the House.

Another possible contender is Senator Risa Hontiveros, a one-time award-winning broadcast journalist for IBC and GMA Network. who has emerged as a prominent voice of the principled opposition. Through indefatigable high-profile Senate investigations into offshore gambling hubs and government irregularities, she has cultivated a reputation for accountability and policy-driven governance. She is feisty, abrasive, a prominent voice in the opposition who is frequently targeted by supporters of the previous and current administrations, with accusations ranging from being a “hypocrite” to unsubstantiated links to communist groups.

Former vice president Leni Robredo, now mayor of Naga City in the Bicol Region, has declined repeated calls to run again for president after her heavy loss to Marcos in 2022. Some backers are eyeing a Duterte-Robredo match, but she insists it’s too early to discuss the 2028 race and says such talk would distract from her duties to local constituents. Still, allies in the Liberal Party haven’t given up on persuading her, pointing to a recent interview in which she said she would go “wherever the road takes me.”

The disinformation battlefield

Hovering over all of this is the powerful influence of disinformation. Philippine elections are increasingly fought on social media as much as in campaign rallies. Digital networks of influencers, partisan pages, and coordinated messaging operations shape public perceptions long before formal campaigning begins. In both 2016 and 2022, online narratives, with legions of paid online trolls, proved capable of reshaping political reputations and rewriting historical memory.

By 2028, the battle may not simply be over who has the best platform, but who controls the most powerful digital megaphone.

What could bring Duterte down?

Despite her current advantage in early surveys, several factors – if impeachment doesn’t -- could undermine Sara Duterte’s dominance. First is accountability. If the impeachment proceedings gather credible evidence that resonates with voters, the damage could be lasting even without a conviction. Second is economic reality. Elections are often decided not by ideology but by the price of rice, electricity, and fuel. If economic conditions worsen, voters may be more willing to consider alternatives. Third is political fragmentation. If the Marcos and Duterte camps continue to attack each other, they may inadvertently create an opening for a candidate who can present themselves as a stabilizing alternative.

Beyond political dynasties

Ultimately, the 2028 election should not be reduced to a contest between rival families seeking to retain power. The real question is whether any candidate can convincingly address the everyday struggles facing ordinary Filipinos — rising prices, job insecurity, and national sovereignty. The colorful posters and campaign jingles will come soon enough. But the decision voters must make is far more serious. Is the next president fighting for the country, or simply fighting for survival within the endless drama of Philippine politics? The answer will determine the future direction of the republic.

Despite the current conflagration in the Middle East, the security architecture of West and South Asia is undergoing a quiet but consequential transformation, driven less by ideology than by strategic necessity. What is emerging is not a return to rigid Cold War–style blocs, but a fluid realignment shaped by…

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Recent developments in the Middle East, with fighting breaking out between the US and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, have brought into sharp focus Tokyo’s dire situation, centered on the lack of energy security, with more than 95 percent of its oil and 11 percent of its liquefied natural …

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More than two decades after Indonesia’s Reformasi movement ushered in democratic governance, there are mounting indications that this era may be entering a more precarious phase. The warning signs are varied but increasingly difficult to ignore: reports of intimidation and terror directed at activists, legislative initiatives widely seen as constraining press freedom, and, perhaps most strikingly, the reactivation of military command structures at the regional level.

For many observers, these developments evoke the territorial military influence that defined Indonesia’s authoritarian past, raising urgent questions about whether the country is gradually retreating from the democratic gains achieved since 1998.

At the center of this evolving debate stands President Prabowo Subianto. Critics have increasingly turned their attention to his governing style, which, according to Yanuar Nugroho in an article published by Kompas Newspaper, appears to rely more heavily on personal loyalty than on deliberative processes grounded in institutional reasoning. Such an approach stands in contrast to the technocratic logic that emphasizes cross-institutional coordination, data-driven decision-making, and systemic accountability.

Pro-democracy activists argue that Prabowo’s leadership has, over time, shown a growing inclination toward military-style approaches that risk undermining democratic norms and civilian protections. This tendency, they say, is exacerbated by a centralized leadership style that is resistant to criticism and often dismissive of social realities on the ground.

The Return of Territorial Command

One of the most contentious developments has been the reactivation of the Territorial Staff Chief (Kaster) position within the Indonesian military which had been abolished in 2001 by former President Abdurrahman Wahid as part of sweeping military reforms. Khairul Fahmi, a co-founder of the Institute for Security and Strategic Studies (ISESS), noted that during the New Order era, territorial commands served as tactical instruments for maintaining political stability. Security functions that should have been the domain of the police were instead carried out by the military as part of its dual function (dwifungsi) in both defense and civilian affairs. This trajectory became more pronounced in March 2025, when the government and Parliament passed amendments to the Indonesian Armed Forces Law, allowing military officers to occupy a wider range of civilian government positions.

“The military today carries a kind of historical burden of proof,” Fahmi said. “It must demonstrate transparently that the reactivation of the Kaster position is not a return to the old patterns of dual function.”

Since last year, Prabowo has overseen the establishment of six new regional military commands and the activation of 100 of a planned 514 territorial development battalions across Indonesia. Additional expansions include 14 naval and three air force regional commands, and one air operations command. The administration has also formed six special forces command groups, 20 territorial development brigades, and several new units within rapid deployment and marine corps structures.

Terror Against Activists

The debate over military expansion has taken on a more urgent tone in the wake of a series of attacks targeting activists and public figures critical of the government. Among the most alarming incidents occurred on the night of March 12, 2026, in Menteng, Jakarta. Two men on a motorcycle threw acid at Andrie Yunus, a 27-year-old deputy coordinator of the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS), as he was returning home after recording a podcast interview.

Yunus suffered burns covering 24 percent of his face, chest, and hands, and faces the possibility of losing the cornea in his right eye. The video of the attack, widely circulated on the internet and social media, sparked public outrage and calls for a thorough investigation.

On March 18, military police arrested four soldiers—a captain, two lieutenants, and a sergeant—assigned to the Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS), in connection with the acid attack on Yunus. However, details regarding their motives, individual roles, and the full chronology of events have yet to be disclosed.

Yunus had been a vocal critic of the military, particularly in light of proposed legal changes expanding its role in civilian affairs. He also contributed to a report examining alleged involvement of BAIS personnel in arson attacks during economic protests in 2025.

Following the arrests, the head of BAIS, Lt. Gen. Yudi Abrimantyo, announced his resignation, citing accountability. Activists, however, argue that this step falls short and have called for the suspects to be tried in civilian courts, pointing to a long history of impunity for military personnel accused of human rights violations. Complicating matters further, police have suggested that more than four individuals may have been involved in the attack. Authorities identified two alleged perpetrators with initials BHC and MAK, whose identities differ from those named by the military, raising concerns that not all those responsible have been brought to justice.

Government officials have sought to frame the incident as the actions of individuals rather than a reflection of institutional conduct. Yet some analysts remain skeptical. Muhamad Haripin, a defense and security researcher at the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN), questioned whether the suspects could have acted independently. “The military operates under a strict hierarchical command system,” he said. “Personnel at all levels are bound by orders and institutional norms.”

During Prabowo’s presidency, similar acts of intimidation have been reported against other outspoken figures. These include the delivery of a chicken carcass to Greenpeace Indonesia activist Iqbal Damanik, a pig’s head sent to Tempo journalist Francisca Rosana, rotten eggs to influencer Sherly Annavita, a Molotov cocktail to content creator DJ Donny, vandalism of a car belonging to creator Viridian Aurellio, and death threats directed at Tiyo Ardianto, head of the student executive body at Gadjah Mada University.

An investigative report by a fact-finding team comprising KontraS, the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI), and the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute (LBH Jakarta) revealed that 6,719 individuals were arrested during mass demonstrations in August 2025. The report described the crackdown as the largest “hunt for activists” since the Reformasi era, alleging that security forces conducted arbitrary arrests aimed at silencing pro-democracy voices. The scale of the operation, it said, has fostered a climate of fear, particularly among young people.

The Specter of “Foreign Agents”

Amid these developments, the government has introduced a new legislative initiative that has further fueled debate over the direction of Indonesia’s democracy. The Coordinating Ministry for Law, Human Rights, Immigration, and Corrections has proposed a draft law on combating disinformation and foreign propaganda.

Under Prabowo’s administration, the management of public information appears to be shifting from a framework of civil governance to one rooted in national security. Pro-democracy activists view the proposed legislation as a significant turning point, marking an attempt by the state to codify mechanisms for countering what it defines as “narrative attacks” from external actors.

Government officials have pointed to campaigns against Indonesian palm oil in European and North American markets as evidence of systematic foreign propaganda aimed at undermining the national economy. Existing legal instruments, such as the Electronic Information and Transactions Law, are considered insufficient, particularly in addressing extraterritorial jurisdiction and the attribution of actions to foreign actors.

Civil society groups, however, see the initiative as deeply problematic. Organizations including Amnesty International Indonesia, the Legal Aid Institute for the Press (LBH Pers), and the Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (ICJR) have warned that the bill reflects a form of state paranoia that could legitimize the suppression of domestic criticism by labeling it as foreign interference.

Usman Hamid, executive director of Amnesty International Indonesia, said the proposed law could significantly curtail freedom of expression. Based on circulating academic drafts, he warned that it could be used to accuse citizens of advancing foreign interests.

“The plan to introduce this bill shows that the current administration intends to intensify repression against increasingly critical voices in society,” he said, particularly among civil society groups, students, and young people.

Concerns have also been raised about the broader implications of the rhetoric surrounding “foreign agents.” President Prabowo has repeatedly invoked the term in public speeches, prompting fears that organizations receiving international support could be targeted. Critics argue that the concept of propaganda is inherently subjective, making it vulnerable to political manipulation.

In this context, the trajectory of Indonesia’s democracy appears increasingly uncertain. The convergence of military expansion, intimidation of dissent, and restrictive legislative initiatives has created a climate in which the boundaries between security and repression are becoming harder to distinguish. For many, the question is no longer whether Indonesia’s democratic gains are under pressure, but how far the country may be willing—or able—to go in defending them.

US President Donald Trump appears to have fallen in love – vainly so far – with a foreign policy in which the US reshapes hostile regimes without committing to prolonged military occupation or large-scale nation-building. Taken together, the mounting pressure on Venezuela, Iran and Cuba suggests a recognizable strategic pattern – the VIC triangl…

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The assassination in Cambodia of Lin Bing-wen, a fugitive billionaire Taiwanese gambling tycoon, is raising speculation in Taipei that Lin was protected and then silenced by powerful political forces. He used social media to deny that he was fleeing justice in Taipei and taunted political figures in Taiwan, suggesting he would return to expose sensitive information involving public officials.

Lin, variously reported as 54 or 55 years old and nicknamed “The Eel,” was found dead with 29 bullet wounds while walking his dog in the gaming mecca of Sihanoukville on March 23, with three to four assailants managing to flee. A manhunt is underway, although Cambodian authorities have released few details and no official motive has been confirmed. Five of the shots were to his head, prompting Hong Kong-based security consultant Steve Vickers, a specialist on organized crime, to quip: “Well, we can probably rule out suicide.”

Top of the Wanted List

A heavily tattooed figure with a clean-shaven head, Lin, an alleged Heavenly Way triad member, had been at the top of Taiwan’s wanted list for his alleged role in one of the island’s largest underground banking and gambling cases, commonly referred to as the “88 Club” scandal, which extended well beyond financial crime. More than two dozen law enforcement officials were disciplined after being linked to the club, which functioned as a high-end private venue catering to influential figures across business, politics and law enforcement.

Together with former Taiwanese gambling executive Kuo Che-min, Lin faced trial at the New Taipei District Court in 2024 for charges related to his alleged involvement in gambling operations and an international money laundering scheme. But he failed to turn up several times and eventually jumped bail, slipping out of Taiwan to Cambodia, where he reportedly became involved in hotel and casino operations in the city, working with Chinese partners.

Lin was also involved in the 2007 “Black Rice Incident,” a match-fixing scandal that rocked Taiwan’s professional baseball league, and he has had a long track record in the Macao gambling industry but left as regulatory pressure from the Chinese government intensified amid widespread reports of Chinese bureaucrats gambling millions. According to the Japanese online publication Nikkei Asia, Lin represented the Venus junket in public events across Asia, including in its dealings with the Suncity junket, which until its closure in 2022 was the undisputed king of VIP casino gaming promotion throughout Macau. Lin was also the owner of PGTalk, an encrypted messaging and payment services app believed to be used by gangsters and money launderers.

Taiwan gangsters’ international scams

Taiwanese gangsters are heavily involved in Southeast Asia’s gambling and scam industry, operating primarily through transnational criminal networks, illegal online betting platforms and scam compounds in countries like Cambodia, Myanmar and the Philippines. These criminal syndicates, including the Bamboo Union, Four Seas Gang and Heavenly Way, often disguise their operations as legitimate IT or gaming businesses to facilitate money laundering, human trafficking and online fraud.

Media commentators believe the motives for Lin Bing-wen’s murder point to two main directions: first, he possessed inside information about the “88 Club” money laundering case, potentially involving Taiwanese political, business and underworld forces, thus requiring that he be silenced. Second, his high-profile entry into Cambodia’s complex gambling market led to a conflict of interest with local gangs. The gambling industry in Cambodia, especially in Sihanoukville, is heavily intertwined with transnational organized crime, serving as a major hub for cyber-scam operations, human trafficking, money laundering and forced labor.

In Taipei, Lin was often photographed fraternizing with politicians belonging to the center-left nationalist Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), currently Taiwan’s ruling party headed by President Lai Ching-te, which controls the central government. Opposition-leaning commentators are rankled by the fact that Lin was released on a meager bail of NT$3 million ($93,000) in the 88 Club scandal and got away with not wearing an electronic ankle bracelet. For comparison, former opposition leader Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) had to post a bail of NT$70 million in corruption and embezzlement cases that on March 26 earned him 17 years in prison.

Was he helped to flee

“The NT$3 million bail was ridiculously low for someone involved in a money laundering case exceeding NT$20 billion, practically allowing him to escape,” said Hsieh Han-ping, a commentator close to the opposition Kuomintang (KMT), in a talk show on Taiwanese cable TV network CTITV on March 24. “Lin Bing-wen’s death might have been a way to close the case, covering up a larger underworld figure or a powerful financial backer within the pro-independence camp, because the dead can’t speak.”

Similarly, Ho Ching-jung, a professor at Tamkang University in Taipei, in the same talk show compared Lin’s case to that of Chen Chi-yu, the former chairman of Taiyen Biotech Co. Chen was a DPP legislator until he was appointed chairman of the newly privatized company. Prosecutors alleged that Chen and other executives released fraudulent revenue reports and falsified documents in collusion with other firms to secure tenders for solar power farm projects and related construction work in southern Taiwan, a DPP stronghold. Ho also invoked the case of Hsu Han, the former head of Taiwan’s state-owned refiner CPC Corp’s refinery division in the DPP stronghold Kaohsiung. Prosecutors accused Hsu of receiving NT$17 million in kickbacks. He was captured in Taitung on March 24.

“The DPP’s political and business circles were giving these criminals the green light, and I am now fearing for the personal safety of the fugitive suspects, as they are now facing the risk of being silenced like Lin,” said Ho.

For his part, a Taichung-based veteran journalist told Asia Sentinel that he believes that the assassination is more about scam and crime than politics.

“The politicians appearing in the pics with Lin were all DPP politicians, but they apparently thought they were taking pics with a success story at the time,” he said. “A general observation is that since the 1990s and the arrival of democracy and rule of law, criminals in Taiwan found it much harder to operate and left Taiwan, spreading out across Southeast Asia and China and taking their operations with them.”

The investigation of a deputy director of the National Financial Regulatory Administration raises the question whether the trackers are circling his former boss, China’s former anti-corruption czar Wang Qishan, 77. Wang was the first chief of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, from November 2012 to October 2017, stepping down from his last post as Chinese Vice President in March 2023.

If Wang, previously regarded as a close ally of Xi, were to fall, he would be one of the most senior officials to succumb to the Chinese leader’s marathon anti-graft campaign, an almost-unprecedented shock, raising speculation among China-watchers that Xi’s campaign is turning from graft to political enemies. No sitting vice president has ever been arrested, although Wang is retired. Known as the “chief of the fire brigade” for his ability to manage crises, Wang has held high-stakes roles including acting Beijing mayor to manage the 2002-2004 SARS outbreak, and purged hundreds of high-ranking “tigers” and lower-level “flies” as Xi’s anti-crime confederate.

“Most communist purges are almost by definition political,” said an analyst who asked not to be named. “In the communist system, there is no independent check on powers. Corruption is therefore rampant. So the power-that-be can easily choose targets to purge, using economic crimes as excuses. If Wang can be taken down, who else cannot be?”

Xi’s 13-year-old anti-graft campaign continues with the investigation of Zhou Liang, Wang’s former long-time secretary, announced on the official anti-corruption website on March 24. Zhou is the latest in a gaggle of top Wang proteges and deputies to come under suspicion.

“Realistically, I think it’s just a matter of time when Wang will be taken down,” said a risk consultant who declined to be named. “Xi is systematically taking down any and all potential replacements of himself. It could mean Zhou Liang was engaging in corrupt activities without Wang Qishan being aware, or the snake is now eating its own tail.”

“Wang Qishan viewed Zhou Liang as a son… according to this trend, Wang Qishan might fall into Zhou Yongkang’s fate,” tweeted David Tsai, a US-based social media influencer, on March 25. Zhou Yongkang, previously China’s top law enforcement official, was taken down in the anti-graft campaign which was then headed by Wang. Zhou was sentenced to life imprisonment in June 2015.

Zhou Liang was Wang’s secretary for 20 years starting in 1997, when Wang was vice-governor of Guangdong province. Zhou Liang followed Wang when the latter became party chief of Hainan province, mayor of Beijing and deputy prime minister. He continued to serve under Wang when the latter headed the Central Committee for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), the very anti-corruption agency now investigating Zhou Liang. In November 2017, shortly after Wang stepped down as anti-corruption czar, Zhou Liang transferred to the NFRA, which regulates China’s banking and insurance sectors.

“Wang Qishan’s several favorite generals have been cut down…. The first three were given suspended death sentences, this fourth one (Zhou Liang) is expected to get a suspended death sentence, with all the chips taken in,” tweeted Xiaoping Chen, a US-based Nieman fellow, on March 25.

In China’s judicial system, a suspended death sentence means the convicted person can escape execution if he cooperates with the authorities – the sentence given for corruption in October 2024 to Fan Yifei, a former Wang protege and former vice governor of the People’s Bank of China. Fan was chief financial officer of China Construction Bank when Wang was vice governor of the state-owned bank.

A former Wang secretary, Tian Huiyu, a former president of China Merchants Bank, also received a suspended death sentence. Tian was Wang’s secretary when the latter headed China Merchants Bank, one of the country’s largest commercial lenders. Another former secretary of Wang, Dong Hong, was given a suspended death sentence in January 2022. Ironically, Dong was a key enforcer of the CCDI when Wang headed the anti-graft agency. Dong was Wang’s personal secretary from 2000 to 2006, when the latter was head of the State Council’s Office for Economic System Reform.

On December 21, 2016, an article of the Jamestown Foundation by the US think tank’s senior fellow Willy Lam, said, “Other members of the fast-growing Wang Qishan faction are up-and-coming cadres who worked with the charismatic princeling when he served in the finance sector. Wang was Vice-Premier in charge of Finance from 2008 to 2013; a top manager of the China Construction Bank and the People’s Bank of China from 1989–1997; and Vice-Governor of Guangdong in charge of finance from 1998–2000. Many of Wang’s underlings have become movers and shakers in the world of banking. For example, Tian Huiyu, who was Wang’s secretary when the latter headed the China Construction Bank, has been President of the China Merchants Bank since 2013.”

“Wang has also played a role in placing several of his protégés in senior slots in regional administrations. A prime example of Wang’s finance-sector associates who have succeeded is Party Secretary of Hubei Province Jiang Chaoliang,” Lam added. On March 17, Jiang was indicted on bribery charges.

Lam presciently wrote on December 21, 2016, “But Wang’s growing power may eventually make him a threat.”

An article by Bo Zhiyue, a China watcher, in Think China, a Singaporean e-magazine, on September 27, 2022 said Xi had taken steps to significantly undermine Wang’s power by either dismissing his comrades-in-arms or sending his former subordinates to jail for corruption.

In China, the investigation of a senior official’s underling sometimes led to the downfall of that official. For example, in August 2006, Qin Yu, an aide to then Shanghai party secretary Chen Liangyu, was arrested for corruption. Subsequently, in April 2008, Chen was sentenced to 18 years in prison.

Politics rather than graft

“I think of these anti-corruption purges as being politically motivated,” said an ex-banker, who declined to be named.

On the afternoon of March 24, the NFRA convened a meeting to denounce its deputy director Zhou Liang, the financial regulator announced on the same day. Apart from vague accusations of corruption against Zhou Liang, the announcement contained no details of his corruption. Instead, the meeting called for unity under Xi as “the core” and increased political understanding, giving the meeting a heavily political flavor.

Xi has shown no qualms of removing senior officials who were his erstwhile allies. In January, Zhang Youxia, China’s most senior general, was investigated for corruption along with another senior general, Liu Zhenli, Asia Sentinel reported on January 26. Xi and Zhang were childhood friends whose fathers fought the Nationalists together during the Chinese civil war.

The Arab Gulf’s glittering skylines were built on a simple promise: stability in exchange for prosperity. That bargain is now under strain. As regional tensions escalate and the specter of a prolonged war looms, the region’s oil-rich monarchies find themselves caught in a strategic vise with no easy escape. Whether Iran emerges weakened or emboldened, the consequences for the Arab Gulf will be profound and potentially destabilizing. What once appeared to be a model of resilient statecraft is beginning to show cracks.

Security Without Certainty

Beneath the façade of luxury and growth lies a deeper vulnerability: an economic and political system heavily dependent on external stability that no one can guarantee anymore. Gulf monarchies have long walked a delicate tightrope, balancing Iranian rivalry, alliances with Western powers and a delicate détente that allowed their economies to flourish. Active hostilities linked to the ongoing US-Israel-Iran conflict have shattered that balance.

As Asia Sentinel reported on March 10, all of the small sultanates except Oman are mainly occupied by foreigners, who comprise even 44 percent of the Saudi population and run as high as 88 percent in Qatar and the UAE. They are workers or expatriates looking for a tax haven with no commitment to their states. Many have already fled or sought to. Should hostilities persist, more will do so, many permanently, creating labor shortages, slowing construction, destroying housing and consumer markets and creating other problems.

Across the Gulf, from the United Arab Emirates to Saudi Arabia, drone and missile strikes have targeted critical energy infrastructure, airports, and military bases, eroding the image of fortress‑like stability.

Reports indicate Dubai’s real estate sector, a bedrock of the UAE’s standing as a global investment magnet, is receiving a major hit. The uncertainty has eroded tourism. If Iran were to become another Iraq or Syria, fragmented into warring camps, it would become a permanent source of instability. If geography had been central to the success of high-flying airlines like Emirates, Qatar and Etihad, it has now become their greatest curse.

The locus of petrodollar-dependent monarchies is the Strait of Hormuz, a 104‑mile waterway between Iran and Oman that has historically handled about 20 percent of global oil and LNG trade. Exports through the Strait have collapsed by at least 60 percent as the hostilities intensify, preventing millions of barrels of oil per day from reaching global markets.

The International Energy Agency has even described a prolonged closure as the “greatest global energy security threat in history.. In response, Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia have been forced to redirect crude via alternative routes such as the East‑West pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, surging shipments to nearly 4 million barrels per day as of March 2026. Yet these reroutes, while mitigating losses, underscore how dependent Gulf exports are on the strait’s security. They are an imperfect remedy for a strategic rupture.

For Gulf monarchies, this brings two unsettling realizations. First, external security guarantees, long the bedrock of regional defense, haven’t deterred cross‑border threats. Second, proximity to ongoing war means even indirect conflict can ripple into domestic disruption. As regional frontlines inch closer, ruling elites must reckon with a security landscape that no longer adheres to old assumptions.

Diversification Under Duress

The economic model that underwrites Gulf monarchies is no longer just about oil; it’s about perceptions of safety and seamless connectivity. Over the past decade, the states invested heavily in diversifying their economies, expanding sectors like tourism, finance, real estate and global logistics. But such diversification depends fundamentally on security and stability. Tourism and property markets are two flagship symbols of diversification. Cities once boasted record international arrivals and surging property prices, with Dubai recording 19.59 million visitors in 2025.

That narrative has been shaken. Airports were closed and civilian infrastructure was hit during recent strikes, casting doubt on the reliability of the Gulf aviation and hospitality sectors. Property markets are also sensitive to geopolitical risk. Uncertainty around the conflict has slowed investor confidence and transaction velocity – a crucial indicator in a market highly dependent on international capital flows. The broader regional trend, as some analysts point out, is that the allure of “safe haven” real estate is losing potency when geopolitics intrudes on everyday economic indicators.

The shock extends into trade, insurance, and global supply chains. Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz raises shipping costs and insurance premiums for vessels transiting one of the world’s key maritime corridors. Such increases feed directly into business costs, slowing logistics, freight flows, and the attractiveness of Gulf ports as commercial hubs.

Last but not least, falling investor confidence has macroeconomic implications. The Gulf states have relied on foreign direct investment as a cornerstone of post‑oil economic strategy. But when investor sentiment shifts, capital allocation follows. The present war has dealt a blow to the narrative that the Gulf is insulated from regional turbulence, a narrative upon which foreign investment flows were predicated.

Together, these factors suggest that the economic shock from conflict isn’t a short blip. It is structural stress that undermines the underlying assumptions of Gulf growth strategies. If sustained, it could reverse much of the progress made toward diversified, sustainable growth.

A Social Contract Under Pressure

The Gulf states’ enduring political stability is rooted in a subtle but powerful social contract: economic safety for its nationals in exchange for political acquiescence. Rulers have leveraged oil wealth into generous public services, subsidized utilities, job creation and social welfare, dampening the space for political dissent. Diversification complicates this contract. When the public sector can no longer absorb jobs at historical rates, and when non‑oil sectors falter due to geopolitical risk, the economic cushion weakens. Fiscal pressures induced by war, including the perpetually rising cost of enhanced defense postures, higher security expenditures, and lost non‑oil revenue, add another dimension.

This intersection of economic pressure and shifting social expectations creates fertile ground for political discontent. When prosperity slows down and the costs of instability rise, memories of past privileges do not insulate populations from frustration. In this context, the Gulf faces a paradox: its wealth provides the tools to absorb shocks, but those same tools foster dependency and risk complacency. A prolonged conflict, or even the perception of long-term vulnerability, risks awakening latent social pressures—youth unemployment, rising expectations, and generational frustration—that have been quietly simmering beneath the surface. Unlike earlier eras, when oil revenues alone could buy stability, today’s Gulf must confront a more complex equation: economic resilience, political legitimacy, and regional power are now inseparably intertwined, and none can be assumed.

The future may no longer be determined by strategic calculus alone. Instead, it will hinge on the monarchies’ ability to navigate uncertainty without collapsing the economic and political frameworks on which their authority has rested for decades. Failure to do so could transform the Gulf from a region long admired for its wealth and spectacle into one where political fragility and economic vulnerability are inseparable, leaving monarchies to confront challenges they have never faced before.

Dr. Salman Rafi Sheikh is an Assistant Professor of Politics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) in Pakistan. He is a long-time contributor on diplomatic affairs to Asia Sentinel.

As global tensions ripple through energy markets and financial systems, President Prabowo Subianto’s flagship child nutrition program is coming under intensifying scrutiny at home. What began as an ambitious pledge has evolved into a flashpoint in a broader debate about fiscal discipline, economic resilience and the limits of state spending in uncertain times.

In recent weeks, economists, civil society groups and even segments of the public have called on the government to temporarily suspend – or even reconsider the Free Nutritious Meals Program, known by its Indonesian acronym MBG. Their concerns are rooted not only in the program’s massive cost, but also in a confluence of global and domestic pressures that threaten to test Southeast Asia’s largest economy over the next two years.

The sense of urgency has been sharpened by geopolitical instability, particularly the ongoing conflict involving Iran, the United States and Israel, which has shown little sign of abating. The war has already begun to push up global oil prices and disrupt energy markets, raising fears of imported inflation in countries like Indonesia that remain vulnerable to commodity shocks.

“The conflict in Iran is creating inflationary pressure across the board — from fuel and electricity to food and housing loans,” said Bhima Yudhistira, executive director of the Center of Economic and Law Studies (Celios), a Jakarta-based think tank. “So far, there has been no comprehensive policy response, even as the effects are being felt within days by lower- and middle-income households.”

Gathering Economic Headwinds

The warning signs for Indonesia’s economy have been mounting. The rupiah briefly weakened past the psychologically significant threshold of 17,000 per US dollar earlier this month before settling slightly stronger, a development that rekindled concerns about financial stability. Currency depreciation not only reflects market volatility but also risks feeding into inflation, eroding purchasing power and increasing the cost of servicing foreign-denominated debt.

At the same time, Indonesia’s benchmark stock index has endured a punishing start to the year, falling sharply and ranking among the worst-performing major indices globally, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The sell-off underscores waning investor confidence at a time when emerging markets are already under pressure from higher global interest rates and geopolitical uncertainty.

Credit rating agencies have also begun to signal caution. Fitch Ratings recently revised Indonesia’s sovereign outlook from stable to negative, citing concerns about fiscal pressures, the Danantara sovereign investment fund and the government’s long-term debt trajectory. Although the country retains its investment-grade rating, the shift serves as a warning that investor sentiment could deteriorate if fiscal risks are not contained.

Indonesia’s debt metrics are also drawing closer scrutiny. The debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to approach 41 percent by 2026, while the debt service ratio — the share of government revenue used to pay interest and principal — has climbed to around 47 percent. In practical terms, nearly half of the state’s income is being absorbed by debt obligations, leaving less room for discretionary spending.

As debt servicing costs rise, fiscal space narrows. Governments in such conditions often face difficult trade-offs, balancing social spending against the need to maintain investor confidence. In extreme cases, economists warn, countries can fall into a “debt trap,” relying on new borrowing to service existing liabilities — a cycle that can erode credibility and drive up borrowing costs over time.

A Costly Flagship Program

It is within this tightening fiscal landscape that the Free Nutritious Meals Program has come under renewed examination. Touted as a long-term investment in human capital, the initiative aims to provide daily meals to tens of millions of Indonesians, particularly schoolchildren. But the scale of the program is staggering. Estimates suggest that over an eight-year period, the initiative could cost as much as Rp4,000 trillion (US$235.3 billion), a figure that has raised alarm among fiscal analysts.

The Center of Economic and Law Studies (Celios) think tank warned as early as 2024 that fully implementing the program could push Indonesia’s budget deficit beyond the legally mandated ceiling of 3 percent of GDP, potentially reaching 3.34 percent even under baseline conditions. With oil prices rising and economic risks intensifying in 2026, the deficit could widen further. Expanding the deficit ceiling, some analysts argue, would offer only temporary relief while creating longer-term risks.

“Relaxing fiscal limits is not a solution — it can become an addiction,” Celios said in a recent statement, emphasizing the importance of maintaining fiscal discipline. Instead, the think tank has called for a reallocation of spending, including a reassessment of the MBG program. The argument is stark: continuing the program in its current form could strain public finances, while suspending or scaling it back could free up resources for more targeted interventions to protect household purchasing power.

Mounting Criticism and Public Backlash

The debate has not been confined to academic circles. Protests have erupted in several regions, with demonstrators demanding its evaluation. Reports of food poisoning and concerns about the nutritional quality of meals have further fueled public dissatisfaction.

On March 10, a coalition of civil society organizations under the banner “MBG Watch” filed a judicial review with Indonesia’s Constitutional Court, challenging the legal framework underpinning the program’s budget allocation. The coalition argues that the policy may violate constitutional provisions, particularly in the way funds are allocated within the national budget.

Critics have also raised concerns about the program’s impact on small and micro enterprises, many of which are run by women. Instead of empowering local businesses, they say, the program has favored large-scale vendors, effectively sidelining smaller players.

“Indonesian women do not need MBG – they need jobs,” said Novia Sari of Solidaritas Perempuan Indonesia, underscoring the argument that employment opportunities would provide more sustainable economic benefits than food assistance alone.

Another contentious issue is the classification of MBG spending within the education budget, which by law must account for at least 20 percent of total government expenditure. Critics argue that including the program in this category reduces funding available for improving teaching quality and teacher welfare.

The Numbers Behind the Program

The rapid expansion of the program has amplified its fiscal impact. As of early 2026, MBG is estimated to reach more than 60 million beneficiaries through tens of thousands of service units across the country.

The daily cost is enormous. Government spending on meals and kitchen operations alone is estimated at over Rp900 billion per day, with additional incentives pushing the total to more than Rp1 trillion daily. By late February, less than two months into the fiscal year, the program had already disbursed approximately Rp36.6 trillion, nearly 11 percent of its annual allocation of Rp335 trillion. The pace of spending has raised concerns about cash flow pressures and the sustainability of financing such a large program.

The broader fiscal picture reflects these strains. In January, government revenue totaled Rp172.7 trillion, while expenditure reached Rp227.3 trillion, resulting in a monthly deficit of Rp54.6 trillion. Spending rose sharply compared to the previous year, driven in large part by the rollout of the lunch program. Without it, analysts suggest, the increase in government spending would have remained within more manageable levels. Instead, it has emerged as a dominant factor in the widening deficit.

Questions Over Effectiveness

Beyond fiscal concerns, questions have also been raised about the program’s effectiveness. Research by Celios points to issues ranging from targeting errors to limited impact on household welfare. According to the study, a significant share of parents reported no noticeable improvements in their children’s focus or activity levels. A majority – 73 percent – indicated a preference for direct cash assistance rather than prepared meals.

The study also found a substantial inclusion error rate, suggesting that a considerable portion of benefits may be going to unintended recipients. Such inefficiencies, if left unaddressed, could translate into substantial financial losses over time.

Government Response and Policy Debate

Faced with mounting pressures, the government has explored options to stabilize the fiscal outlook. One proposal, presented by Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Airlangga Hartarto, involves raising the budget deficit ceiling above 3 percent of GDP in response to crisis conditions.

Under worst-case scenarios, the deficit could reach as high as 4 percent, driven by rising oil prices and increased spending needs. Implementing such a change would require revising existing fiscal rules, potentially through emergency regulations. The proposal has sparked debate within government and among economists. Finance officials have emphasized that the idea remains under consideration, noting that Indonesia’s deficit limit is relatively conservative compared to other countries.

Critics, however, warn that abandoning the 3 percent cap could undermine fiscal credibility. Since the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1998, Indonesia has adhered to strict fiscal rules as a cornerstone of economic stability. Deviating from these norms, they argue, could trigger negative reactions from investors and rating agencies, leading to higher borrowing costs and currency pressure.

Many economists advocate a different approach: tightening spending and prioritizing programs with the highest economic impact. In this context, scaling back or postponing the program has emerged as a key recommendation.

Political Undercurrents

The debate is unfolding against a backdrop of political tension. President Prabowo has dismissed some criticisms as overly pessimistic, suggesting that they don’t reflect a constructive or patriotic outlook. Without offering further detail, Prabowo said the government would “bring order” to those it deems to be inciting unrest or amplifying negative narratives about the national economy.

The remark quickly drew criticism from civil society groups and free speech advocates, who warned that such language could signal a narrowing space for dissent. The concern has been heightened by a recent development involving Indonesia’s security apparatus: four members of the Army’s Strategic Intelligence Agency, known as Bais, have been named suspects in an alleged acid attack against Andrie Yunus, an activist with the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence, or KontraS.

Yunus has long been a prominent voice on human rights and democratic accountability, frequently speaking out on issues ranging from past abuses to legislative transparency. He had also taken part in protests criticizing what activists described as opaque deliberations over revisions to the military law, which were conducted largely behind closed doors.

While the case remains under investigation, the attack occurred shortly after a directive from Indonesia’s military commander placed forces on what is known as “Alert Level 1,” the highest state of readiness. Military officials said the move was intended to respond to shifting global dynamics, but activists have expressed concern that it could be used to justify a more assertive posture toward critics and political opposition.

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On February 26, in a demonstration of the Vietnam Communist Party’s support of citizens’ rights, the government set up early voting areas for 4,000 voters including those on ships, oil rigs, other offshore facilities and specialized environments to vote in advance of national elections, well before the actual March 15 start date. Domestic media have extolled the state and party’s commitment to free and fair polls to elect deputies to the 16th National Assembly and the 11th City Council of Ho Chi Minh City.

It is an election in name only, however, critics say. Only party members are effectively allowed to run, with party General Secretary Tô Lâm, a former security chief and the country’s most powerful political figure, significantly tightening security, consolidating power across the board and intensifying control over dissent, media, and the political establishment itself.

Across the country, 218 early polling stations have been opened. Some 73.4 million voters from 34 newly rearranged administrative units are expected to cast ballots. As a general rule, local community leaders compete for the highest turnout, mostly by pressuring citizens to vote and permitting proxy voting.

First year under sweeping changes

This year marks the first election that claims to be in an era characterized by sweeping reforms: provincial mergers, transition to a two-tier administrative model, digitization of public services, etc. Yet, amid the fanfare of media and the ongoing lawfare that prevents voters from exercising their freedom of expression, this 2026 edition remains a secure sham.

Domestic media have also gone to great lengths to emphasize the diversity of the pool of candidates that are to compete for 500 slots in the legislative body. Among the 864 candidates across 182 electoral units nationwide are 392 female candidates (accounting for 45.37 percent); 188 candidates from ethnic minorities (21.76 percent), surpassing minimum criteria set by the 2025 amended Law on elections that women and members of ethnic minorities account for 35 percent and 18 percent respectively. Only 65 of the 846 candidates are not members of the Communist Party, compared to 74 candidates in 2021. Only four are approved independent candidates, compared to nine previously.

The list of nominees for the National Assembly elections published on the information portal of the government is in a new order, not alphabetical, with Tô Lâm, the re-elected Secretary General, the first person listed. He is reportedly seeking dual roles as party chief and president, copying China’s Xi Jinping. On the list, date of entry to membership is also indicated to show seniority, though the law says that party membership is not compulsory.

In 2021, prior to the election, two self-nominated and non-Party member candidates were arrested for propagating information, documents and items aimed at “opposing the Socialist State,” although there was little evidence to prove their charges. State-controlled outlets accused the self-nomination as a “theatrical play” of self-styled democrats conspiring to overthrow the state.

Dissent crushed

Vietnam, now sitting on the UN Human Rights Council for the second term, has shown progress in crushing dissent over the past five years. As usual, the party is warning the public to be cautious of “distorted information” regarding self-nomination. Now, in addition to posting comments deemed detrimental to the reputation of the police or the party, sharing social media posts by overseas dissidents is also subject to fines, commonly VND 7.5 million (US$288. 25).

This year, there are no outstanding independent candidates. Lương Thế Huy, a Vietnamese jurist who became the first openly gay selfnominated candidate for the National Assembly in 2021, is no longer seeking candidacy. According to a 2024 report by the US-registered NGO Legal Initiatives for Vietnam, statebacked cybertroopers allegedly ran a smear campaign against him in 2021 with messages accusing him of tax evasion and of being a USfunded antistate actor although he is a prominent civil society figure.

Huy had been actively using social media to explain what he would do if elected, something other candidates at the time didn’t do. His failure to gain a seat in the legislature was disappointing but not surprising.

The “yes men” legislative body

The amended Law on Promulgation of Legal Documents, enacted by the National Assembly last year, significantly shortened the time for soliciting public comment when drafting laws to one third for ordinary procedures and to one sixth for fast-tracked ones, and even allows public consultation to be waived entirely for documents in “special” cases, though what it means to be special is cloaked in secrecy.

That facilitated the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), which produced most of the legislation in 2025, to announce a draft proposal to rate “digital citizens” last December, a few days after the conclusion of the 15th National Assembly. Citizens would be categorized into three groups: positive, basic, and unranked, depending on their engagement with the MPS-managed Vietnam Electronic Identification platform (VNeID).

In another move that parallels China, the MPS also proposed national regulation for DNA Biometrics for the national Identity System. Although the MPS has since the beginning of the year proposed 20 draft laws and proposals online for public consultation, the time frame for input coincides with the lunar new year. They include a draft decree detailing certain provisions of the Cybersecurity Law, one on regulations to prevent and combat fake news and misinformation, a draft circular on the implementation of the task of court protection by the People’s Police force, etc.

The police also occupy a major role in the electoral process, having helped to identify eligible voters based on national population data collected since 2021. For the first time, voters can also access information about elections via mobile application (VNeID). The police are committed to proactively and promptly “preventing, detecting, stopping, and neutralizing any plots to sabotage the election early and from a distance.” The MPS has produced 36 nominees including the Minister Lương Tam Quang, now also Politburo member.

Shortened term

The 2021-2026 parliamentary term has been shortened by three months, with election day also two months earlier than previously, supposedly because of alleged shortcomings of the transitional model in previous years. The early date is designed to smooth the rapid consolidation of the political apparatus and personnel of State agencies in alignment with Lâm’s plan to ensure new leadership is in place quickly.

“There are ministers and leaders who are not re-elected but still continue to manage because their terms are not over,” explains an article in state-affiliated media. “Similarly, at the local level, some individuals may not be re-elected as provincial party secretaries but continue to serve as chairpersons of the People’s Council until the new council is elected. This reality shows that while the old apparatus remains in place due to their ongoing terms, the new personnel and structure cannot commence because they lack legitimacy.”

Top leadership positions such as the President, Prime Minister, and Chairperson of the National Assembly are usually decided at the first session of the newly elected National Assembly in July 2026. However, these three must be members of the Politburo.

International actors, having condemned elections elsewhere, have so far been silent on Vietnam’s polls despite its consistent failure to adhere to human rights commitments. The EU upgraded its ties to comprehensive strategic partnership just a few days after the Party Congress concluded.

Trần Thanh Mẫn, who became chairman of the National Assembly following the “forced resignation” of his predecessor Vương Đình Huệ and was reelected to the Politburo last January, states that election results will be announced no later than March 25. Another all-time high turnout and broad unanimity are a foregone conclusion.