For a head of state who has spent years as the West’s favorite pariah, Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, in early July, received the diplomatic equivalent of a royal flush. Sukhoi combat aircraft roaring overhead. An 80-member cavalry escort thundering down Medan Merdeka Utara. The traditional Enggang dance from East Kalim…

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Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Manila this week— attending the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, the East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, and the ASEAN Regional Forum — highlights a crucial geopolitical reality: while the Taiwan Strait and the first island chain remain vital to regional security, the long-term balance of power in the Indo-Pacific may ultimately depend on strategic choices made across Southeast Asia.

Global attention centers on China’s military modernization, America’s alliances, and Taiwan risk. Less examined is China’s quieter contest to shape ASEAN’s strategic orientation. Beijing’s approach appears pragmatic: not expelling the United States from Asia but preventing a cohesive regional coalition capable of balancing Chinese influence, preferring to deal with Southeast Asian nations on a bilateral basis rather than as a unified bloc, which allows it to leverage its immense economic size.

By forging closer ties with more receptive or dependent states such as Cambodia, Laos, and Malaysia, Beijing is ensuring that the bloc is stymied in attempting to achieve consensus needed to issue unified criticisms or counter-pressures. By benefiting from ASEAN’s preference for strategic autonomy and non-alignment, China is advancing its interests without directly confronting Washington’s alliance network.

This competition transcends military power. It focuses on economic influence, political credibility, technological partnerships and the shaping of regional norms and institutions.

The United States holds strong cards. Alliances with Japan and South Korea remain enduring pillars of its Indo-Pacific strategy. Security ties with the Philippines have deepened significantly, and Australia continues as a vital partner. These relationships anchor the first island chain. Yet they cannot alone determine the broader Indo-Pacific order. ASEAN is central.

ASEAN’s Strategic Weight

ASEAN is neither a military alliance nor a unified bloc. It is a diplomatic community rooted in consensus, sovereignty, and strategic autonomy. Its 11 member states span diverse political systems, economic priorities, and threat perceptions. What unites them is not a common security policy, but a shared commitment to regional stability and resistance to excessive dependence on any major power.

The Philippines has strengthened defense cooperation with Washington as a treaty ally. Singapore maintains close security ties with the United States while avoiding formal alliances. Thailand balances its longstanding US alliance with diversified engagement. Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and others prioritize strategic autonomy and diversified partnerships.

For Beijing, outright alignment is unnecessary. It may be sufficient that ASEAN sustains its aversion to great-power rivalry and avoids the formation of a unified balancing coalition, a preference that aligns naturally with ASEAN’s longstanding doctrine of flexibility and non-alignment.

The Weight of Economic Geography

China enjoys significant structural advantages in Southeast Asia. As ASEAN’s largest trading partner, China is deeply embedded in regional supply chains, manufacturing, infrastructure, energy and digital networks. Geography reinforces this advantage: China is a permanent neighbor, while the United States remains an external Pacific power. When neutrality pairs with deepening economic interdependence with Beijing, Washington’s military strengths become harder to translate into sustained political influence.

Deterrence remains essential, but long-term leverage demands economic engagement, technological cooperation, institutional trust, and persistent diplomacy.

The key question is not whether ASEAN states will choose Washington or Beijing, but whether they can preserve real space for independent decisions. If that space narrows under the weight of economic dependence, neutrality may gradually evolve into de facto alignment—even without formal treaties or political declarations.

Three Models of Strategic Hedging

Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore exemplify distinct hedging approaches, with Vietnam confronting direct maritime pressure in the South China Sea.

Hanoi balances growing economic ties with China against deepened partnerships with the United States, Japan, Australia, India, and Europe. Its “Four Nos” policy — no formal alliances, no foreign bases, and no alignment with any major power — safeguards autonomy. However, flexibility without domestic resilience and credible alternatives risks turning into vulnerability. Vietnam remains one of the most important counterweights to Chinese maritime assertiveness among ASEAN claimant states. Sustaining this role requires ongoing modernization, institutional strength, and economic capacity.

Indonesia represents autonomy rooted in scale and leadership. As ASEAN’s largest member by population, economy, and territory, Jakarta follows its “free and active” foreign policy tradition. It avoids alignment while preserving ASEAN centrality and preventing any single power from dominating the regional order. Although facing fewer direct confrontations than Vietnam, particularly around the North Natuna Sea, Indonesia wields influence through demographic weight, diplomacy and institutional shaping.

Singapore builds autonomy on institutional strength and global connectivity. It welcomes a sustained US security presence while maintaining deep economic links with China. Singapore’s leaders reject Cold War binaries, positioning the city-state as a pragmatic bridge and global hub, a model that maximizes maneuverability in an increasingly competitive environment.

Together, these cases demonstrate that hedging is not indecision. It is deliberate statecraft — tailored efforts by large and small states to maximize agency amid great-power rivalry.

Washington’s Diplomatic Imperative

Rubio’s visit highlights the distinct challenge for US diplomacy. Reassuring allies is familiar terrain. Engaging non-aligned partners requires nuance. Most ASEAN governments prioritize development, stability, and autonomy. They view China as a neighbor, competitor, and vital economic partner simultaneously.

The United States need not create an anti-China bloc. It must demonstrate that closer partnership expands — rather than restricts — Southeast Asian choices. This calls for initiatives beyond defense: resilient supply chains, digital governance, technological standards, infrastructure, education exchanges, and support for maritime rights. The goal is an open, independent ASEAN capable of resisting coercion while preserving strategic flexibility.

The Decisive Arena

ASEAN’s refusal to choose sides may prove one of the defining factors in the Indo-Pacific balance. Neutrality is not pro-China. Yet under conditions of China’s economic weight and geographic proximity, it can produce asymmetric outcomes. Southeast Asian states seek neither dependence on Washington nor Beijing. Meaningful autonomy requires economic resilience, diversified partnerships, and institutional credibility.

The institutional and economic rules that solidify in this decade will shape not only the regional balance of power, but also the range of choices available to the next generation of Southeast Asians.

The region’s future will not be settled by naval power or alliances alone. It will be decided in ASEAN’s diplomatic, economic, and institutional space — the true strategic center of gravity in US –China competition. The first island chain remains indispensable for security. But the broader contest for regional order will increasingly be shaped in Southeast Asia, the strategic center of the Indo-Pacific century.

Khanh Vu Duc is a frequent contributor to Asia Sentinel. He is a lawyer and part-time law professor at the University of Ottawa who researches on Vietnamese politics, international relations, and international law.

What began as an investigation into a series of nationwide power outages has rapidly evolved into a rare confrontation between Indonesia’s two most powerful law enforcement institutions. Indonesia’s National Police, through its Anti-Corruption Task Force (Kortastipidkor), is investigating alleged corruption and money laundering in coal procurement for state-owned power plants between 2018 and 2026. Investigators suspect manipulated contracts, falsified coal quality and supply records, and illicit financial flows that may have caused state losses of roughly US$300 million.

As the investigation has expanded, police have searched more than a dozen locations in Jakarta and nearby cities last week. Several of the properties were linked to Febrie Adriansyah, the former head of the Special Crimes Unit (Jampidsus) of the Attorney General’s Office (AGO), transforming what appeared to be a procurement case into a much broader inquiry into the relationships among Indonesia’s law enforcement elite.

A Prosecutor under Investigation

Police have named Febrie a suspect in corruption and money laundering investigations tied to three separate cases: a scandal involving state-owned insurance company PT Asabri, alleged corruption involving state-owned PT Krakatau Steel, and the coal procurement case. Don Ritto, a lawyer described by investigators as one of Febrie’s close associates, was also named as a suspect. Investigators allege that Febrie accepted illicit payments through the extortion of suspects in those major corruption cases. He has since resigned from the Attorney General’s Office.

The allegations mark a dramatic fall for one of Indonesia’s best-known anti-corruption prosecutors. Since taking charge of the Special Crimes Unit in January 2022, Febrie led investigations into some of the country’s largest corruption scandals, including the tin trading case, the crude oil governance scandal, and the controversial and politically charged Chromebook procurement case involving former Education Minister Nadiem Makarim. Most recently, his office was handling corruption cases involving the government’s massive Free Nutritious Meals program.

Police searched 13 locations linked to Febrie, including his residence in suburban Jakarta, and several businesses in Jakarta. Officers seized 74 kilograms of gold, hundreds of billions of rupiah in cash, and other evidence. They also searched Koin Money Changer, where they confiscated cash in 16 foreign currencies worth about 7.2 billion rupiah. “There are strong indications the location was used for money laundering,” said Senior Commissioner Budi Hermanto, the Jakarta Metropolitan Police spokesman.

Soon after videos of the raids circulated online, prosecutors – accompanied by dozens of armed military soldiers – arrived at the Jakarta Metropolitan Police headquarters demanding the return of the seized evidence. At the same time, Indonesian military personnel guarded Febrie’s residence in South Jakarta. Military spokesman Brig. Gen. Muhammad Nas said the deployment was carried out at the request of the Attorney General’s Office. What appeared to be a stand-off between the police and military was alarming – and huge news nationwide.

According to Inspector General Totok Suharyanto, head of the National Police’s Anti-Corruption Task Force, investigators are focusing on three cases. The first concerns alleged corruption in coal procurement that investigators believe contributed to electricity shortages and widespread blackouts. The second revisits alleged corruption and money laundering connected to PT Asabri and another state-owned insurer, Jiwasraya. The third involves the settlement of debts between two subsidiaries of Krakatau Steel.

Although the investigations concern separate legal matters, police have linked them in pursuing Febrie, leaving unresolved questions about the precise role prosecutors believe he played in each case, which has since been handed over to the attorney general’s office, prompting concerns that the institution is being asked to investigate one of its own and will potentially shield senior officials from independent scrutiny.

The Curse of the Free Meals Program

The bitter feud between Indonesia’s police and prosecutors didn’t begin with the coal investigation. Its roots lie in a far more politically sensitive case: alleged corruption in President Prabowo Subianto’s flagship Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) program.

Far from becoming the signature social program Prabowo envisioned, the free lunch initiative has increasingly become synonymous with allegations of corruption. What was designed as a nationwide effort to improve child nutrition and ease widespread stunting has instead exposed weaknesses in governance as the program expanded at remarkable speed.

Since mid-June 2026, the attorney general’s office has instructed prosecutors nationwide to investigate suspected corruption in the program’s rapidly expanding network of community kitchens. Prosecutors have examined allegations ranging from the sale of operating permits and kitchen locations to inflated procurement costs, illegal commissions and the misuse of government incentives.

The investigation soon reached senior officials with close ties to the police. Among those arrested was Sony Sonjaya, the deputy head of the National Nutrition Agency and a retired police inspector general. Investigators allege that Sony implicated other police officers involved in the program, including Brig. Gen. Lalu Muhammad Iwan Mahardan, an active-duty officer who was later named as a suspect.

Police officials were outraged, arguing that prosecutors had designated Lalu a suspect without coordinating with the force. They also accused the attorney general’s office of selective prosecution, saying it targeted kitchens operated by the police while leaving untouched hundreds of facilities affiliated with the Indonesian military. More than 1,000 MBG kitchens are currently managed by the national police.

The police response was swift. Soon afterward, investigators unveiled corruption and extortion allegations involving one of the Attorney General’s Office’s most influential figures, former Special Crimes chief Febrie.

Exposing Each Other’s Secrets

Indonesia has witnessed recurring rivalries among its law enforcement institutions since the police were separated from the military in 1998. Previous clashes – including the long-running conflict between the police and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), as well as periodic tensions between the police and the armed forces – have repeatedly tested the country’s justice system. This time, however, the rivalry has escalated into competing corruption investigations, with each institution exposing alleged wrongdoing by the other.

The military’s involvement reflects the political alliances surrounding both institutions. Febrie serves as executive chairman of the government’s Forest Area Enforcement Task Force, which is led by Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, a retired army general with considerable influence within the armed forces.

Legal scholars argue that the escalating conflict underscores the need for an independent referee. They say Prabowo could ease the institutional deadlock by transferring both the MBG investigation and the allegations against prosecutors to the KPK. Although many KPK investigators come from the police and the prosecution service, the agency operates independently of the institutions now locked in conflict.

Without an impartial investigation, they argue, the greatest casualty will not be either institution but public confidence in the rule of law.

Calls for Anti-Graft Agency Intervention

Hendardi, chairman of the National Council of the influential SETARA Institute, said the KPK should immediately exercise its statutory supervisory powers to take over – or at least oversee – the investigations. Allowing the attorney general’s office to investigate allegations involving its leadership, he argued, “simply makes no sense. The Attorney General’s Office would effectively be investigating itself.”

Hendardi also criticized the police’s willingness to hand the case to prosecutors, saying the move deepened public distrust and fueled suspicions of a political bargain between the two institutions. If the decision resulted from political pressure by the executive branch, he said, it would blur the boundary between law enforcement and political interests.

“The more political actors intervene in an ongoing legal process, the greater the risk that justice will be sacrificed for political expediency,” he said.

Hendardi warned that appeals to national stability must never become a justification for shielding corruption or manipulating legal proceedings. Stability built on impunity, he argued, ultimately weakens the legitimacy of the state. He also questioned the military’s involvement in a civilian law enforcement process, saying such intervention had no legal basis.

Finally, he said that investigators should not stop with Febrie alone. They should follow the chain of command, trace financial transactions and identify all beneficiaries of the alleged corruption, including, if supported by evidence, other senior officials within the Attorney General’s Office, or even the government’s Forest Area Enforcement Task Force.

“Corruption at this level is rarely the work of a single individual,” Hendardi said. “If the investigation ends with one suspect while protecting those above him, it will amount to sacrificing one person to preserve a corrupt system.”

Since Chinese President Xi Jinping launched his anti-corruption campaign in late 2012, millions of Chinese officials have been taken down, including “flies” (minor officials) and “tigers” (senior officials). Recently, complications have emerged in Xi’s crusade, involving a tiger who got caught and the apparent disappearance of a general in charge of fighting corruption in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

After a decade and a half in power, with waves of sweeping purges to protect his position, there’s little evidence that Xi faces any genuine rival, but internal power struggles nevertheless remain fierce. It is also an indication, however, of the difficulty of eradicating corruption that continues to pervade the Chinese political establishment. The recent snared tiger, Ma Xingrui, is a former head of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and a former member of China’s Politburo, the country’s highest policy-making body– and an acquaintance of President Xi’s wife.

On June 30, the state-owned People’s Daily announced that Ma had been expelled from the Chinese Communist Party and dismissed as a member of the National People’s Congress. Ma’s ill-gotten gains were confiscated and he faces trial, People’s Daily added. He is the first civilian Politburo member to be taken down for corruption since July 2017.

“Politburo members typically enjoy an informal layer of political immunity and are rarely ever removed while in office,” said a report of SinoInsider, a China-focused political risk consultancy based in New York, on July 16. “Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, very few sitting Politburo members have been publicly expelled and criminally prosecuted solely for conventional corruption or personal misconduct. Ma Xingrui’s downfall suggests that he was deemed guilty of serious transgressions.”

What makes Ma’s case unusual is his long association with Xi’s wife, Peng Liyuan, growing up together in Yuncheng County, Shandong Province. When she was a child, Peng frequently spent time in the Ma family home, according to media reports. Ma’s wife, Rong Li, is reportedly close to Peng. Despite Peng’s associations with Ma and his wife, there is no evidence of wrongdoing by China’s first lady.

“The case is significant as it marks the first visible crack in the implicit social contract between Xi and his top lieutenants,” tweeted Henry Gao, a law professor at Singapore Management University, on July 15.

Some overseas Chinese media outlets and commentators have argued that the purge of Xi “confidant” Ma is a sign that Xi is “losing power,” said the SinoInsider report. “A closer examination of Ma’s career, however, shows no special connection between Ma and Xi,” adding that Ma didn’t receive special promotion or treatment while being elevated in the officialdom, “unlike those who were actually longtime Xi allies such as Cai Qi or Li Qiang.”

“Ma Xingrui turned his back on the party’s principles, seriously violated the party leadership’s political requirements for senior officials…. The nature of his case is extremely severe, creating an extremely bad influence,” said the People’s Daily. He was also accused of trading power and money for sex. He was charged with accepting gifts and money and was accused of helping relatives buy property at below-market prices, helping relatives obtain huge benefits and “committing rampant family corruption.”

Ma’s “rampant family corruption” largely involved his wife Rong Li and younger brother Ma Xingquan, reported the Hong Kong-based Chinese-language daily Ming Pao. Rong distributed Hong Kong-registered insurance policies to families of senior Chinese officials, alleged several media reports.

A July 17 report by the Chinese financial publication Caixin on Ma “has uncovered a sprawling political-business syndicate that extracted billions of yuan from real estate deals and dumped toxic assets onto property giant China Vanke Co. Ltd. (which is listed in Hong Kong and Shenzhen).”

Ma was close to Hui Ka Yan, a former chairman of the now-defunct China Evergrande Group, once China’s biggest property developer, which collapsed last year in a sea of red ink. In April, Hui pleaded guilty in a Chinese court to fraud, embezzlement and bribery in relation to his formerly Hong Kong-listed company.

Disappearing generals

Although Ma has been expelled from the NPC, two generals, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, remain members, five months after the announcement of corruption investigations against them in January. Zhang Youxia and Liu were formerly members of the Central Military Commission (CMC), China’s most powerful military body, headed by Xi. After their removal from the CMC, the commission shrank from four members to two –Xi and General Zhang Shengmin, the PLA’s top anti-graft official. Strangely, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli remain listed on the CMC, although the weblinks to their names are no longer there.

“Zhang Youxia’s fall represents far more than another corruption case. It marks the culmination of a multi-year power struggle between competing princeling factions for control of China’s military,” said a report of the Institute of Security Development & Policy based in Stockholm, Sweden, on January 30, 2026.

In another unusual development, a few weeks after two other Chinese generals were appointed to important posts, all mention of them was deleted from the Chinese Ministry of Defense website and the People’s Daily Chinese-language website.

According to an announcement on China’s Ministry of Defense on July 3, at a ceremony in Beijing on that day, Xi promoted Zhang Shuguang to full general and appointed him as head of the CMC anti-corruption department. At that ceremony, Xi promoted Wang Gang to full general and appointed him the chief of China’s air force, said the defense ministry announcement.

“That means Zhang Shengmin will retire soon and Zhang Shuguang will likely become new Vice Chair of CMC. Wang will likely be part of new CMC lineup in 2027,” tweeted Lyle Morris, a senior fellow of the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.

Subsequently, the announcement on the defense ministry website has been shortened such that the names of Zhang Shuguang and Wang Gang were obliterated, only stating Xi promoted unnamed generals. The names of Zhang and Wang can no longer be found on the defense ministry website at this time of writing. The latest mentions of Zhang Shuguang and Wang on other Chinese state media websites like China Daily and the English version of People’s Daily occurred on July 3 and 4

On July 11, Morris tweeted, “Interesting. News of this has been scrubbed from the PRC MND website and the PLA Daily. It’s like it didn’t happen. Are they purged already?”

“The strange goings-on around Zhang Shuguang and Wang Gang further illustrates the fact that while Xi remains top dog overall, his influence on PLA high-level personnel developments is less than total, in fact, subject to disruptions by generals who do not see eye to eye with Xi, but who publicly dare not openly contradict Xi,” Willy Lam, a senior fellow of the US think tank Jamestown Foundation told Asia Sentinel.

The photograph of the promotion ceremony showed an unsmiling Xi, who looked unhappy, standing with Generals Zhang Shengmin, Zhang Shuguang, and Wang Gang.

A possible clue to why references to Zhang Shuguang and Wang were deleted from the defense ministry’s website lies in the identity of their ultimate backers. Wang is believed to be a protégé of former Chinese President Hu Jintao, who was unceremoniously escorted from a meeting by Xi in October 2022. Wang’s major promotions came while Hu was China’s leader. Zhang Shuguang spent years as a PLA anti-corruption investigator under Zhang Shengmin and is therefore considered his protégé. He also served for a time in the northern Chinese command under Zhang Youxia.

Zhang Shengmin is believed to be an ally of Zhang Youxia (they are not related), Asia Sentinel reported on June 5, 2025. Both men belong to the “Shaanxi gang,” since Zhang Shengmin was born in Shaanxi province while Zhang Youxia was born in Beijing, but his ancestors hailed from Shaanxi, raising the likelihood that Zhang Shuguang is possibly an ally of Zhang Youxia.

When strategic passages become instruments of coercion, everyone pays the price, as the world is relearning to its sorrow from Iran’s disruption of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz for the past four months. The dispute is centered on Iran’s refusal to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the international treaty that …

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In early June, General Uchikura Hiroaki, Japan’s joint staff chief, met in Hanoi with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Phan Van Giang and General Staff Chief Nguyen Tan Cuong to strengthen bilateral defense and security ties, the latest of continuing high-level exchanges between political leaders, prime ministers, foreign ministers, and defense officials of Vietnam and Japan.

These meetings have become regular, predictable, and largely free of the historical tensions or territorial disputes that complicate many relationships in East Asia. Driven partly by supply-chain diversification and “China Plus One” strategies, Japanese investment has expanded into advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, digital technology, renewable energy, and critical minerals with an objective not of balancing China through military alignment, but of raising the costs of coercion by strengthening Vietnam’s own capabilities and improving regional resilience. This approach remains fully consistent with Vietnam’s long-standing policy of strategic autonomy and its “Four No’s” defense doctrine.

In addition, Vietnam has become an increasingly important production base for Japanese companies seeking resilience in an uncertain geopolitical environment and rising hostility to Japanese interests in China. Japan’s average annual FDI in Vietnam hovers around US$6.5 to US$7 billion, with cumulative investments nearing US$78.6 billion. In contrast, Japan’s FDI in China, while still commanding a much larger historical cumulative base and seeing occasional yearly spikes, has cooled on average due to supply-chain diversification and geopolitical tensions.

Economic cooperation now extends beyond trade and investment to economic security, technological innovation, and supply-chain resilience. Both countries increasingly view economic competitiveness as an integral component of national security.

Developing Trust

Japan has earned Hanoi’s confidence by consistently respecting Vietnam’s independent foreign policy while providing long-term political and economic support without demanding strategic alignment. The two countries also cooperate closely through ASEAN, the East Asia Summit, ADMM-Plus, APEC, CPTPP, and the United Nations. Both consistently affirm the importance of international law—particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea—as the foundation for maintaining peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

While Tokyo openly advances its vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Hanoi continues to pursue strategic autonomy through diversified partnerships. These approaches are not contradictory. Rather, they are complementary, allowing both countries to deepen cooperation without forcing Vietnam into bloc politics.

The exchanges are an example of how the Indo-Pacific region is increasingly shaped not by rigid military blocs but by flexible partnerships among states seeking greater security without sacrificing strategic autonomy. In an era of intensifying great-power competition, middle powers are finding new ways to strengthen resilience while avoiding the constraints of formal alliances. Few relationships illustrate this better than the growing partnership between Vietnam and Japan.

Over the past five decades of diplomatic relations, Hanoi and Tokyo have transformed a once-cautious post-war relationship into one of Asia’s most stable and consequential strategic partnerships. What began as economic engagement following Vietnam’s Đổi Mới reforms in 1986 has evolved into a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership encompassing diplomacy, trade, infrastructure, technology, and defense. Yet neither country seeks a military alliance. Instead, both have deliberately chosen a model of deep cooperation that preserves policy independence while advancing shared strategic interests. That balance explains both the durability and the growing importance of the relationship.

Political Trust as Strategic Capital

Trust has become the partnership’s most valuable asset, with economic ties remaining the partnership’s strongest pillar. For decades, Japan has been Vietnam’s leading provider of official development assistance, financing ports, highways, power generation, urban transport, and industrial infrastructure that supported Vietnam’s modernization. Today, the relationship has moved well beyond the traditional donor-recipient framework.

The most significant transformation has been in security cooperation, with military dialogues, cybersecurity cooperation, maritime domain awareness, coast guard coordination, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and peacekeeping becoming regular components of the bilateral agenda. Through its Official Security Assistance program, Japan has strengthened Vietnam’s maritime capabilities by supporting surveillance, training, and transfers of non-lethal equipment.

Yet strategic autonomy requires more than diplomatic flexibility. It also depends on the institutional strength, transparency, public trust, and a clearly articulated set of principles and shared values that allow a country to sustain independent decision-making over the long term. For Vietnam, the challenge is not merely maintaining balanced relations among major powers, but ensuring that its strategic autonomy is supported by stronger institutions, greater societal trust, and clearer principles guiding its international engagement. In the 21st century, countries do not choose sides only through alliances; they also choose the principles and norms that shape their place in the international order.

Tokyo understands Vietnam’s strategic constraints. Hanoi, in turn, values Japan’s technological capabilities, institutional reliability, and long-term commitment. The result is a partnership that deepens steadily without transforming into an exclusive security coalition.

Different Paths, Shared Goals

A comparison with Japan’s relationship with the Philippines highlights the flexibility of Tokyo’s regional strategy. The Philippines, backed by its alliance with the United States, has pursued deeper military interoperability with Japan through reciprocal access arrangements, logistics agreements, expanded joint exercises, and major defense equipment transfers. Vietnam has chosen a different path—one centered on capacity-building, institutional cooperation, and greater self-reliance rather than alliance integration.

Neither model is inherently superior. Each reflects different historical experiences, domestic political choices, and strategic circumstances. Japan’s success lies not in exporting a single security model but in adapting its partnerships to the priorities of each country.

The Vietnam-Japan relationship demonstrates that strategic trust does not require a formal alliance. As great-power competition intensifies, middle powers are becoming increasingly important in shaping the regional order. By combining economic interdependence, technological cooperation, and measured security engagement, Vietnam and Japan have built a partnership that strengthens resilience while preserving sovereign decision-making.

In that evolving landscape, the Vietnam-Japan partnership offers a practical model for the Indo-Pacific: stable, adaptable, and rooted in mutual respect. It demonstrates that strategic autonomy does not require strategic ambiguity, and that middle powers can shape the regional order not through alliances alone, but through partnerships built on trust, resilience, and shared principles.

Khanh Vu Duc is a frequent contributor to Asia Sentinel. He is a lawyer and part-time law professor at the University of Ottawa who researches on Vietnamese politics, international relations, and international law.

As widely expected, Malaysia’s Barisan Nasional last weekend swept to a resounding victory in elections in the populous southern state of Johor across the strait from Singapore, taking 48 of 56 seats and leaving its rival, Anwar Ibrahim’s Pakatan Harapan coalition, with just eight, compounding the prime minister’s hopes to stay in power on the national level in general elections to be held before February 17, 2028.

The signs have been clear for a long time. Anwar didn’t become prime minister in 2022 because his coalition won the majority of parliamentary seats. The King proposed a “unity government” in which parties that had just battled it out in a bruising general election, propagating different ideologies and different dreams, were coerced into supporting an uneasy coalition government which, to its credit, has lasted three and a half years as Anwar, a gifted public speaker, persuaded many more politicians to team up with him to avail themselves of the benefits of being in government.

Malaysians were fatigued and drained by a massive scandal that had ended the 61-year reign of the Barisan Nasional as well as three successive governments since 2018 and accepted the Anwar coalition, choosing to believe the alternative, an Islamic government headed by the rural Islamist Parti Islam se-Malaysia, or PAS, would have been worse. Buoyed by an international reputation as a moderate Muslim seeking to establish a multiracial government in a country that has long suffered from tense relations between its Malay Muslim majority and its Chinese and Indian minorities, Anwar promised reformasi and stability.

The country got neither, signaled almost immediately when Anwar appointed the scandal-scarred United Malays National Organization’s President Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, literally on trial at the time for looting his own charitable organization, as his deputy prime minister. The charges mysteriously disappeared, with investigations into several UMNO leaders suddenly slow-walked into oblivion.

Anwar went back on his promises. He said there would be no politicians on boards of government-linked companies and asked all who had been appointed before to resign. And subsequently, he proceeded to fill these boards again with politicians. One after another, the promises made during the polls kept being broken. Anwar promised a clean government, but it was anything but clean.

In addition, as the leaders of Anwar’s coalition took over ministries, critics say, they displayed overweening arrogance to both the general public and government officials, a mistake in a bureaucracy put in place by 61 years of UMNO leadership and hardly receptive to tone deaf ministers. A promise to reform Malaysia’s education system has seen the schools become more Islamic, with the government actively expanding religious curriculum and implementing policies rooted in Islamic teachings across public schools nationwide.

The Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party, the largest party in Anwar’s coalition and for 60 years the loudest voice in criticizing and preaching against corruption, power abuse and good governance, kept silent and reveled, enjoying the perks of power and fame. They paid for it.

People saw through them. The talk of “what’s the alternative to Anwar? Surely not PAS?” started floating. The DAP lost every seat it contested in last year’s Sabah state election and Anwar’s Parti Keadilan Rakyat won only one (more by default). In Johor, the DAP contested 17 seats and won six. Overall, the Pakatan Harapan coalition was left reeling from a disastrous outcome, winning only eight of the 56 seats it contested.

Top DAP leaders, including Secretary-General of DAP Anthony Loke, dismissed the danger signals. The only two who concurred in reports of alarm were the old guard, led by former Party Secretary-General and National Chairman Lim Kit Siang and his son, Lim Guan Eng.

It was shortly after that Zahid Hamidi invited all the leaders and members he had expelled a few years earlier to rejoin UMNO, still a member of Anwar’s Pakatan Harapan coalition. That is when Anwar himself was splitting his Parti Keadilan Rakyat by almost openly supporting moves by his more ambitious and crafty leaders to rid themselves of Reform- minded deputy president Rafizi Ramli and his supporters. Anwar lost the support of one-third of his members of parliament, and with that, their already dwindling supporters. Zahid’s actions helped UMNO as several thousand returned to the fold - including the popular Khairy Jamaluddin and Hishamuddin Hussein.

This was complicated by the royalty flexing their muscles beyond their constitutional roles, as Asia Sentinel reported on July 10, while Anwar’s PKR became even more splintered. Anwar seemed to bend over backwards to appease, disappointing his pro-reformasi followers by refusing to take a position on Azam Baki, the subject of a massive Bloomberg article accusing him credibly of enriching himself by turning the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission into a protection racket for corrupt businessmen, succumbing to heavy tariffs imposed on the country by the Trump administration in Washington. The disappointments continued.

The result – a weary, fatigued voter base, struggling with rising costs and fear of the future – has shown in Sabah and Johor that they’d rather support anyone but Anwar and his coalition. This trend may continue in state elections in Negri Sembilan, in Malacca, and in the coming general elections. It’s not that UMNO has shown it has changed. But it is the devil that people know, and for all of its corruption, it has had six decades of learning how to deliver to voters. Pakatan Harapan, after almost eight years in power, is the devil people have begun to despise because it didn’t deliver on its promises. Malaysia in the past several years has been able to get by because of the fear among moderates that his coalition could be replaced by an Islamic government. Faced with the logic of choosing Anwar’s coalition – the dilemma of complacency – humans have preferred known misery over terrifying freedom and uncertainty.

Political parties today spend fortunes on consultants, data, algorithms, influencers, and war rooms. But Anwar and his advisers appear to have lost out on the fact that they are not dealing with machines. They are dealing with humans in a country disillusioned by scandal and unkept promises. A voter can go into the polling booth – if he’s not a committed party man which the majority are not – and change his mind at the last second. Party strategists of today can come up with slogans: “Ini Kali Lah; Jalan Teruih; Keluarga Malaysia; Endless Possibilities…” (This is the Time; The Road to Recovery; Malaysian Family; Endless Possibilities)

These are slogans. They don’t put food on the table, nor do they create jobs. Ultimately, that’s what counts; that’s what happened in Johor. The future, probably coming sooner than Anwar’s coalition wants on February 17, 2028, does not look bright.

Kalimullah Hassan is a veteran political commentator. A version of this story is posted on his Facebook page.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) seems finally to have tired of the civil war and violence in Myanmar. Five years of feckless diplomacy, never ASEAN’s forte, have produced nothing. A new approach is now being tried. Engagement,

On July 12, Philippine Foreign Minister Theresa P. Lazaro hosted an informal gathering of ASEAN foreign ministers in Bangkok hosted by her Thai counterpart Sihasak Phuangketkow. The meeting included a briefing from Myanmar’s foreign minister Tin Maung Swe on recent developments inside the country. The Myanmar side claimed that detained former leader Aung San Suu Kyi is in good health, following years of ASEAN leaders trying to obtain access to her, a significant sticking point in ASEAN high-level contact with the Myanmar military leadership.

The statement released by the Thai ministry signaled a significant shift in ASEAN’s direction. “The meeting recognized the need for direct engagement and dialogue between ASEAN and Myanmar to help build confidence, foster meaningful progress, and create the conditions for calibrated re-engagement between ASEAN and Myanmar. ASEAN will continue to follow developments in Myanmar closely and remains united in its shared objective of helping Myanmar achieve peace and stability through dialogue and consensus-building.” This informal gathering is clearly the brainchild of Thailand. Sihasak and Tin Maung Swe met bilaterally on Saturday.

The gathering is the highest level recognition of the Myanmar regime since ASEAN released the Five Point Consensus (5PC) in April 2021 following a military coup just months before. Military chief Min Aung Hlaing attended that emergency meeting in Jakarta, and was subsequently prohibited from attending annual ASEAN summits. His subsequent diplomatic strategy was to stonewall the regional grouping and reject all efforts to implement the 5PC. Sunday’s meeting may indicate that playing the long game of obstinacy has paid off for the dictator. The meeting comes ahead of the annual ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Manila from 21-23 July.

There is a significant impasse on the Five Point Consensus between the regional grouping and Myanmar. In May, the statement following the ASEAN Summit in Cebu, “reaffirmed our united position that the consensus remains our primary reference to address the political crisis in Myanmar” while noting its “minimal progress on the implementation” and discussed the creation of a dedicated Special Envoy for Myanmar.

ASEAN remains divided over the consensus. Following Sunday’s meeting, Singapore’s foreign minister Vivian Balakrishnan posted on Facebook, “(w)e reaffirmed the importance of the Five Point Consensus – it was and it remains valid.” Malaysia, too, is exasperated by Naypyidaw’s truculence. But it may be all too late.

Yet on July 9, the joint houses of the Myanmar parliament, the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, following days of debate, passed a motion calling on the new ‘government’ to review the consensus. This is merely a parliamentary stamp on five years of the military regime rejecting ASEAN’s diplomatic efforts. By any measure, it has been a dismal failure since it was foisted on Min Aung Hlaing in April 2021. Every ASEAN meeting, and there are multiple ones annually, reaffirms the consensus as the cornerstone of the grouping’s approach, including by its many ‘dialogue partners.’

The political masquerade of the past year in Myanmar is ample evidence for ASEAN of reform. Three rounds of charade elections, the convening of national and regional parliaments, Min Aung Hlaing’s assumption of the presidency, the reshuffling of the top military leadership, the announcement of 100 days of peace to lure armed groups to negotiations and several rounds of peace talks with armed groups that signed the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA).

The Union Consultative Council formed in February may appear to be a reconstituted State Administration Council (SAC) which was formed after the coup and abolished in mid-2025, but in reality, Myanmar is a dictatorship. This arrangement likely won’t raise too many eyebrows in ASEAN, itself a grouping of authoritarian states and illiberal democracies, and Min Aung Hlaing as a ‘civilian’ president may be more acceptable. His first state visit to Laos in early July could potentially herald more regional acceptance as a leader. A visit to China in June was another major step.

The foreign ministers’ informal meeting will further demoralize an already divided and increasingly hapless political opposition, particularly the exiled National Unity Government (NUG) and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs). The unity government’s statement released on Sunday was plaintive, insisting on inclusion as an equal partner but obviously not realizing ASEAN doesn’t take them seriously. Their chance for diplomatic reform and recalibration years ago was squandered.

Indonesia and Malaysia hosted multiple opposition stakeholder meetings in 2024 and 2025, lauded for the inclusiveness of multiple actors and groups. Yet these meetings also revealed the complexity of inter-group tensions, the confusing array of opposition political claims, and competing diplomatic entreaties from the NUG and groups such as the Euro-Burma Office (EBO) and various EAO leaders.

ASEAN will also likely be aware of reversals on the military front in Myanmar. Over the past 18 months, the army and air force have increased counter-offensives backed by air strikes and increasingly sophisticated drone strikes in multiple locations. The dubious nature of claims to ‘effective territorial control’ of more than half of Myanmar that emerged from 2022 appears even less credible now. Fighting between EAOs, and increasingly between various People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), supports the narrative of potential state collapse. There is an increasing urban-rural divide of reality. Visitors to Yangon would barely register that Southeast Asia’s most destructive civil war is raging close by.

For ASEAN, the military appears to have weathered the storm. It may be with a resigned shrug, but the grouping appears set on rehabilitating the revamped regime.

David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian, and human rights issues in Myanmar.

Reported interference by royal families, infuriating members of his government, could force Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim to call for an early general election by year-end despite holding a 68 percent super-majority in the 222-seat parliament.

The issue is very sensitive, given the power of the royal families, particularly from Johor, and a descending attitude toward the press in Malaysia, with editors and reporters frequently being brought in by authorities to answer for their reporting. However, the current crisis is said to have been triggered by Johor Crown Prince Tunku Ismail, currently the state’s regent and acting ruler, who forced the state to dissolve its assembly and call for fresh elections this weekend. The outcome of the election, plus another one in August in the state of Negeri Sembilan, could dictate whether Anwar has to call general elections later this year.

Beyond that, the Selangor ruler has banned pig-farming in his state, causing an uproar among the non-Muslim Chinese who form about 22 per cent of the population and giving Anwar problems in trying to undo the situation. The regent of Pahang and the ruler of Johor are both demanding more share of the federal revenue. Negeri Sembilan has been plunged into constitutional and political crises in a squabble for power between rival wings of the royalty, forcing the dissolution of the state assembly two years ahead of its five-year term and adding to Anwar’s electoral problems.

The 78-year-old Anwar himself is fighting a popularity decline for failure to keep his electoral promises, making him a tempting target for the squabbling royal families. He came to power at the behest of the previous king, the Sultan of Pahang, who ordered him into a “unity government” with the archrival, deeply corrupt United Malays National Organization, after weeks of stalemate from a hung parliament in 2022, when for the first time since independence in 1957, no single political party won the requisite minimum 112 parliamentary seats to form the government. That led the king to offer it to Anwar, who hastily cobbled to gather an ideologically diverse coalition to form a government.

Technically, it is a “strong government” with more than a two-thirds majority, enough to pull off major constitutional amendments. But in reality, vested interests and ideological differences, many created by UMNO, which continues to seek power in its own right, have prevented Anwar from doing that. In the three and a half years he has been in power, he has always been a whisker away from having his government collapse.

Powerful states like Sarawak, which controls 26-parliamentary seats, and the once powerful UMNO which also has 26 seats, have exerted pressure on Anwar and extracted major concessions. But at the same time, some of the rulers – sensing Anwar’s weakness – have started flexing their muscles, in particular the rulers of Johor, Selangor and Pahang, albeit to a lesser extent.

The situation is a far cry from the interactions of one-time Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who took on the royalty, emasculating their political and legal sway, fomenting a major constitutional crisis in 1983 and following that up with sweeping 1993 constitutional amendments to strip them of the blanket legal immunity conferred on them during the British colonial reign. In 1994, the federal constitution was further updated to remove the king’s remaining power to delay bills, firmly establishing legislative and executive supremacy over the hereditary royalty.

While these moves directed executive power away from the sultans, the monarchy has occasionally seen renewed importance during national and political instability, of which Malaysia has had plenty over the past two decades. There are nine monarchs, each elected king every five years, meaning each gets to be the wearer of the king’s hat, a quite ornate affair, rather than for a lifetime.

Malaysia’s political system is based on the Westminster parliamentary system in combination with features of a federation. Nine of the states are constitutionally headed by traditional Malay rulers, collectively referred to as the Malay states. Of these, seven are hereditary monarchies based on primogeniture, and in Perak and Negri Sembilan. While they are supposed to be constitutional monarchs, the Malaysian rulers wield more power than that and have a large influence on the administration of the country – including in choosing the democratically elected prime minister and chief ministers of the state.

All rulers, except those of Perlis and of Negeri Sembilan, use the title of Sultan. The ruler of Perlis is styled the Raja, whereas the ruler of Negeri Sembilan is known as the Yang di-Pertuan Besar.

While the sultans are publicly venerated as guardians of Islam and protectors of the people, in fact, historically, they were basically warlords selected by the British as representatives to deal with the colonial government. Many have gotten in trouble with gambling and other debts and had to be bailed out by their respective state governments. The Johor royal family partly precipitated Mahathir’s 1994 constitutional move when the then sultan allegedly assaulted a hockey coach amid other allegations of royal interference in politics,

The Johor family, which controls the populous, wealthy state directly across the strait from Singapore, historically has wielded political, economic, and social influence extending far beyond that of Malaysia’s other monarchs. The current Sultan Ibrahim Iskandar serves as the country’s 17th Yang di-Pertuan Agong, or king. The current crisis has partly been created by the family’s demands for a larger share of state tax revenues to remain in Johor despite the fact that Sultan Ibrahim is a billionaire with highly diversified business interests, spanning real estate (including involvement in mega-projects like Forest City Johor, infrastructure, and telecommunications.

Last November, Tunku Ismail Sultan Ibrahim, the 41-year-old Crown Prince of Johor, managed to embroil the country in an embarrassing scandal when, frustrated with his country’s decades-long lacklustre performance in the international league tables, he came up with the idea of drafting international players and giving them heritage passports identifying them as Malaysian nationals. The scheme was uncovered by FIFA, and Malaysia was booted out of the World Cup competition.

It was hardly the first time Johor royalty had acted outside Malaysian social norms. Members of the family have frequently been embroiled in nightclub violence and other problems. A Johor Sultan four decades ago allegedly shot and killed a man walking on the Johor beach as a trespasser. He was never prosecuted, although the incident caused a major stir in the country and played a role in Mahathir’s campaign to break the power of the royalty.

Whatever the royals are up to, however, Anwar is fighting a popularity decline stemming from his own problems, compounded by growing disloyalty among the ranks of his coalition. He looks likely to be unable to hold the fort and may be forced to dissolve Parliament soon and call for fresh elections. The prognosis does not look good.

The Philippine Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, opened Vice President Sara Duterte’s impeachment trial on Monday in what could become the country’s most consequential constitutional proceeding since the conviction of former Chief Justice Renato Corona in 2012. The stakes extend far beyond Duterte’s political survival, testing not only the allegations against the country’s second-highest official but the resilience of Philippine democratic institutions and their ability to function independently amid deep political polarization.

The proceedings offer a familiar question confronting many Asian democracies: Can constitutional institutions remain credible when legal accountability and political rivalry become inseparable?

Duterte faces charges of betrayal of public trust, culpable violation of the Constitution, misuse of P612.5 million (US$9.98 million) in confidential funds, concealing unexplained wealth, bribery involving Department of Education officials, and public threats against President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., first lady Liza Araneta-Marcos and former House Speaker Martin Romualdez. She has denied all allegations and dismissed these as politically motivated.

2028 stakes

The outcome could fundamentally reshape the Philippines’ political landscape ahead of the 2028 presidential election, where Duterte remains one of the strongest prospective candidates. A conviction would remove her from office and could permanently disqualify her from holding public office, eliminating the administration’s most formidable rival in the next presidential race. An acquittal could be equally transformative. Duterte would likely emerge politically strengthened, reinforcing her claim that the impeachment was driven more by politics than evidence and casting the Marcos administration as unable to stop its principal challenger despite commanding the machinery of government.

For Marcos, therefore, the trial presents risks regardless of its outcome. His administration cannot afford to appear as though it is weaponizing impeachment against a political opponent, yet neither can it ignore serious allegations involving one of the country’s highest officials.

The Senate, meanwhile, carries perhaps the greatest burden. Its legitimacy will rest not on whether Duterte is convicted or acquitted but on whether Filipinos believe the verdict was reached fairly and strictly according to law.

Setting the rules

The first day of proceedings reflected both the strengths and vulnerabilities of the process. Senators spent more than an hour debating whether Senate President Sherwin Gatchalian or Sen. Francis Escudero should preside over the proceedings before electing Escudero, 12-8, despite strong objections from the minority led by Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano, who was ousted on June 3 as Senate president and subsequently replaced by Gatchalian.

Escudero then settled key procedural issues, including affirming that conviction requires at least 16 votes—the constitutional two-thirds threshold—and that the House prosecution bears the burden of proving its case through clear and convincing evidence.

Those decisions may appear technical, but they establish the legal framework that will govern the months-long trial and reduce uncertainty over procedural disputes that could otherwise undermine the proceedings.

Competing narratives

The opening statements likewise presented two sharply contrasting visions of the case.

Chief prosecutor Gerville Luistro urged senators to set politics aside and judge only the evidence. “This trial matters not to persecute an individual, not to exact revenge on an opponent, and not to win in politics,” she said. “Judge this case by the evidence.”

The prosecution argued that the four Articles of Impeachment collectively depict a pattern of abuse of power, betrayal of public trust, and lack of accountability.

The defense offered an equally forceful counter-narrative. Lead counsel Sheila Sison portrayed the impeachment as an attempt to overturn the democratic mandate given to Duterte by more than 32 million voters in 2022. Invoking the country’s anti-dictatorship slogan “never forget,” she argued that constitutional safeguards, not political passions, must guide the proceedings.

She accused the House of conducting a “mini trial” and a “fishing expedition” before the case reached the Senate and insisted that Duterte remains entitled to the full protection of due process.

Neither narrative should be accepted uncritically. That is precisely why impeachment trials exist—to replace political accusation with judicial examination.

The absent respondent

Yet the day’s biggest political message came not from either legal team but from Duterte herself. The vice president chose not to attend the opening session, instead appearing through her lawyers. She described personal testimony as “a matter of legal strategy and constitutional rights,” while her counsel correctly noted that Senate impeachment rules allow respondents to appear through counsel.

Legally, the decision was entirely permissible. Politically, however, it came at a cost.

Impeachment is more than a legal proceeding; it is also a public exercise in accountability. Citizens reasonably expect senior elected officials facing grave allegations to confront the process directly. Duterte’s absence inevitably fueled criticism from prosecutors who viewed it as disrespectful to the impeachment court.

Still, political optics must not overshadow constitutional principles. The vice president’s decision to stay away cannot be treated as evidence of guilt, just as her presence alone would not establish innocence. The Constitution places the burden squarely on the prosecution. If it proves its allegations through credible documents and witness testimony, conviction would be warranted. If it fails, acquittal must follow regardless of political pressure or public opinion.

The larger test

That principle becomes even more important because the trial unfolds against the collapse of the Marcos-Duterte alliance that swept the 2022 elections. The former running mates now stand on opposite sides of the country’s most significant political divide, fueling competing claims that the impeachment is either a necessary act of accountability or an attempt to sideline the administration’s strongest electoral rival.

The Senate’s credibility will therefore depend less on the final verdict than on whether Filipinos believe every witness was fairly examined, every piece of evidence properly weighed and every ruling anchored in the Constitution rather than partisan calculation.

Only one Philippine official, former Chief Justice Renato Corona, has ever been convicted through impeachment. Former President Joseph Estrada’s trial collapsed amid political upheaval, while other impeachment cases ended in resignation before judgment. Duterte’s trial thus becomes another defining test of the country’s constitutional order.

Its significance extends well beyond Manila. Across Asia, democracies continue to wrestle with the tension between political competition and institutional accountability. Their durability is measured not during periods of consensus but when powerful rivals submit their disputes to constitutional processes rather than political force.

Ultimately, this impeachment is testing two questions at once: whether Sara Duterte remains fit to hold public office, and whether Philippine democratic institutions are strong enough to decide that question through evidence, due process and the rule of law.

The answer will shape not only the 2028 presidential race but also public confidence in Philippine democracy for years to come.

Malaysia’s Anwar Ibrahim could be forced to call for an early general election by year-end despite holding 151 seats, a 68 percent super-majority, in the 222-seat parliament if the Barisan Nasional, the second-largest partner of his Madani Coalition with 30 seats, wins two key state elections with a clandestine pact with its Islamist archrival, PAS.

Landslides in the state polls of Johor (July 11) and Negeri Sembilan (August 1) may embolden Barisan’s anchor party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), to pull out and force Anwar’s hand.

Johor is UMNO’s birthplace, the strongest among the four states in which the party, once Malaysia’s most powerful political party, still holds power following the 2022 national election. Johor is the only state that refused to reciprocate power-sharing with Anwar’s coalition, Pakatan Harapan.

More powerful than UMNO are the Sultan, Sultan Ibrahim, currently Malaysia’s King, and his Crown Prince Tunku Ismail, currently the state’s regent. The father is among Malaysia’s richest men. In the last state election in March 2022, with a low 55 percent turnout, UMNO won 43 percent of the votes and 71 percent of the seats with the popular incumbent Chief Minister Hasni Mohammad as the poster boy. However, Sultan Ibrahim picked a younger politician, Onn Hafiz, as the new chief minister just to make the point that the chief minister is picked by the monarch, not the ruling party.

Days before the nomination, the Crown Prince rejected Anwar Ibrahim’s claim that the wealthy state has suffered significant leakages. He accused the Federal Government of draining the state and demanded that 25-30 percent - not just 5-7.5 percent currently - of the federal revenue collected in the state should be returned to the state government. Dissolving the assembly 10 months before his full term, Onn Hafiz made clear that Barisan would contest all 56 state seats, leaving no room for cooperation with Pakatan. Such a strategic choice made perfect sense: UMNO voters want the party to lead instead of playing second fiddle in a gigantic pact with Pakatan Harapan. UMNO’s non-Malay partners want to challenge Anwar’s coalition in its Chinese-majority and ethnically mixed strongholds.

In reciprocity, on June 5, Pakatan Harapan dissolved the state legislature in Negeri Sembilan, where an intriguing royal feud has the sitting ruler Tuanku Mukhriz and his four elector chiefs trying to unseat each other. UMNO seized the opportunity to attack the pro-Mukhriz Pakatan Harapan chief minister and pulled out as the junior partner of the state government. The dissolution ended a truce that temporarily kept the Pakatan Harapan minority government in office.

Two days later, Oon Hafiz made a gung-ho vow that he would rather not be the chief minister than to “sit on the same table with the Democratic Action Party (DAP)”, the Chinese-dominant, largest component party in Anwar’s coalition. The DAP has long been a punching bag in Malay-Muslim nationalist politics for being assertive on liberal values, minority rights, and reform. However, UMNO and DAP have been sharing power for 43 months in Anwar’s coalition government, and many ministers on both sides have been working respectfully with each other.

Onn Hafiz’s grandstanding was initially puzzling because the Barisan is poised to win a majority and does not need to form a coalition government with Pakatan. Both ethnic relations and inter-party relations between the two have been largely cordial in Johor, not least because the assertive palace actively promotes a mini-nation narrative of Bangsa Johor (the Johor Nation).

However, it soon became clear that Johor may be a testbed for quietly reviving Muafakat Nasional, a short-lived opposition pact between UMNO and PAS after Pakatan unseated Barisan in 2020. Both parties became part of the new federal government when another UMNO splinter, Bersatu, left and collapsed the first PH government in what became known as the Sheraton Putsch in 2020. However, that soon also ended Muafakat as PAS joined Bersatu to form a new coalition, Perikatan Nasional. However, Bersatu has split after being in opposition for three years, and PAS sided with Bersatu’s new splinter over the remnant party.

Now that PAS has ditched the Bersatu remnant, the obstacle to UMNO-PAS rapprochement disappears. PAS unsuccessfully negotiated for PAS and its allies to contest some seats under the Barisan’s logo. Failure in seat allocation forced PAS to resume the Perikatan brand with Bersatu as the estranged partner, contesting only 33 seats in total. Nevertheless, PAS issued clear instructions to its base: first, support the Barisan in 23 constituencies which PN stayed out of; second, no support for Bersatu for 16 seats it contests.

This basically reduces a tripartite battle in 2022 to primarily a straight fight between BN-PAS and PH, with insignificant friendly matches between BN and PAS and allies. For UMNO and PAS, the goal is to eliminate Bersatu, whose president and former Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin hails from Johor, and to shrink PH’s presence. Political scientist and former DAP parliamentarian Ong Kian Meng’s likeliest scenario is a landslide of BN’s 53 seats while PH’s seats would plummet from 10 to mere three.

If this formula works out, then UMNO and PAS would take it to Negeri Sembilan and the general election. There is no trust between UMNO and PAS, just as there was none in Muafakat then, but this is not an obstacle for their marriage of convenience. They can fight later after winning together a parliamentary majority by dividing up the Malay-majority seats.

There are caveats, however. First, can PAS carry Perikatan votes to Barisan? Would they stay back or even vote for Pakatan? As part of the federal Government, Pakatan and Barisan tried pooling votes in six state elections in 2023, but it backfired. Where UMNO was not on the ballot, many voters turned to Perikatan instead of Pakatan.

Second, there might be signs of a Malay backlash against the royal overreach, but the size is hard to estimate. The outgoing legislative speaker has quit UMNO in protest and declared his support for Pakatan.

Third, the Malay unity game is a double-edged sword that may also rally the lethargic minority and liberal votes to Pakatan or its reformist splinter Bersama. An enthusiastic turnout by Pakatan’s base may reverse Barisan’s luck. Eight months after BN’s low turn-out landslide, the federal election in November 2022 registered a 20 percent surge in turnout, and BN’s vote share plummeted by 12 percent. If the state election had been held then, BN would have lost 38 percent in state seats.

Wong Chin Huat is a political science professor at Sunway University, Malaysia

When President Prabowo Subianto unveiled Danantara last year, he presented it not merely as another state investment agency but as the financial cornerstone of Indonesia’s economic future. The sovereign wealth fund was designed to marshal trillions of rupiah in state assets, invest in strategic industries and generate the returns needed …

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As Bangkok undergoes its gubernatorial election today, two front-running candidates are proposing sharply different visions for the city. Chadchart Sittipunt, the former Pheu Thai transport minister, now an independent and an incumbent known for steady administration, faces Chaiwat Sathawo…

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Realization is growing across the world that the Trump administration in Washington has spent blood, bombs, money, and years of diplomacy on a war it did not need to fight and handed the strategic windfall to a country that never fired a single shot: China. The memorandum of understanding signed at Versailles on June 18 between Don…

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The June 19 swearing-in of Jennifer Wicks McNamara, a career professional rather than a political appointee, as the first female US Ambassador to Vietnam is more than a diplomatic rotation; it is a definitive policy signal. Washington has moved beyond seeing Vietnam as a post-war normalization story or a simple low-cost manufacturing base. It now treats Vietnam as a foundational strategic asset in the Indo-Pacific—an alignment in all but name. Both sides understand this reality, yet both deliberately choose the flexibility of an unwritten partnership over the rigidity of formal alliance language.

The Realism of Converging Interests

This relationship is not rooted in shared political values or historical reconciliation. It is forged in pragmatic realism—exactly as the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) prefers it. For Hanoi, the United States serves as strategic insurance against over-dependence on China, coercion in the South China Sea, and regional imbalance. The party plays with Washington but never fully trusts it. Between them, there are no deep shared values—only overlapping interests. This mirrors the party’s broader worldview: it trusts no one completely, prioritizing regime survival, sovereignty, and national autonomy above all.

With China, the dynamic is even more layered: “đồng sàng dị mộng” (same bed, different dreams). Despite shared ideological origins, historical enmity—including the 1979 border war—and persistent territorial disputes make Beijing a “kẻ thù truyền kiếp” (hereditary adversary) in Vietnamese strategic thinking. Economic ties and party-to-party channels continue, but deep mistrust remains. Vietnam, therefore, hedges by strengthening options with the United States, Japan, India, Australia, and others while carefully managing the indispensable—yet risky—relationship with its northern neighbor.

Washington accepts this ambiguity. The United States builds a long-term strategy; Vietnam builds maximum options. The result is a functional, operational alignment that advances mutual interests without forcing Hanoi into choices that would trigger a crisis with Beijing.

The Economic Nexus and the Governance

Economic integration is the most dynamic pillar of this alignment. Vietnam has successfully become a key node in US supply-chain de-risking, expanding from textiles into electronics, semiconductors, and high-tech assembly. Trade volumes continue to grow, with the United States remaining Vietnam’s largest export market. Success, however, brings scrutiny. Vietnam’s sustained trade surplus, issues of transshipment involving Chinese inputs, and enforcement of rules of origin have become central concerns in Washington. Access to the American market is conditional: playing by the rules matters more than rhetoric.

The ceiling on this partnership is institutional. Moving from a “vital node” to a “core hub”—where Vietnam designs, innovates, and captures greater value—requires regulatory predictability, stronger intellectual property protections, transparent enforcement, and a reliable legal system. Advanced sectors such as semiconductors and artificial intelligence do not thrive in opaque environments.

The CPV’s systemic wariness—refusing full trust in any external power—limits deeper integration. At the same time, US law, congressional oversight, and investor expectations increasingly tie high-end cooperation to governance improvements. In 2026, the greatest obstacle to tighter US–Vietnam ties is often not China, but the internal institutional architecture of the Vietnamese state itself.

Maritime Security and Operational Ambiguity

In the South China Sea, cooperation has deepened into quiet operational alignment: enhanced maritime domain awareness, capacity building, and improved intelligence sharing. Yet both sides deliberately avoid formal structures that could alarm Beijing or contradict Vietnam’s “Four Nos and One Depending” defense policy — no military alliances, no alignment with one country against another, no foreign military bases, no use or threat of force in international relations — while preserving the flexibility to expand defense cooperation when national sovereignty is threatened.

This arrangement functions well in stable times. In a crisis, however, the absence of joint escalation frameworks, clear command expectations, and formal contingency mechanisms creates dangerous ambiguity. Managing this tightrope is a core part of Ambassador McNamara’s mandate: deepening practical cooperation on supply chains and maritime security while respecting Hanoi’s political red lines.

By 2030, US–Vietnam relations will likely feature deeper trade and technology integration, expanded defense cooperation, and selective intelligence sharing while maintaining deliberate political distance. No treaty. No formal alliance. Vietnam will continue its bamboo diplomacy: flexible, deeply rooted in self-reliance, and calibrated to extract maximum benefit from great-power competition.

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Vietnam’s leadership understands a distinctly Kissingerian lesson: becoming America’s enemy can be dangerous, but becoming dependent on any great power can be fatal if a nation lacks the strength to stand on its own. The current approach—engagement without illusion—reflects hard-learned historical experience with both Washington and Beijing.

The decisive variable for the coming decade lies in Hanoi’s own choices: its willingness and ability to strengthen institutions, enhance transparency, and build the governance foundations necessary for higher-value partnerships. Alignment in today’s Indo-Pacific is not declared through treaties. It is earned through performance and ultimately stress-tested when the geopolitical environment hardens.

For now, Vietnam remains a pivotal state in the Indo-Pacific, and the United States remains its most consequential external partner. Whether this architecture of alignment can withstand a more contested strategic environment will determine whether managed ambiguity proves to be a masterstroke of statecraft or a strategic vulnerability when it matters most.

Khanh Vu Duc is a frequent contributor to Asia Sentinel. He is a lawyer and part-time law professor at the University of Ottawa who researches on Vietnamese politics, international relations, and international law.

Singapore’s Shangri-La Hotel has hosted Asia’s premier security forum for more than two decades. This year, it hosted something rarer: a region confronting the gap between what it says it wants and what it is actually capable of building. The 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue made clear that the Indo-Pacific has developed, with growing conv…

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Princess Bajrakitiyabha Mahidol, the eldest daughter of Thai King Maha Vajiralongkorn, has died at age 47, the palace announced today, after having been kept alive artificially despite the fact that she apparently was clinically dead in December 2022 after she collapsed while walking her dogs.

Considered by many to be the king’s favorite among his seven children, the princess had been believed a possible heir to the throne despite the fact that Thailand’s rigid customs surrounding loyalty dictated that only a male could inherit the throne to lead one of the world’s richest kingdoms. As observers have widely, if cautiously, pointed out, the success of the monarchy depends on the ability to produce offspring. Bajrakitiyabha died childless. Having no designated heir will not guarantee the stability of the throne, nor the future of Thailand.

The death, while long expected, reawakens speculation over who will inherit the throne from Vajiralongkorn, who is now 73. The resumptive heir is Prince Dipangkorn Rasmijoti, now 21, although there have long been rumors about his health. Mentioning the youth’s health dares Thailand’s strict lese-majeste law. Dipangkorn is Vajiralongkorn’s son by his fourth wife Srirasmi Suwadee, whom he divorced in 2014, stripped of her titles and perks and sent her to live in exile in the straits far from Bangkok.

Vajiralongkorn’s delay in formally designating an heir apparent makes the succession line complex. According to one Bangkok source, Dipangkorn was raised to be close to Bajarakitiyabha, his elder sister, with the idea that she could serve as a sort of regent, advising and protecting him. With her lingering illness, that has obviously long nullified that plan.

Although funeral arrangements are certain to be ornate, the country is expected to remain open, with no suspension of business activity but with a period of half-mast flags and official observances, likely voluntary restraint from entertainment venues and event organizers, concentrated in the initial mourning window and with ministries slowing regular activities while they support funeral arrangements. Previous such mourning periods have cut into economic activity.

“The medical team provided the closest and most intensive care possible, but her condition continued to decline progressively,” the palace said in a statement. According to the announcement, Bajrakitiyabha passed away at 19:48 local time in King Chulalongkorn Memorial Hospital in Bangkok.

Her status as the king’s beloved eldest daughter and the deeply held wishes of the royal family kept her on life support for more than three years, not only for her heart but for her lungs and kidneys as well, an indication of how completely her body had shut down. In early May, the palace said her medical condition had worsened as a result of multiple infections in several organs and physicians were unable to stabilize her irregular heart rate. In April, according to reports, physicians discovered a stomach infection that led to inflammation in her intestines, causing her blood pressure to fall and her heartbeat to become irregular. Her kidney function and breathing had been supported through medical equipment, palace statements said.

It remains unclear why Princess Bajrakitiyabha was kept alive after reportedly being clinically dead in 2022. Doctors were ordered to keep her blood circulating and oxygenated outside her body. In Thailand, the death of a senior royal can bring the country nearly to a halt. Queen Sirikit, Vajiralongkorn’s mother and Thailand’s queen mother, died last October 24, prompting a yearlong mourning period that will continue through this October. As one of the most senior members of the royal family, Bajrakitiyabha’s death is expected to require another extended period of mourning. Because it occurred while the country is still mourning Queen Sirikit, it remains unclear how the royal family will proceed.

The princess, before her death, was not only regarded as the king’s favorite, but was well loved in her own right. A trained lawyer, she received her juris doctor degree from Cornell University in 2005. She worked briefly at the Thai Permanent Mission to the United Nations, in New York, before returning to Thailand. She later became an attorney in the Attorney General’s office in Bangkok and was later appointed the Thai ambassador to Austria. She was reportedly instrumental in prodding the Thai government to observe the rights of women incarcerated in a system built principally for men and was said to be a force in leading to the United Nations adoption of the “Bangkok Rules,” the first set of universal guidelines addressing the treatment of women in the justice system.

“Among the children of the King, Princess Bajrakitiyabha was the most genuine in her relations with the Thai people,” said a former Thai diplomat. “When she was a Thai ambassador to Austria, she was a good boss who listened to the embassy’s staff and never showed a condescending attitude. She was respectful to embassy personnel and the rules that governed the functioning of the embassy without adding extra layers to their responsibilities. She performed her royal duties well with passion and sincerity.”

Three and a half years into leading an ideologically diverse coalition government, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has been busy courting the support of ethnic Malay voters. He now faces a formidable challenger for the urban, minority, pro-reform vote base that propelled his Parti Keadilan Rakyat which led the Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition to power.

In early May, two of his former ministers took over a small party and rebranded it to court Anwar’s increasingly disenchanted PKR/PH supporters. Former Economy Minister Rafizi Ramli, 50, and Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad, 44, resigned from Parliament, reducing the majority’s Anwar’s Madani coalition government to 151, just three more than the two-thirds majority necessary for constitutional amendment. Rafizi has six more allies in the government backbench, whose departure would deny Anwar the super majority and might even trigger him to seek an early election.

This is not just a succession struggle between the Gen X Rafizi and baby-boomer Anwar, 78. It poses a larger question: is inclusive reformist politics politically viable in a former British colony divided by reinforcing cleavages of ethnicity, religion, and language?

Having broken away from The United Malays National Organization in 1998 after his purge and imprisonment by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, Anwar eventually came to power 24 years later in 2022 on the support of the party that had spurned and imprisoned him, along with regional parties from the eastern Malaysian states of Sarawak and Sabah.

Despite winning 38 percent of votes and 37 percent of seats in the federal election, Pakatan Harapan was constantly accused of selling out the ethnic majority Malay-Muslims. This makes Anwar beholden not only to UMNO but also to the powerful Malay royalty and the predominantly Malay bureaucracy. To survive, Anwar went soft on kleptocrats in UMNO and his Sabah regional ally and tried hard to woo the Malay electorate.

Not only have his efforts failed to pay off in winning UMNO’s loyalty and raising Malays’ approval, but Anwar has also alienated his predominantly Chinese urban base. In a leaked internal analysis in May, only seven of Parti Keadilan Rakyat’s 31 seats were considered safe, and that excluded Anwar’s. The larger casualty has been Anwar’s Chinese-based partner, the Democratic Action Party (DAP). DAP and PKR were wiped out from urban centres in the Sabah state election last November, prompting DAP to push Anwar to expedite reforms or the party would withdraw from his cabinet.

Unlike Anwar, who rose meteorically in UMNO to become Mahathir’s Deputy Prime Minister after a brief stint as a Malay-Islamist student activist in the height of the Cold War, Rafizi and Nik Nazmi joined politics to defend Anwar and oppose UMNO after his purge from the nationalist party. Hailing from a humble working-class background, Rafizi was a model Malay talent that UMNO’s pro-Malay policies aspired to groom. Rafizi rose to fame for exposing UMNO’s corruption. His use of data analysis and targeted campaigning was widely credited for PH’s electoral success in the 2018 and 2022 elections.

As Anwar’s deputy in PKR, Rafizi was appointed to economy minister, whose signature project to integrate the government data of every citizen into a single database, however, did not take off. His detractors see him as elitist and aloof and nicknamed him “the formula king.”

Ironically, Rafizi regained his popularity when he started his “Hiruk” roadshow in PKR’s party election in early 2025 when Anwar’s daughter Nurul Izzah led a camp to challenge him and his ally. Meaning “noisy” in Malay, “Hiruk” is also an acronym for “Living the Idealism of Reform in the test of Power.” Rafizi and Nazmi lost the party election, which his camp alleged to have been marred by irregularities. They impressed many Malaysians by resigning from cabinet, citing that cabinet positions are based on party mandate.

As a backbencher, Rafizi became an outspoken critic of Anwar’s coalition government. He took on Anwar’s confidantes in the government and private sector. The break with Anwar became irreversible when Rafizi’s teenage son was jabbed by syringe in a carpark, in an obvious warning to the father. The police never arrested a single suspect.

Rafizi’s new party is known in acronym as “Bersama” (together) and in logo as a “mouse deer”, the resourceful animal that outsmarts bigger enemies in Malay folklore. Rafizi attacks Anwar’s compromises in the coalition and signals that its party would rather stay out of a coalition government than bend its principles. To indicate their break from established parties captured by dynasty and factionalism, Bersama talks about moving away from the patronage network that has blighted Malaysian politics for decades and recruiting non-partisan local talent as election candidates. They even aspire to build a lawmaker-based party in the British and American mold.

Before the new party can change Malaysia’s landscape, however, they must be able to survive and triumph over PH, PN, and UMNO in multicornered contests. Bersama enthusiasts hope the mousedeer can replicate the success of Warisan – a Muslim-dominated multiethnic splinter of UMNO – in exterminating PH in virtual straight fights in Sabah. However, here in Peninsular Malaysia, many PH supporters fear that the shift to Bersama would not be complete and PN – especially the Islamist opposition PAS – may emerge as the minority winner. If such fear looms large, even incumbents from Rafizi’s camp may not survive.

Rafizi would decide where his party would contest based on data analysis, but ultimately, his challenge is simple yet complex under Malaysia’s First-Past-The-Post elections: can Bersama avoid being seen as a spoiler to PH that would cannibalize PH’s vote base and hand over the seats to PN and UMNO?

Bersama’s base is primarily middle class and Gens X and Y. Can Rafizi succeed where Anwar has failed in courting young Malays? If he can’t, Bersama may end like many other admirable political startups in Malaysia. If he can, then Malaysian politics may see changes beyond just a generational renewal.

Wong Chin Huat is a political science professor at Sunway University, Malaysia

Chinese President Xi Jinping begins a two-day state visit to Pyongyang today amid concerns North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un is drifting ever closer to Moscow while continuing to expand his nuclear arsenal, which South Korean officials say can now produce five or six atomic bombs a year.

In a note of defiance clearly aimed at Beijing before Xi’s arrival, the Kim regime announced that a new underground nuclear fusion plant has been put into operation, which it hopes will produce an “exponential” amount of nuclear fusion material. While on the surface neither China nor Russia is directly responsible for Kim’s expanding nuclear program, his growing nuclear capability is clearly becoming a global concern, especially for East Asia where Japan and South Korea must feel the horror of Pyongyang’s capability.

On the surface, Xi’s state visit marks the 65^th anniversary of the signing of the China-North Korea Treaty of Amity and Mutual Assistance, under which Beijing is obliged to come to the assistance of North Korea in time of war. The treaty’s importance was affirmed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during his April visit to Pyongyang. He described the Sino-North Korean relations as that “forged in blood” and “indestructible.” The emphasis placed on bilateral ties has waned in recent years, with the Kim regime steadily drifting towards Russia. North Korea, in the last two years, has sent millions of artillery shells to Russia’s war against Ukraine, with 14,000 North Korean troops fighting in the Kursk region at the cost of 5,000 to 6,000 casualties.

But the Pyongyang regime doesn’t mind participating in the war in Europe so long as it gets hefty military aid programs, including the latest continental ballistic missiles and warships.

While China remains a major source of commercial trade and food aid, Russia provides precious foreign exchange and the latest weapon technology at a time of utter isolation in North Korea.

Kim is in no mood to worry about international censure stemming from its relations with Russia. Its soldiers paraded proudly among Russian troops marching to celebrate the last World War II Victory Day ceremony in Moscow.

But Beijing remains clearly concerned by Pyongyang’s expanding military ties with Russia with which both China and North Korea share border. In exchange for the contribution of combat troops to the Ukrainian theater, Moscow has reopened a significant flow of economic aid to North Korea, on top of space-age weapon systems including satellite-level technology, advanced missiles, and even talks on the provision of nuclear-fueled submarines.

Indeed, the day after the announcement of Xi’s visit, Kim struck a note of defiance by announcing his plan to build a 10,000-ton destroyer and unspecified undersea weapons, without giving details. That will be in addition to the 5,000-ton warship Kim said the regime is launching as part of an overall expansion of the North’s naval power.

China remains clearly concerned over such a dramatic modernization of North Korea’s already significant military arsenal just across its 1,300-km border. According to South Korean Minister of Unification Chung Dong Young, North Korea today is capable of producing five to six nuclear bombs a year. Washington today believes the Kim regime is already holding a stock of about 50 atomic bombs. Kim himself has already presided over four of six underground nuclear tests Pyongyang has so far conducted.

The regime’s main objective today is to develop a full range of continental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear bombs to the US mainland, with China coming under growing US-South Korean pressure to keep a leash on its neighbor.

For China’s geopolitical concern, Pyongyang’s belligerence comes against the backdrop of Moscow’s expanding ties with a rogue regime. North Korea today not only supplies millions of artillery shells to Moscow’s long war with Ukraine; some 14,000 to 15,000 North Korean troops are said to be fighting in Ukraine on behalf of Russia. Those returning home on rotations bring with them new, technology-oriented warfare training using drones and other sophisticated Russian weapons. In exchange for combat troops, Russia has agreed to provide satellite and submarine technology, reports say.

Another concern on Xi’s mind, according to recent reports, is the completion of a land bridge linking the North Korean city of Hyesan with the Russian border town of Hassan on the entryway to the Vladivostok region. While this facilitates Russia’s supply lines to North Korea in time of war, it can also provide China with an entry to the Sea of Japan, according to analysts here. Reports here say one of Xi’s topics of discussion with Kim will be China’s hope of using this passageway for trade. North Korea shares a 17-km border with Russia.

What concession Kim will ask China for opening this sensitive port borders with Russia is unknown. But Xi, according to China watchers here, is likely to accept more North Korean workers for its manufacturing sector employment, who can send US dollar wages back home. Some of China’s factories in the northeastern region around the Yalu River border areas around Dandong already have a significant number of North Korean “guest workers” running Chinese factories. Xi is also likely to agree to send more Chinese tourists to help Kim generate US dollar income, reports here say.

In Seoul, however, the Lee Jae Myung government is seeking to promote China’s expanding relations with the Kim regime, hoping that wider economic contacts with China will help to promote détente with Seoul. At the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in South Korea last summer, Lee specifically welcomed any Chinese initiative to relax tensions with North Korea. At the last Trump-Xi summit in Beijing, the US is also known to have asked Xi to help reopen talks with Kim, following up on the three summit-level talks President Trump held with Kim Jong Un in Singapore, Hanoi, and DMZ during his first term in office. In a similar effort to persuade Kim to restart the dialogue process with Washington, Seoul has asked Singapore recently to approach Pyongyang for the resumption of summit-level talks with President Trump.

With Kim’s priority now resting on driving up his nuclear capability in complete isolation, even from China, the likelihood of Kim holding another round of summit with Trump is considered almost nil. Seoul is thus pinning its hope on President Xi’s trip to Pyongyang for another round of persuasion.

Under the cover of the smashing victory of South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s ruling Democratic Party in this week’s local government elections lurks the shadow of political unrest, with the opposition People Power Party retaining the Seoul mayorship from incumbent Oh Se Hoon. The Democrats seized 12 of 16 governorships and mayoralt…

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