Prof. Robert Thurman, an American Buddhist scholar and activist who passed away recently, epitomized the optimum synthesis of Buddhist scholarship with activism for the Tibetan cause. His Holiness the Dalai Lama, in his condolence letter to the family, wrote that Thurman “understood profoundly that the survival of Tibetan Buddhist culture is inseparably linked to the future of Tibet itself.”

In other words, Buddhism is the foundation of Tibetan civilization, and without it, there would be no Tibetan nation. In the 65 years since the Dalai Lama’s arrival in India in 1959, the Tibetan prelate has won international respect and much sympathy for a Tibetan cause to which he is central, as a spiritual leader, as an international statesman, and as an essential figurehead uniting Tibetans. Without him, there would have been no Tibetan nation in exile, just a trickle of refugees vanishing into India’s vastness. In those years, a vibrant “Little Tibet” has formed—based on shared memory, language, narrative, and myth. And as more Tibetans have migrated from India to the West over the past two decades, this exiled community has morphed into a true diaspora.

The question is: what will become of this Tibetan nation in exile in the years to come?

At the heart of this collective identity lies Buddhism, in all its variations. For Tibetans, Buddhism is not simply a religion—it is a way of life, the essence of their culture and the foundation of their civilization. Without it, Tibetans risk becoming just another displaced ethnic group. With it, they remain a living, breathing civilization.

In exile, spirituality—alongside common narratives—is often the last thread that holds a people together. That thread becomes more vital as elders with a lived memory of Tibet pass away. Today, few Tibetans in exile have any direct experience of their homeland; many are now welcoming fourth-generation descendants, some of whom do not speak the language.

This shift demands a transition—from memory to imagination. In the language of political scientist Benedict Anderson, the Tibetan nation must become an imagined community, held together not by borders but by shared memory, myth, and ritual.

Just as Judaism preserved the Jewish people during centuries of exile, Tibetan Buddhism, and the language that carries it, is essential for sustaining the Tibetan nation through its long, uncertain exile.

Yet Buddhism faces threats from two directions: from Chinese communists on one side, and Tibetan secular nationalists on the other. The former seeks to dismantle it within Tibet. The latter, influenced by Western ideas of progress, often scapegoats Buddhism and theocracy for Tibet’s past failures. This camp’s well-intentioned but arguably misguided view is that for Tibet to become a modern nation-state, Buddhism must be cast aside, a belief that, ironically, mirrors the logic of the Chinese Communist Party. Where Beijing sees Buddhism as a political threat, some Tibetan secularists view it as a cultural liability—an outdated vestige of a theocratic past.

While secular Tibetans are right to emphasize democracy, education, and modernization, many underestimate the extent to which Buddhism remains the vessel through which Tibetan language, culture, ethics, and collective memory are transmitted.

Meanwhile, in highly developed societies such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and even in China, Tibetan Buddhism is embraced as a sophisticated alternative to modernity and materialism. As modern Tibetans turn away from their heritage, others in the world are turning toward it.

Thanks to the foresight of the Dalai Lama, hundreds of monasteries and institutions in India and Nepal continue to preserve Tibetan Buddhism, language, ritual, and philosophy. These are now the subject of growing academic and scientific research, well beyond exotic fascination.

Tibetan nationalists also forget that the heroes of the Tibetan resistance—the Chushi Gangdruk fighters—drew inspiration from Buddhism and called themselves The Voluntary Force for the Protection of Dharma. It is that dharma (Tibetan faith and spirituality), now the essence of our collective cultural memory, that must continue to be protected.

Political activism and democratic participation are important and will help Tibetans respond to immediate geopolitical challenges and continuing Chinese repression. But it is the cultural memory of Tibet that will allow its people to imagine a nation in exile in the long haul. And there is one more quiet certainty: Buddhism will outlive communism.

This does not mean that young Tibetans need to become monks, meditators, or scholars, nor is it a call to reinstate theocracy or religious rule, which the exile community has long outgrown. Bhutan is a good example of this synthesis between Buddhism and modernity. It’s hard to imagine Bhutan without Tibetan Buddhism. Similarly, Tibetans might consider looking at Tibetan Buddhism as an alternative form of modernity and take pride in their rich spiritual inheritance and values. In it, they may find not only memory, but meaning. Through Buddhism, they rediscover their language—the soul of the Tibetan nation.

In doing so, they ensure that Tibet remains not only a political cause, but a living civilization in diaspora. And history teaches us this: no civilization that has sustained its memory and meaning has ever vanished from the earth.

Tsering Namgyal Khortsa is a writer and and occasional contributor to Asia Sentinel. He is the author of three books, most recently, of novel ‘Tibetan Suitcase’ (Speaking Tiger, 2024). His novella about Buddhism and modernity ‘A Season of Retreat’ is forthcoming from Speaking Tiger later in the summer.

A new compendium edited by respected Tibetan scholar Vijay Kranti and published by VK media group for the Centre for Himalayan Asia Studies and Engagement (CHASE), comprises nearly 60 essays by 39 leading experts on Tibet and China, reiterating the spirit of independence of a subjugated people. Its central thesis is that China, rather t…

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On June 9, India opened a strategically vital 13.15 km tunnel linking the Kashmir region to Ladakh beneath the 3,529-meter Zojila pass, the world’s longest single-tube bi-directional road tunnel at the world’s highest altitude, providing permanent, all-weather reinforcement of its sovereignty along the Line of Actual Control demarking the border with China, reducing travel time from three hours to 20 minutes. It is designed to allow the Indian Army to rapidly move troops, artillery, and supplies to forward positions without the previous weather-dependent delays.

The 3,488-km de facto military border between the two countries has been a source of tension since at least 1963, when disputes over sovereignty at the roof of the world escalated into a full-scale border war in which China secured control of the Aksai Chin region in the west, while claiming nearly all of India’s Arunachal Pradesh region. In 2017. Hostility flared again for 73 days on the Doklam plateau near the Bhutan-India-China tri-junction after Indian forces halted Chinese road-building crews. Hand-to-hand combat between border patrols in the Galwan Valley in 2020 resulted in casualties for both sides, leading to sustained military standoffs.

Built at a cost of US$820–850 million, the tunnel is the first-ever all-weather, year-round connection between the two regions. Historically, the past has been cut off for 160 to 180 days annually by snowfall and temperatures which plunge to -35°C. It is being developed under extremely demanding geological and climatic conditions. Once operational, the project will provide year-round connectivity on the Srinagar–Kargil–Leh axis, a route that remains affected by prolonged winter closures due to heavy snowfall and avalanche risks. The tunnel is expected to be fully operational by 2028.

The project makes it Asia’s longest bi-directional road tunnel with a total project length of 30.894 km including tunnel roads and bridges, located between Baltal in Jammu & Kashmir and Meenamarg in Ladakh across the challenging Himalayan corridor. The project is being executed by Megha Engineering & Infrastructure Ltd (MEIL) as the main contractor under the client National Highways & Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd (NHIDCL), utilizing the New Austrian Tunnelling Method (NATM) construction methodology.

The final breakthrough of the main tunnel, as per an official statement, represents the “completion of the most critical excavation phase and reflects the successful execution of underground works in fragile Himalayan geology under highly adverse terrain and weather conditions.”

“The project is of immense socio-economic and strategic importance, as it is expected to improve mobility, strengthen logistics reliability, support tourism and essential services, and enhance connectivity for border regions,” the release stated.

The work on the project was inaugurated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi on May 19, 2018 in Leh. Union Minister Nitin Gadkari (Road Transport & Highways), accompanied by J&K Lieutenant Governor Manoj Sinha and Chief Minister Omar Abdullah, inaugurated the breakthrough ceremony on June 9, marking the connection between the two ends of the tunnel.

“This is a historic day in India’s infrastructure story,” union minister for road transport and highways Nitin Gadkari said on the occasion. “The Zojila Tunnel is set to make a world record once it is fully operational. It will be a lifeline for the people of Ladakh and Jammu & Kashmir.”

Chief Minister of Jammu & Kashmir Omar Abdullah said the long-awaited dream of the people of Ladakh and Jammu & Kashmir has finally come true. “The joy on people’s faces shows how positively the tunnel’s completion will affect their lives. Improved transport, new opportunities, and tourism will bring real change to the region. Now that the breakthrough is complete, I hope the remaining work is finished quickly,” the chief minister said.

The tunnel is designed to strengthen military movements along the border with China and Pakistan. Improved military movements and quicker access via tunnel are also expected to strengthen India’s ability to respond to potential Pakistani and Chinese aggression along the Line of Control and Line of Actual Control.

“From the defense point of view, the road link will strengthen national security. It will be of great importance to the defense forces,“ said Iranian engineer Yousef Eshaghpour, who worked for years as a team leader on the Zojila tunnel project. He said this was the most challenging project he has worked on in his career until now.

“This project is vital for Ladakh as you don’t have access to this area for about 4 to 5 months in winter due to snowfall. Through this tunnel, one can reach Ladakh in 15 minutes, and it provides all-weather connectivity between Ladakh and Kashmir. Almost 80 percent of the project is completed,” the engineer said.

Another engineer who has worked on the project said the tunnel ensures the road will remain open in all seasons, bringing economic benefits for Ladakh and boosting winter tourism to Ladakh as visitors can visit Ladakh via the tunnel route in the winter season as well.

“The defense forces have to use air force planes to carry equipment and advance stock to Ladakh from Chandigarh when the road closes for several months in winter. When the road is opened, advance stocks will not be needed and the government can use the tunnel to ferry stock for defense and civilian purposes in all weather conditions,” the engineer said.

After the Union Minister of Road Transport and Highways Nitin Gadkari pressed the button for the final blast inside the tunnel on June 9, he emphasized that the tunnel project will prove to be a game-changer when it comes to strengthening India’s security.

“With round-the-year connectivity, the movement of the Indian Army, as well as the supply of Army materials, equipment, and logistics, will become faster, safer, and more effective, thereby strengthening the country’s strategic preparedness,” he said.

In Indonesia, government officials frequently defend development policies by pointing to statistical achievements: rising investment, declining poverty rates, expanding infrastructure, and improving economic indi…

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On June 12, a Canadian social media influencer named Ryan Kelly posted a reel on Instagram exposing a seemingly new and novel PR tactic being employed by high-powered individuals in the Asia-Pacific embroiled in ongoing transnational financial crime investigations.

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The international rating service Moody’s has joined a substantial chorus warning of China’s growing influence in Latin America, an indication that US President Donald Trump’s “Donroe Doctrine” seeking to wall the US’s backyard off from outside influence is having little effect. Chinese overseas direct investment (ODI) in Latin America totaled US$116 billion between 2015 and 2025, making the region the third largest destination for Chinese capital outside Asia and Europe, according to Moody’s.

“China’s huge and soaring exports to Latin America are eroding the region’s manufacturing sector and increasing its dependency on China, said Moody’s in a June 8 report. “Imbalances in China’s industrial production pose direct competitive risks to Latin America’s domestic manufacturing base, particularly in sectors such as steel, vehicles, electronics and chemicals.”

For more than a decade, warnings have been echoing about Beijing’s expanding regional footprint, focusing on economic dependency, critical infrastructure control, and technological vulnerabilities. Policymakers and security experts have highlighted primary risks including Chinese ownership of as many as a dozen port projects across South America and the Caribbean, including the Chancay megaport in Peru. Experts warn these dual-use facilities could serve strategic or defense purposes for Beijing. In addition, widespread adoption of 5G and smart city infrastructure from Chinese telecom and technology firms like Huawei raises fears of significant cybersecurity and espionage risks. Moodys is now warning that those investments are being joined by Beijing’s huge and growing exports to the region.

“Auto, electronics and machinery, as well as basic metals manufacturing (including steel) are vulnerable, driven by high displacement risk and increasing Chinese value added in exports,” said the Moody’s report. “Latin America’s export profile to China is becoming more concentrated in raw materials. The shift from refined to unrefined exports means the region captures less value added per dollar of trade, increasing its vulnerability to price and demand shocks, as well as protectionist policies.”

While Latin America exported about US$174 billion to China — close to 80 percent of which was raw materials — it imported US$252 billion in manufactured goods, the Moody’s report pointed out. “These facts represent a deeply asymmetric trade relationship: Latin America is dependent on China’s demand for commodities while China supplies manufactured products.”

Trade between China and Latin America jumped to a record exceeding US$500 billion in 2025, an increase of more than 2.5 times from $200 billion in 2010 and solidifying China as the region’s second most important trading partner behind the US and the top trading partner for Brazil, Chile and Peru, the Moody’s report noted.

“The 304 percent growth in Chinese transportation equipment and vehicles imports since 2018 for Mexico and an eighteenfold surge of Chinese EVs (electric vehicles) imported to Brazil in 2023 are signs of intensifying reliance on imports from China, displacing domestic production,” said the Moody’s report. “The accelerating competition from Chinese imports is adding to the risks of Latin America’s deepening dependence on commodities and geopolitical reorientation because of ongoing shifts in the trade landscape.”

Some Latin American countries have enacted policies to protect domestic industries. In January, for example, the Mexican Congress approved tariffs targeting countries that lack free trade agreements with it, including China, the Moody’s report cited.

However, China is localizing from export to local manufacturing in Latin America, for example, in the auto and auto parts sector, said Alice Sun, founder of OrcaMar Strategies, a Hong Kong consultancy which helps Chinese firms expand abroad, at a lunch talk at the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents’ Club on April 27.

“We are helping Chinese companies find industrial parks in areas in Latin America where they can get electricity and water easily,” Sun disclosed.

Chinese manufacturers are investing in multiple regions like Latin America, Southeast Asia and Africa to avoid tariffs, Sun explained. “Chinese investments in Latin America in the past three years have been influenced by geopolitics.”

Sino-US rivalry over Latin America

Trump appears unconcerned.

“The Monroe Doctrine is a big deal, but we’ve superseded it by a real lot. They now call it the Donroe Doctrine…Under our new National Security Strategy, American dominance in the Western Hemisphere will never be questioned again,” Trump said at a press conference on January 3. The Monroe Doctrine, formulated by US President James Monroe in 1823, opposes the intervention in the political affairs of the Western Hemisphere by external powers.

For instance, the Panamanian government, likely backed by the US, seized two ports along the Panama Canal which were operated by CK Hutchison, a Hong Kong-listed conglomerate controlled by Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-shing, in February. Trump’s raid on Venezuela in January is likely to strengthen the US petrodollar due to the US takeover of the nation’s abundant oil resources, Asia Sentinel reported on January 6.

“A core difference is how China and the US engage Latin America. China is very focused on the bigger markets in the region like Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Argentina. The US seeks to control strategic areas like Venezuela and Colombia. It’s very political, military and strategic. For China, it’s more economic. The US focuses on Guatemala, Guyana, Ecuador and the Caribbean because of strategic and military considerations,” Sun said.

US-China trade tensions are reshaping commodity flows (such as soybean purchases redirected from the US to Brazil), manufacturing supply chains (including Chinese factory investment in Mexico) and tariff structures, Moody’s said. “These shifts create both opportunities and risks for Latin American economies. Chinese investment is flowing into energy-transition sectors and critical minerals, contributing to regional economic growth, but the broader trend is a deepening dependence on China as a demand and supply hub, increasing the region’s exposure to Chinese industrial policy decisions and US trade actions,” the report added.

While Brazil and Argentina have benefited from US-China trade tensions and tariffs — exporting record levels of soybeans in 2025 — the US-China trade agreement completed by Trump and China President Xi Jinping in May includes soybean purchase provisions and could reverse that trend, the Moody’s report warned. “Slowing construction in China is reducing demand for traditional commodities like iron ore and steel even as activity remains high for now. The increasing role of raw materials in regional exports to China, with only minimal local transformation, suggests the region is moving down the value chain.”

The composition of Chinese ODI in the region has been undergoing a structural transformation since 2020, said Moody’s, quoting a Boston University Global Development Policy Center report that while overall Chinese ODI in Latin America slowed by approximately 9 percent from 2020 to 2024 compared to the previous five years, ODI in transition minerals more than doubled, solar and wind power generation surpassed hydropower as the leading energy ODI category and EV manufacturing now dominates Chinese automotive investment in the region.

“For Latin American economies, this recalibration carries dual implications. On one hand, Chinese capital is flowing into sectors critical for the energy transition, which is contributing to economic growth… On the other, the deepening dependence on Chinese demand and investment in a narrow band of raw materials and assembly-stage manufacturing raises structural vulnerabilities to shifts in Chinese industrial policy or US–China decoupling pressure,” the report added.

Previously, a lot of Chinese investment in Latin America was in mining and energy, but now there are smaller Chinese investments in fintech and auto parts in the region, Sun said. Formerly, Chinese state-owned enterprises led Chinese investment in Latin America, but now most of the investments come from private Chinese companies, she added. “Although private Chinese companies make smaller investments in Latin America, they are expanding in Latin America.”

“In the top part, there is a lot of tension between China and the US. Trump is doing lots of things, but in the lower part, there are positive things for Chinese companies and support from Latin American governments for Chinese companies,” Sun said.

Toh Han Shih is a Singaporean writer in Hong Kong and a regular contributor to Asia Sentinel.

Thailand is in the middle of its most ambitious aviation expansion in a generation, a five-year investment program of around Bt80 billion (US$2.43 billion), with the Suvarnabhumi East Expansion heading to tender and a revised master plan targeting 120 million passengers a year, roughly double current throughput. A new international passenger service charge rising to Bt1,126 is structured to fund it.

These numbers will make the headlines. They are also the least interesting part of the story. Capacity is necessary, but it is not what decides whether a country becomes an aviation hub. Those decisions are being taken elsewhere: in ministries, in boardrooms, and, as this is written, in Paris.

The visible contest is a capacity race in a converging field. By early this year, Singapore’s Changi, Kuala Lumpur, and Suvarnabhumi sat within a rounding error of one another in departing seats, each near 3.5 to 3.7 million in a peak month, while Vietnam’s Long Thanh adds a large new node and Indonesia grows on a vast domestic market. When every serious player is building toward similar numbers, capacity stops being an advantage and becomes the cost of entry.

A hub is not a building that processes passengers. It is a system that concentrates connectivity: route density, transfer traffic, and the high-value services that anchor an aviation economy in place. That rests on two things a terminal cannot supply: a home carrier driving network density, and a regulatory architecture that lets the value settle locally rather than passing through. Both are now in motion in Thailand, and neither is getting the attention it deserves.

Thai Airways rebuilds as a network engine

A hub needs a home carrier with the reach and incentive to build transfer traffic. For most of the past decade, Thailand’s was a liability. That has changed.

Thai Airways is best understood against where it began. In early 2020, it was seeking a Bt58.1-billion (US$1.8 billion) state-guaranteed emergency loan to stay liquid; weeks later, a contentious bailout gave way to court-supervised restructuring. The airline won court approval of its rehabilitation plan in June 2021, addressing debt of around US$12.9 billion, then spent four years executing it: halving its workforce, cutting routes, simplifying the fleet and converting debt to equity. It exited rehabilitation in mid-2025 and relisted on the Stock Exchange of Thailand that August, returning to profit on revenue of roughly Bt190 billion for 2025 and operating margins that, by some measures, ranked among the stronger full-service carriers globally.

None of this was unforeseeable. When the airline first sought rescue in 2020, our own assessment, offered publicly at the time, was that its problems were institutional rather than cyclical: recovery would depend less on capital than on shedding state-enterprise constraints, professionalizing management and insulating the carrier from political influence. By the 2021 court approval, the diagnosis was unchanged, and the restructuring did, in substance, exactly that. We note it not to claim foresight but because it is the thesis in miniature: in this market, the decisive constraints are institutional, and they are visible well before they are resolved.

Rebuilt as a connecting carrier, Thai Airways is consolidating to fewer aircraft and engine types while growing from around 80 aircraft toward 150 by the early 2030s, anchored by 45 Boeing 787s and incoming A321neos. A founding Star Alliance member at the crossroads of South Asia, Northeast Asia and the West, it aims to lift domestic market share from 26 to 35 percent by 2029 and win far more international transit. Transfer traffic is the connective tissue of a hub, and a flag carrier rebuilt to generate it is a central input into Thailand’s ambitions.

Around it sits a layered ecosystem: Bangkok Airways in a profitable regional and premium-leisure niche built on routes such as Samui, and a low-cost segment, Thai AirAsia, Thai VietJet, Nok Air and Thai Lion Air, supplying the point-to-point volume that keeps Don Mueang among the region’s busiest low-cost hubs. Whether these layers are coordinated into a single network or left to compete is a question of policy, not fleet size. And connectivity is never the work of home carriers alone: it depends as much on the access, slots, and bilateral rights extended to international and partner airlines. How open Thailand chooses to be, and how it allocates scarce capacity, is itself among the decisions that matter most.

MRO, cargo, and the institutional layer

If carriers determine the network, the services ecosystem determines whether the value stays, and this is where the consequential decisions are being made now.

Asia’s large-scale MRO capacity sits in Singapore and China; Thailand has long exported its heavy maintenance and the skilled jobs with it. The planned Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul complex at U-Tapao, in the Eastern Economic Corridor is meant to change that: a roughly 210-rai site on a 50-year lease, with Thai Airways committing about Bt10 billion to build hangars in phases, a Bangkok Airways sub-lease alongside, and early interest from Airbus, Boeing and Singapore’s ST Engineering, with construction timed to the airport’s second runway.

Ben Kiatkwankul is a cofounder and partner in Maverick Consulting of Bangkok, which advises governments, investors and international companies on regulatory positioning, market entry and stakeholder strategy across Thailand, Southeast Asia and the Gulf. This is taken from a study completed earlier by Maverick Consulting.

In April 1975, a small group of people sat in a closed room and decided the fate of millions of Vietnamese. No one asked for their opinion. No one told them in advance. Like so many others, I suddenly found myself boarding a ship leaving Vietnam — because of a decision made by people I had never met.

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Singapore’s Shangri-La Hotel has hosted Asia’s premier security forum for more than two decades. This year, it hosted something rarer: a region confronting the gap between what it says it wants and what it is actually capable of building. The 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue made clear that the Indo-Pacific has developed, with growing conv…

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India’s Supreme Court last week delivered a landmark judgment measuring the monetary worth of a homemaker’s unpaid care work, the second decision in recent months pushing the boundaries of the rights of women in a country where they have often been ignored. The ruling, delivered by Justices Sanjay Ka…

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A rare auction with the entire 93 lots coming from a single collection produced record sales totaling £18,91 million (US$25.37 million) at Christie’s in London yesterday. On offer was what is known in the art world as the Goodricke Collection, a name long connected with Calcutta and t…

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While we have articles that are widely available to all readers, these stories can only be accessed fully by our paid subscribers:

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On the morning of June 4, 18 former Philippine marines arrived at the Philippine Senate to testify about a flood control scandal that had allegedly cost the public hundreds of billions of pesos. Getting them inside required senators to physically escort them past a cabinet secretary standing in the corridor.

What follow…

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Princess Bajrakitiyabha Mahidol, the eldest daughter of Thai King Maha Vajiralongkorn, has died at age 47, the palace announced today, after having been kept alive artificially despite the fact that she apparently was clinically dead in December 2022 after she collapsed while walking her dogs.

Considered by many to be the king’s favorite among his seven children, the princess had been believed a possible heir to the throne despite the fact that Thailand’s rigid customs surrounding loyalty dictated that only a male could inherit the throne to lead one of the world’s richest kingdoms. As observers have widely, if cautiously, pointed out, the success of the monarchy depends on the ability to produce offspring. Bajrakitiyabha died childless. Having no designated heir will not guarantee the stability of the throne, nor the future of Thailand.

The death, while long expected, reawakens speculation over who will inherit the throne from Vajiralongkorn, who is now 73. The resumptive heir is Prince Dipangkorn Rasmijoti, now 21, although there have long been rumors about his health. Mentioning the youth’s health dares Thailand’s strict lese-majeste law. Dipangkorn is Vajiralongkorn’s son by his fourth wife Srirasmi Suwadee, whom he divorced in 2014, stripped of her titles and perks and sent her to live in exile in the straits far from Bangkok.

Vajiralongkorn’s delay in formally designating an heir apparent makes the succession line complex. According to one Bangkok source, Dipangkorn was raised to be close to Bajarakitiyabha, his elder sister, with the idea that she could serve as a sort of regent, advising and protecting him. With her lingering illness, that has obviously long nullified that plan.

Although funeral arrangements are certain to be ornate, the country is expected to remain open, with no suspension of business activity but with a period of half-mast flags and official observances, likely voluntary restraint from entertainment venues and event organizers, concentrated in the initial mourning window and with ministries slowing regular activities while they support funeral arrangements. Previous such mourning periods have cut into economic activity.

“The medical team provided the closest and most intensive care possible, but her condition continued to decline progressively,” the palace said in a statement. According to the announcement, Bajrakitiyabha passed away at 19:48 local time in King Chulalongkorn Memorial Hospital in Bangkok.

Her status as the king’s beloved eldest daughter and the deeply held wishes of the royal family kept her on life support for more than three years, not only for her heart but for her lungs and kidneys as well, an indication of how completely her body had shut down. In early May, the palace said her medical condition had worsened as a result of multiple infections in several organs and physicians were unable to stabilize her irregular heart rate. In April, according to reports, physicians discovered a stomach infection that led to inflammation in her intestines, causing her blood pressure to fall and her heartbeat to become irregular. Her kidney function and breathing had been supported through medical equipment, palace statements said.

It remains unclear why Princess Bajrakitiyabha was kept alive after reportedly being clinically dead in 2022. Doctors were ordered to keep her blood circulating and oxygenated outside her body. In Thailand, the death of a senior royal can bring the country nearly to a halt. Queen Sirikit, Vajiralongkorn’s mother and Thailand’s queen mother, died last October 24, prompting a yearlong mourning period that will continue through this October. As one of the most senior members of the royal family, Bajrakitiyabha’s death is expected to require another extended period of mourning. Because it occurred while the country is still mourning Queen Sirikit, it remains unclear how the royal family will proceed.

The princess, before her death, was not only regarded as the king’s favorite, but was well loved in her own right. A trained lawyer, she received her juris doctor degree from Cornell University in 2005. She worked briefly at the Thai Permanent Mission to the United Nations, in New York, before returning to Thailand. She later became an attorney in the Attorney General’s office in Bangkok and was later appointed the Thai ambassador to Austria. She was reportedly instrumental in prodding the Thai government to observe the rights of women incarcerated in a system built principally for men and was said to be a force in leading to the United Nations adoption of the “Bangkok Rules,” the first set of universal guidelines addressing the treatment of women in the justice system.

“Among the children of the King, Princess Bajrakitiyabha was the most genuine in her relations with the Thai people,” said a former Thai diplomat. “When she was a Thai ambassador to Austria, she was a good boss who listened to the embassy’s staff and never showed a condescending attitude. She was respectful to embassy personnel and the rules that governed the functioning of the embassy without adding extra layers to their responsibilities. She performed her royal duties well with passion and sincerity.”

In less than a month, an indie film with an unknown cast became China’s second-highest grossing film of 2026. Dear You, with a modest budget of CNY 14 million (US$2.06 million), earned CNY 1.5 billion (USD 221 million) at the box office by June 5 after being released nationwide on May 3.

Its success is surely causing some consternation in Beijing. As Xi Jinping calls on media professionals to share the uplifting messages of China’s modern development through what he dubs “positive energy,” Dear You centers on protagonists eking out a living amid the poverty and disorder of the 1940s. And as the government promotes the nationwide usage of Mandarin, the film is done entirely in Teochew, a regional Guangdong dialect that few elsewhere in the country understand.

What explains its nationwide success? Viewers shed plenty of tears as they follow a series of remittance letters sent between the husband in Thailand and his wife awaiting his return at their home village. Each details the travails Chinese emigrants faced in their host society, and the longing for the family that they cannot return to. The reality of being hurt and dying all alone in a foreign land amidst the increasingly desperate calls to “come home” tug at the heartstrings of an audience aware that they are privileged enough that they need not leave in the first place.

Propaganda tool?

That inconsolable distance, however, produced not heartbreak, but dismay and suspicion among the Teochew-speaking viewers of Southeast Asia. The Singapore newspaper Lianhe Zaobao suggested that Dear You is an emotional device persuading the progeny of those original emigrants to see China as their homeland. Even though the film had no government involvement, its message inadvertently echoed the Chinese government’s message that the overseas Chinese “come home” and contribute to the mainland’s development.

The sentiment cannot simply be dismissed as paranoia, even if most of the region’s ethnic Chinese today, born and bred locally, no longer have any familial ties to China. As someone who left China at age 5, I also watched Dear You with discomfort. The film is fundamentally reductionist, presenting an extremely “clean” story of where the male protagonist’s allegiances lie in ways that I, and many other overseas Chinese I met, will perhaps never be able to have.

It highlights one extreme sentiment often expressed by the newest arrivals in the newest Chinese communities. Think of the smartphone seller in an African market town or the soybean farmer in the Russian Far East. Their personal success is almost completely reliant on China, in the form of suppliers, customers, and go-betweens that ferry goods, capital, and information between China and the host society. Economic dependence breeds emotional ties. These new emigrants want a wealthier, stronger China that can help their businesses and improve their social standing in the host society, in ways that can fend off unscrupulous locals, whether bribe-seeking officials, xenophobic neighbors, or contract-flouting partners. Dear You’s domestic audience can easily understand this perspective: living in China, they too see no reason not to want the best for where they live.

Split identity

But there is also an entirely different way for the overseas Chinese to think about social standing. Some see their acceptance hinged on outright signaling that they suffer no split loyalties and intend to contribute exclusively to the host society. They know that hostility arrives with suspicions of being a fifth column. Imagine the AI expert in Silicon Valley or the Taiwanese with big investments on the mainland. Whatever they originally felt about China, they need to verbalize their economic and emotional distance from it. And the more they publicize that distance to their families, friends, and professional networks, the distance becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy of sorts. Personal success that came from defining themselves as “not China,” buttressed with the evidence of ever-weakening familial ties to China, only entrenches the distance over time.

The overseas Chinese’s discomfort from watching Dear You ultimately comes down to the male protagonist being portrayed firmly in the former, without giving him the room and agency to shift, even if slightly, to the latter. By portraying the non-Chinese almost exclusively as antagonists, the film implicitly closes off the audience’s imagination that an overseas Chinese’s time abroad can be anything but a temporary sojourn to escape poverty and disorder back home.

Yet, this “we vs them” portrayal discounts the vibrant ties among different communities within any host society. In my travels, it is not rare to come across Chinese workers who planned for a few years in a foreign land, but ended up building entirely new lives when they married, had children, and became part of the non-Chinese community. This shift happens despite the opportunity cost of lost ties with people “back home” or further success that could be had by moving elsewhere. Could the male protagonist have naturally gone down this path over time? The film conveniently leaves that part unanswered.

The contrast between Dear You’s resonance at home and skepticism in the diaspora comes at a time when Chinese identity has become more fraught. The China of 1940s left elicited more sympathy than hostility. Being a fifth column for a country in civil war meant little to a much wealthier host society. That China gave few usable resources for emigrants seeking more success in business or higher social standings. But as China’s rise today drives up anxieties in host societies, the overseas Chinese pay a price. Many face a new sense of urgency in assuaging their non-Chinese friends, while pondering how China’s increasing economic sophistication can translate into their own. Like me, many are constantly remolding who they are to find balance. Dear You might elicit tears, but its absolutist view of the Chinese identity does little to help with that uncertainty.

Xiaochen Su, Ph.D. is a business risk and education consultant and a regular correspondent to Asia Sentinel. He has worked in several countries throughout Asia.

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Singaporean authorities are alleging foreign interference in the country’s domestic affairs, stoking racial divisions with South Asians as targets via a China-based platform allegedly sowing racial discord with online subject matter. On June 6, the police announced orders for the disabling of content circulating on YouTube, Facebook, and X “which target the Indian community and undermine Singapore’s model of multiculturalism.”

“Last month, narratives started circulating online in the Chinese information space that Singapore is displaying anxiety over our cultural identity and ethnic politics. Shortly thereafter, online content emerged containing inflammatory narratives about Singapore’s cultural diversity and suggesting that Singapore was being overrun by Indians,” officials disclosed in a press release.

Chinese constitute 75.5 percent of Singapore’s population, while Indians account for 7.6 percent, according to 2025 Singapore government data. Ethnic Malays make up another 15 percent in a balanced racial mix that is closely watched by authorities.

The South Asian community in the city state is long established and highly heterogeneous, encompassing descendants of early migrants from the colonial period as well as more recent expatriates and professionals. Over recent decades, highly skilled professionals from South Asia have relocated to work in IT, finance, and academia, occasionally stirring public debate regarding employment opportunities and population density, bringing to light issues of xenophobia, cultural friction, and housing pressures.

South Indians have historically tended to swing well above their weight in politics, today including Tharman Shanmugaratnam, the country’s current president, K. Shanmugam, coordinating minister for national security and minister for home affairs, Indranee Thurai Rajah, minister in the prime minister’s office, second minister for finance and second minister for national development, and former transport minister S Iswaran, who was jailed on bribery charges in 2024.

In general, race relations are largely peaceful, although deep-seated prejudices and racialization occasionally surface, partly because the island state persists as a predominantly Chinese island in an ethnic Malay sea, and are carefully managed through the government’s aggressive zero-tolerance policy toward any rhetoric that threatens communal stability. State-enforced multiculturalism is administered through a so-called CMIO framework, standing for Chinese, Malay, Indian, Others agenda. Authorities use strict legal structures such as the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act and the penal code—to swiftly penalize hate speech.

Thus, although the current incident might seem minor to outsiders, Singaporean authorities regard it with concern. Police say the narratives included claims that Singapore’s multiracial policy is a façade meant to appeal to western values, that stability cannot be attributed to its multiracial policy but rather to the fact that the country is majority Chinese, that ethnic Indian politicians act in favor of Indian immigrants, and that its culture is fundamentally Chinese so the government’s approach of “decoupling” itself from China while neglecting the threat of a growing Indian community would lead to a negative outcome.

The Ministry of Home Affairs and police assessed these posts to have violated Singapore laws on racial harmony. Investigations revealed that the content likely originated from a China-based platform, police said. “These are malicious efforts to sow discord by inciting ill-will against the Indian community in Singapore.”

On June 6, Edwin Tong, Singapore’s law minister and second minister for home affairs, clarified there is no evidence to suggest this was a coordinated campaign by any government including the Chinese.

Singapore leaders are at pains to maintain harmonious relations with both China and the US, both of whom are locked in geopolitical competition. China is Singapore’s biggest trading partner, while the US is the city-state’s biggest military partner.

“These videos attack our multi-racial society and they try to divide people based on race. This, however, is not who we are,” Tong told reporters on June 6,

“We don’t tolerate any narratives at all that seek to undermine the racial harmony that we enjoy and that we protect, especially when it is propagated by foreigners, and many of these posts are of foreign origin,” he added.

Singapore Minister for Digital Development and Information Josephine Teo also denounced foreign online content for sowing discord in the multiracial country.

In a Facebook post on June 6, Teo said, “Some videos have been circulating online, targeting our Indian community — one even showed a religious procession at Pagoda Street, implying Indians are not welcome there. This is untrue and unacceptable. These videos did not come from Singapore and do not speak for us. Their intent is to divide,” she added.

Toh Han Shih is a Singaporean writer in Hong Kong. He is a regular contributor to Asia Sentinel.

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Three and a half years into leading an ideologically diverse coalition government, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has been busy courting the support of ethnic Malay voters. He now faces a formidable challenger for the urban, minority, pro-reform vote base that propelled his Parti Keadilan Rakyat which led the Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition to power.

In early May, two of his former ministers took over a small party and rebranded it to court Anwar’s increasingly disenchanted PKR/PH supporters. Former Economy Minister Rafizi Ramli, 50, and Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad, 44, resigned from Parliament, reducing the majority’s Anwar’s Madani coalition government to 151, just three more than the two-thirds majority necessary for constitutional amendment. Rafizi has six more allies in the government backbench, whose departure would deny Anwar the super majority and might even trigger him to seek an early election.

This is not just a succession struggle between the Gen X Rafizi and baby-boomer Anwar, 78. It poses a larger question: is inclusive reformist politics politically viable in a former British colony divided by reinforcing cleavages of ethnicity, religion, and language?

Having broken away from The United Malays National Organization in 1998 after his purge and imprisonment by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, Anwar eventually came to power 24 years later in 2022 on the support of the party that had spurned and imprisoned him, along with regional parties from the eastern Malaysian states of Sarawak and Sabah.

Despite winning 38 percent of votes and 37 percent of seats in the federal election, Pakatan Harapan was constantly accused of selling out the ethnic majority Malay-Muslims. This makes Anwar beholden not only to UMNO but also to the powerful Malay royalty and the predominantly Malay bureaucracy. To survive, Anwar went soft on kleptocrats in UMNO and his Sabah regional ally and tried hard to woo the Malay electorate.

Not only have his efforts failed to pay off in winning UMNO’s loyalty and raising Malays’ approval, but Anwar has also alienated his predominantly Chinese urban base. In a leaked internal analysis in May, only seven of Parti Keadilan Rakyat’s 31 seats were considered safe, and that excluded Anwar’s. The larger casualty has been Anwar’s Chinese-based partner, the Democratic Action Party (DAP). DAP and PKR were wiped out from urban centres in the Sabah state election last November, prompting DAP to push Anwar to expedite reforms or the party would withdraw from his cabinet.

Unlike Anwar, who rose meteorically in UMNO to become Mahathir’s Deputy Prime Minister after a brief stint as a Malay-Islamist student activist in the height of the Cold War, Rafizi and Nik Nazmi joined politics to defend Anwar and oppose UMNO after his purge from the nationalist party. Hailing from a humble working-class background, Rafizi was a model Malay talent that UMNO’s pro-Malay policies aspired to groom. Rafizi rose to fame for exposing UMNO’s corruption. His use of data analysis and targeted campaigning was widely credited for PH’s electoral success in the 2018 and 2022 elections.

As Anwar’s deputy in PKR, Rafizi was appointed to economy minister, whose signature project to integrate the government data of every citizen into a single database, however, did not take off. His detractors see him as elitist and aloof and nicknamed him “the formula king.”

Ironically, Rafizi regained his popularity when he started his “Hiruk” roadshow in PKR’s party election in early 2025 when Anwar’s daughter Nurul Izzah led a camp to challenge him and his ally. Meaning “noisy” in Malay, “Hiruk” is also an acronym for “Living the Idealism of Reform in the test of Power.” Rafizi and Nazmi lost the party election, which his camp alleged to have been marred by irregularities. They impressed many Malaysians by resigning from cabinet, citing that cabinet positions are based on party mandate.

As a backbencher, Rafizi became an outspoken critic of Anwar’s coalition government. He took on Anwar’s confidantes in the government and private sector. The break with Anwar became irreversible when Rafizi’s teenage son was jabbed by syringe in a carpark, in an obvious warning to the father. The police never arrested a single suspect.

Rafizi’s new party is known in acronym as “Bersama” (together) and in logo as a “mouse deer”, the resourceful animal that outsmarts bigger enemies in Malay folklore. Rafizi attacks Anwar’s compromises in the coalition and signals that its party would rather stay out of a coalition government than bend its principles. To indicate their break from established parties captured by dynasty and factionalism, Bersama talks about moving away from the patronage network that has blighted Malaysian politics for decades and recruiting non-partisan local talent as election candidates. They even aspire to build a lawmaker-based party in the British and American mold.

Before the new party can change Malaysia’s landscape, however, they must be able to survive and triumph over PH, PN, and UMNO in multicornered contests. Bersama enthusiasts hope the mousedeer can replicate the success of Warisan – a Muslim-dominated multiethnic splinter of UMNO – in exterminating PH in virtual straight fights in Sabah. However, here in Peninsular Malaysia, many PH supporters fear that the shift to Bersama would not be complete and PN – especially the Islamist opposition PAS – may emerge as the minority winner. If such fear looms large, even incumbents from Rafizi’s camp may not survive.

Rafizi would decide where his party would contest based on data analysis, but ultimately, his challenge is simple yet complex under Malaysia’s First-Past-The-Post elections: can Bersama avoid being seen as a spoiler to PH that would cannibalize PH’s vote base and hand over the seats to PN and UMNO?

Bersama’s base is primarily middle class and Gens X and Y. Can Rafizi succeed where Anwar has failed in courting young Malays? If he can’t, Bersama may end like many other admirable political startups in Malaysia. If he can, then Malaysian politics may see changes beyond just a generational renewal.

Wong Chin Huat is a political science professor at Sunway University, Malaysia

Chinese President Xi Jinping begins a two-day state visit to Pyongyang today amid concerns North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un is drifting ever closer to Moscow while continuing to expand his nuclear arsenal, which South Korean officials say can now produce five or six atomic bombs a year.

In a note of defiance clearly aimed at Beijing before Xi’s arrival, the Kim regime announced that a new underground nuclear fusion plant has been put into operation, which it hopes will produce an “exponential” amount of nuclear fusion material. While on the surface neither China nor Russia is directly responsible for Kim’s expanding nuclear program, his growing nuclear capability is clearly becoming a global concern, especially for East Asia where Japan and South Korea must feel the horror of Pyongyang’s capability.

On the surface, Xi’s state visit marks the 65^th anniversary of the signing of the China-North Korea Treaty of Amity and Mutual Assistance, under which Beijing is obliged to come to the assistance of North Korea in time of war. The treaty’s importance was affirmed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during his April visit to Pyongyang. He described the Sino-North Korean relations as that “forged in blood” and “indestructible.” The emphasis placed on bilateral ties has waned in recent years, with the Kim regime steadily drifting towards Russia. North Korea, in the last two years, has sent millions of artillery shells to Russia’s war against Ukraine, with 14,000 North Korean troops fighting in the Kursk region at the cost of 5,000 to 6,000 casualties.

But the Pyongyang regime doesn’t mind participating in the war in Europe so long as it gets hefty military aid programs, including the latest continental ballistic missiles and warships.

While China remains a major source of commercial trade and food aid, Russia provides precious foreign exchange and the latest weapon technology at a time of utter isolation in North Korea.

Kim is in no mood to worry about international censure stemming from its relations with Russia. Its soldiers paraded proudly among Russian troops marching to celebrate the last World War II Victory Day ceremony in Moscow.

But Beijing remains clearly concerned by Pyongyang’s expanding military ties with Russia with which both China and North Korea share border. In exchange for the contribution of combat troops to the Ukrainian theater, Moscow has reopened a significant flow of economic aid to North Korea, on top of space-age weapon systems including satellite-level technology, advanced missiles, and even talks on the provision of nuclear-fueled submarines.

Indeed, the day after the announcement of Xi’s visit, Kim struck a note of defiance by announcing his plan to build a 10,000-ton destroyer and unspecified undersea weapons, without giving details. That will be in addition to the 5,000-ton warship Kim said the regime is launching as part of an overall expansion of the North’s naval power.

China remains clearly concerned over such a dramatic modernization of North Korea’s already significant military arsenal just across its 1,300-km border. According to South Korean Minister of Unification Chung Dong Young, North Korea today is capable of producing five to six nuclear bombs a year. Washington today believes the Kim regime is already holding a stock of about 50 atomic bombs. Kim himself has already presided over four of six underground nuclear tests Pyongyang has so far conducted.

The regime’s main objective today is to develop a full range of continental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear bombs to the US mainland, with China coming under growing US-South Korean pressure to keep a leash on its neighbor.

For China’s geopolitical concern, Pyongyang’s belligerence comes against the backdrop of Moscow’s expanding ties with a rogue regime. North Korea today not only supplies millions of artillery shells to Moscow’s long war with Ukraine; some 14,000 to 15,000 North Korean troops are said to be fighting in Ukraine on behalf of Russia. Those returning home on rotations bring with them new, technology-oriented warfare training using drones and other sophisticated Russian weapons. In exchange for combat troops, Russia has agreed to provide satellite and submarine technology, reports say.

Another concern on Xi’s mind, according to recent reports, is the completion of a land bridge linking the North Korean city of Hyesan with the Russian border town of Hassan on the entryway to the Vladivostok region. While this facilitates Russia’s supply lines to North Korea in time of war, it can also provide China with an entry to the Sea of Japan, according to analysts here. Reports here say one of Xi’s topics of discussion with Kim will be China’s hope of using this passageway for trade. North Korea shares a 17-km border with Russia.

What concession Kim will ask China for opening this sensitive port borders with Russia is unknown. But Xi, according to China watchers here, is likely to accept more North Korean workers for its manufacturing sector employment, who can send US dollar wages back home. Some of China’s factories in the northeastern region around the Yalu River border areas around Dandong already have a significant number of North Korean “guest workers” running Chinese factories. Xi is also likely to agree to send more Chinese tourists to help Kim generate US dollar income, reports here say.

In Seoul, however, the Lee Jae Myung government is seeking to promote China’s expanding relations with the Kim regime, hoping that wider economic contacts with China will help to promote détente with Seoul. At the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in South Korea last summer, Lee specifically welcomed any Chinese initiative to relax tensions with North Korea. At the last Trump-Xi summit in Beijing, the US is also known to have asked Xi to help reopen talks with Kim, following up on the three summit-level talks President Trump held with Kim Jong Un in Singapore, Hanoi, and DMZ during his first term in office. In a similar effort to persuade Kim to restart the dialogue process with Washington, Seoul has asked Singapore recently to approach Pyongyang for the resumption of summit-level talks with President Trump.

With Kim’s priority now resting on driving up his nuclear capability in complete isolation, even from China, the likelihood of Kim holding another round of summit with Trump is considered almost nil. Seoul is thus pinning its hope on President Xi’s trip to Pyongyang for another round of persuasion.