A recent crackdown on an international scam and human trafficking ring in Dubai involving the US and China, Dubai and Thailand may indicate warming relations between the US and China, ahead of US President Donald Trump’s visit to Beijing on May 14 and 15, when he will meet Chinese President Xi Jinping.

“With so many Americans impacted by …

Read more

Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, already heading a weakened coalition partly due to an opposition Perikatan Nasional coalition, particularly the Islamist party PAS, capitalizing on Malay-Muslim identity politics, is now faced with a head-on confrontation with one of the country’s most influential and powerful Sultans over pig farming.

The 80-year-old Sultan of Selangor, Sharafuddin Idris Shah, decreed last month that no more pig farms should be allowed in his state, which is the country’s richest industrial and commercial center, to avoid environmental pollution and to respect the state’s majority Muslim population. Despite some rumblings from Anwar’s party, which draws support mainly from non-Muslims, Anwar agreed to the ban. The government then said pork would be brought in from other states to meet Selangor’s needs.

But the non-Muslim ground has rebelled and rumblings have grown louder. The consumption of pork has long been a volatile issue in Malaysia, where Muslims find the consumption of pork to be against religious laws and the Chinese, who make up approximately 23 percent of the population, consider it a mainstay of their diet. They constitute the second-largest ethnic group in the country, with a population close to 7 million. Selangor has a marginally higher number of Chinese residents, often numbering over 1.7 million and 28 percent of the state’s makeup, one of the largest concentrations in the country. The industry is mainly operated by ethnic Chinese, with significant commercial farms using modern, closed-house systems.

Anwar’s Pakatan Harapan coalition, whose backbone is the Chinese-majority Democratic Action Party, has suffered continually eroding support since it came to power at the end of 2022. This has largely been due to lack of promised reforms, corruption, internal strife and Anwar’s leadership, described by critics in Malaysia as lackadaisical. Although the World Bank had forecast resilient growth of 4.0 percent to 5.0 percent in 2026, driven by strong domestic demand, tourism, and a tech-upcycle boost in electrical and electronics exports, the war on Iran and the resulting oil and energy crisis has put further strain on the country’s finances with economists predicting the situation will get worse over the next two years even if the war ends soon.

Faced with this, Anwar was preparing for a general election at the end of this year ahead of an even worsened economy in 2027. Elections need not be called until early 2028 under Malaysia’s Westminster parliamentary system.

Anwar’s cabinet decided to reverse the ban on pig farming at its weekly cabinet meeting two days ago and he sought an audience with the Sultan to inform him of the decision the same afternoon. The Sultan does not have executive powers and is a constitutional monarch. However, the royalty is largely revered amongst the Malays and hold the trump card of appointing chief ministers and the prime minister, particularly when there is no single party with a simple majority.

The 80 -year-old Sultan immediately struck back, posting a quotation from the late US President Harry Truman on his official Facebook, saying “no man can get rich through politics unless he is a crook.” On May 7, the Sultan doubled down, saying there would no pig farming in his state, “Full Stop.” He posted an image of himself attesting to this.

Anwar and his government are thus in a conundrum – open confrontation with the monarch at the cost of Malay votes or accede to his decree and lose crucial non-Muslim votes.

Anwar has, in the past 42 months as prime minister, always backed off from openly opposing the country’s King and nine hereditary monarchs. This has allowed the monarchs, who had their powers curtailed through two bruising constitutional crises during the rule of strongman Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in 1983 and 1992, to flex their muscles of late.

In the pig farming impasse, Anwar will have to decide – capitulate and lose a major portion of his support base or confront the Sultan and lose any hope of coming to power in what will again be a fractious general election as in 2022, which resulted in the country’s first-ever hung parliament after no single coalition secured the 112 seats required for a simple majority. The then king forced Anwar into an unwieldy coalition with the corruption-ridden United Malays National Organization, which has continued to frustrate his efforts to govern effectively ever since.

Singapore, which endured a massive S$3 billion money laundering affair perpetrated by Chinese cyber scam nationals dubbed the “Fujian Gang” in 2023, appears to have effectively closed the doors to scandal, according to the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in its latest Mutual Evaluation Report, an undoubted relief to …

Read more

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations next week will hold its 48th Summit at Cebu, the Philippines, amid geopolitical turmoil arising from the torture and killing of international law in Iran. ASEAN’s ability “to navigate its future, together,” the summit’s slogan, will depend on the rules embedded in international law that the Associ…

Read more

When President Prabowo Subianto stood before thousands of workers at Jakarta’s National Monument to mark May Day and asked whether his signature free nutritious meals program was beneficial, he likely didn‘t expect the united roar that came back: no. The response, blunt and unambiguous, appeared to catch him off guard. For a brief moment, he fell silent before attempting to reassure the crowd, insisting that the initiative—known as Makan Bergizi Gratis, or MBG—was “very important for many Indonesian children who are malnourished, whose bodies are small, whose cells are not developing.”

The exchange captured growing unease surrounding one of Prabowo’s most ambitious and expensive policy undertakings. For months, he has invoked the program in speeches at home and abroad, presenting it as a cornerstone of his vision to improve public health and human capital. Just two days before the May Day incident, speaking at a groundbreaking ceremony for an industrial downstreaming project, he reiterated his commitment to see it through. Acknowledging its shortcomings, he pledged to fix them. Critics, he suggested, opposed the initiative not on its merits but out of fear that it might succeed.

Yet beyond the rhetoric, scrutiny has intensified. In Indonesia’s digital public sphere, a vigilant online community has begun to perform what some have called a “citizen audit,” combing through procurement data and budget allocations tied to the program. Their findings, drawn largely from publicly accessible government databases, have raised questions not only about inefficiency but also about the possibility of systemic corruption.

Red Flags

An examination of procurement data from Inaproc, the government’s official platform managed by the National Public Procurement Agency, reveals that in 2025 the National Nutrition Agency (BGN), tasked with implementing MBG, oversaw spending totaling approximately Rp6.2 trillion (about US$3.571 million). This figure encompassed 1,089 procurement packages executed through various mechanisms, including tenders, direct procurement and electronic catalog purchases.

But a closer look at how that money was allocated has fueled concern. The largest expenditures weren’t directed toward food—the program’s central promise—but toward supporting infrastructure and logistics. Vehicle procurement and leasing accounted for roughly Rp1.39 trillion, followed by the construction of kitchens at Rp1.26 trillion, and hardware and computer equipment at Rp830 billion. By contrast, the budget allocated specifically for food amounted to just Rp242.8 billion, significantly lower than spending on items such as clothing (Rp622.3 billion) and training programs (Rp464.6 billion).

Among the most contentious purchases was the acquisition of 21,801 electric motorcycles intended for operational use, each priced between Rp41 million and Rp43 million. The contract was awarded to a private firm, Yasa Artha Trimanunggal, with interests spanning logistics, medical equipment and international trade. Public attention quickly turned to the firm’s background, including reports that one of its senior executives had previously been questioned as a witness in a high-profile corruption case involving the distribution of social assistance funds in 2020.

The clothing budget has also drawn scrutiny. With expenditures reaching over Rp600 billion, the allocation covered uniforms, official footwear and accessories. Even seemingly minor items, such as socks, came under question: Rp6.9 billion was spent on socks priced at around Rp100,000 per pair, with no clear branding or adherence to national quality standards. Critics argue that such pricing far exceeds typical market rates.

Technology procurement is another flashpoint. The government allocated Rp508.4 billion for tablet computers to be used in a development initiative involving university graduates. Each unit was priced at Rp17.9 million—nearly double the estimated market value for comparable specifications, which hover around Rp8 million. Analysts say this discrepancy suggests a potential markup that could amount to hundreds of billions of in inflated costs.

Further controversy has surrounded the procurement of items deemed tangential to the program’s core objective of improving nutrition. These include expenditures on shoe polish and brushes totaling Rp1.5 billion, undershirts costing Rp 4.5 billion, belts at Rp 5 billion and towels reaching Rp 3.7 billion. For many observers, such spending appears disconnected from the stated mission.

Accountability and Oversight

Concerns have also emerged about how funds are distributed within the program’s operational framework. The head of the National Nutrition Agency, Dadan Hindayana, acknowledged that 1,720 nutrition service units had been temporarily suspended. Despite this, the kitchens associated with these units reportedly continued to receive daily incentives of Rp6 million. The agency has argued that certain activities remain ongoing during the suspension period, justifying the payments.

Charles Honoris, deputy chairman of a parliamentary commission overseeing health and employment affairs, questioned the logic of providing such incentives, particularly in cases where negligence may have contributed to food poisoning. He also cited discrepancies in the reported number of suspended units, noting that some accounts place the figure as high as 3,778. “How is it possible,” he asked, “that those responsible for failures resulting in public harm continue to receive substantial daily payments?”

Legal experts and anti-corruption advocates have pointed to broader structural issues. Wana Alamsyah, a researcher with Indonesia Corruption Watch, has argued that the procurement patterns suggest potential violations of law, including inflated pricing and weak budget planning. He estimates that the markup on tablet procurement alone could reach Rp7.95 million per unit, translating into a total potential overpayment of approximately Rp238.5 billion.

There are also indications that procurement rules may have been circumvented. Regulations require high-value contracts—those exceeding Rp100 billion —to be approved at the highest level of budget authority. However, data suggests that some contracts may have been artificially divided into smaller packages to avoid this requirement, a practice explicitly prohibited under existing regulations.

While electronic purchasing systems are designed to streamline procurement, critics argue that they can also obscure accountability. Items listed in official catalogs are often priced higher than those available in the open market, and the system allows for direct appointment of suppliers without competitive bidding under certain conditions.

A Program That Draws from Education Funds

Prabowo has remained steadfast, framing the program as a moral and economic imperative, arguing that state resources must be directed toward the welfare of the people. He has also claimed that the funds used to finance such initiatives come from savings achieved by curbing corruption.

Yet budget documents tell a more complicated story. In the 2026 state budget, a significant portion of the funding for MBG—amounting to Rp 223 trillion —has been drawn from the education sector. This represents a reduction of nearly 29 percent from the total education allocation of Rp769.1 trillion, leaving approximately Rp 546 trillion, or just 14.2 percent of total government spending, for education.

The National Nutrition Agency’s total budget has surged to Rp 335 trillion in 2026, a fivefold increase from the previous year. Of this, more than 83 percent is sourced from education funds, with the remainder coming from health and economic allocations.

The reallocation has prompted legal challenges. Critics argue that diverting such a large share of education funding violates constitutional mandates to prioritize education spending. They warn that the cuts could undermine efforts to improve teacher quality, expand access to schooling and upgrade educational infrastructure.

Government officials have defended the move by classifying the MBG program as part of educational spending, asserting that improved nutrition enhances students’ ability to learn. Critics, however, dismiss this as an overly broad interpretation that stretches the definition of education beyond reasonable limits.

Warnings of Systemic Risk

Independent watchdogs have issued stark warnings. In its 2025 annual report, the national anti-corruption commission highlighted the risks associated with large-scale programs lacking robust regulatory frameworks and oversight mechanisms. It pointed to vulnerabilities including conflicts of interest, weak accountability and the potential for criminal misconduct.

A separate study by Transparency International Indonesia, titled “Corruption Risks Behind the Free Nutritious Meals Program,” using a corruption risk assessment framework, concluded that the program’s design and implementation create fertile ground for systemic corruption.

Among the key findings were the absence of a strong legal foundation at the program’s inception, opaque processes for selecting implementing partners and procurement practices that fall short of transparency standards. The report also noted that some implementing organizations have ties to political, military or law enforcement figures, raising questions about conflicts of interest.

The scale of the program—targeting nearly 83 million beneficiaries with a projected budget of up to Rp400 trillion —further amplifies these risks. Without clear prioritization of recipients, analysts warn, the initiative could strain public finances while failing to deliver meaningful improvements in nutrition.

“The program appears promising on paper,” said Agus Sarwono, a researcher involved in the study, “but it does not meet the prerequisites of sound governance. The high vulnerability to corruption suggests that it should be suspended to prevent further losses to the state.”

The strength of India’s representative democracy, where voters produce surprise results that throw out long-established governments, has been demonstrated by results in the country’s recent state assembly elections, notably in West Bengal and Tamil Nadu.

In Bengal, the Hindu nationalist Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) is launching a new political era by defeating the incumbent Mamata Banerjee’s regional All India Trinamool Congress (TMC). Banerjee has ruled for almost 15 years, following 23 years of continuous Communist (CPI-M) governments, and she seemed almost unstoppable.

Banerjee, who lost her own seat, has alleged that the BJP “looted” more than 100 seats to give it around 206 out of a total 294. The TMC has only 81.

There are likely to be more allegations of election fixing and controversy, partly involving a recent election commission that removed about 9 million names from the voting lists to eliminate alleged illegal migrants from Bangladesh and duplicate entries.

The state suffers from slow industrial growth and serious unemployment so expectations will be high that the BJP will bring in a new era of job creation with investment infrastructure development and welfare schemes.

The result is a blow for the country’s opposition parties and a victory for Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister. He had set Bengal as his next major target to build on the party’s established strength across east, west, and much of north India – when these results are confirmed, it will be in power in 20 out of 28 states.

In the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, a new party, the Tamizhaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) or Tamil Nadu Victory Federation, founded just two years ago by Joseph Vijay, a top film star has won control with 108 seats out of a total 234. The TVK will need to find allies to form a government. Vijay, who is a big earner with a charismatic presence and is known for his charity work with education, disaster relief and other social initiatives, has said he is retiring from films.

The result confirms the power of the cinema in the state’s politics because the two long-running regional parties, the DMK and AIADMK, which the TVK is ousting, were also originally founded by film stars. Between them, they have governed since 1967.

Vijay has promised a break from decades of corrupt dynastic rule and a focus on development and jobs for youth, emphasizing Tamil regional pride and opposition to Hindu nationalism. It was expected that he would make a mark, but his victory seemed unlikely and was suggested by only one of half a dozen exit polls. Sometimes called kaattin singam, which is Tamil for “lion of the jungle”, Vijay, 51, has a big image and a charismatic presence. He said he was retiring from films when he founded his political party and is now known for his charity work with education, disaster relief and other social initiatives.

Also in southern India, a coalition headed by the Gandhi family’s Indian National Congress has won in Kerala, providing the party with a rare and much-needed victory. Priyanka Gandhi, whose brother Rahul is the ineffectual leader of the party, holds a parliamentary seat in the state.

Significantly, the BJP has won only three seats in Kerala and one in Tamil Nadu, demonstrating Modi’s failure to win over the south apart from the tiny southern enclave of Puducherry where it is playing a small role in a victory of its National Democratic Alliance (NDA). The NDA is also holding onto power in the eastern state of Assam.

The West Bengal victory, which was far from certain, is a major boost for Modi’s image, though substantial credit will go to the BJP’s chief election strategist, Amit Shah, who is Modi’s main ally and tough home minister.

Modi has largely recovered from the BJP doing far less well than had been expected in the 2024 general election, but he has had recent setbacks, and India is facing economic problems from the US-Iran war, including rising energy prices.

The government was defeated last month in parliament for the first time in more than a decade over legislation that would have reserved 33% seats for women in parliament’s Lok Sabha and state assemblies. It would, however, have also changed parliament’s seat allocation, reducing representation from areas that include southern India.

Internationally, problems have escalated with US President Donald Trump, who has been developing a close relationship with Pakistan’s army chief, Asam Munir. That led to Pakistan achieving a level of international recognition that it has craved for decades when Trump picked Munir and Shehbaz Sharif, the prime minister, as mediators in the US-Iran war, with talks being held in the capital, Islamabad.

This shocked Modii’s government, which has painted Pakistan for many years as a virtually untouchable terrorist state. Foreign minister S. Jaishankar had been pursuing a policy of multi-alignment that straddled relations with the US, Russia and China as well as Israel and Iran, but had not envisaged Pakistan slipping through the network as a major player.

Modi said yesterday in a statement that the West Bengal victory “will be remembered forever. People’s power has prevailed, and BJP’s politics of good governance has triumphed. I bow to each and every person of West Bengal”.

He may, however, not find it easy to clamp the BJP’s nationalism onto the state. He dreams of replacing regional identities with country-wide Hindu nationalism and the Hindi language, but he will encounter strong resistance because of strong Bengali loyalties, not least to the Bengali language.

The BJP victory possibly reflects voter apathy for incumbent Banerjee and her TMC government more than it does desire for the BJP and all it stands for. The TMC has a strong grassroots network and continuing representation in local politics, so politically charged opposition and demonstrations, sometimes violent, are likely.

Shah managed to organize a victory, but ruling the Bengalis may not be so easy.

John Elliott is Asa Sentinel’s South Asia correspondent. He blogs at Riding the Elephant.

At a moment when Washington is urging Beijing to step up as a global crisis manager, China is doing something far more unsettling: nothing. With the United States grappling with overlapping conflicts and strained alliances, Beijing’s refusal to intervene isn’t hesitation; it is by design. China is allowing American power to dissipate under the weight of its own commitments. In today’s geopolitical contest, influence is no longer seized through action alone; it can be accumulated, quietly and deliberately, including through strategic absence.

The Logic of Strategic Absence

For much of the post-Cold War era, global leadership has been equated with visibility: diplomatic activism, military deployments, and crisis mediation. The United States has embodied this model, positioning itself as the indispensable power in regions ranging from the Middle East to East Asia. Yet this approach has come at mounting cost. Prolonged engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with ongoing commitments across Europe and the Indo-Pacific, have stretched American resources and political will.

China, by contrast, has opted for a different path, rejecting the assumption that great power status requires constant intervention. Despite its growing economic stakes in volatile regions, Beijing has shown little appetite for direct involvement in conflict resolution. This is particularly evident in the Middle East, where China remains heavily dependent on energy imports. According to the International Energy Agency, China is the world’s largest crude oil importer, with a significant share of its supplies passing through critical chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz

Conventional strategic thinking would suggest that such dependence should compel China to play a more active security role. Instead, Beijing has largely relied on a combination of diplomatic neutrality (and disastrous American bumbling) to navigate the complexity of its ties with most warring Middle Eastern states and economic engagement. Even in moments of heightened tension—whether involving Iran, Saudi Arabia, or broader regional instability—China has avoided entanglement in security commitments that could draw it into protracted conflicts.

This posture is not merely defensive. It reflects a calculated understanding of the risks associated with intervention. Military involvement can generate unintended consequences, erode domestic support, and expose vulnerabilities. By staying on the sidelines, China preserves flexibility while allowing others—primarily the United States—to bear the costs of maintaining order.

Benefiting from American Overextension

China’s strategic restraint becomes more consequential when viewed alongside the US’s evolving position. Washington’s global commitments haven’t diminished; if anything, they have expanded in response to new challenges. The war in Ukraine, tensions in the South China Sea, and instability in the Middle East have all demanded sustained attention and resources. This pattern of engagement has prompted growing debate within the United States about the limits of its global role. The most visible limit overextension imposes is the accumulation of commitments that can undermine strategic coherence. The US security posture vis-à-vis the Middle East amidst an ongoing war on Iran is different from its changing commitments with Europe in the middle of a similar military conflict involving Russia and Ukraine.

China appears to be capitalizing on this dynamic. By refraining from direct involvement, Beijing avoids the reputational and material costs associated with failed interventions while benefiting from the relative decline of American influence in regions where U.S. policies have generated fatigue or skepticism.

The Middle East offers a telling example. While the United States remains a central security actor, its role has become increasingly contested. Public opinion in several regional states reflects ambivalence toward American policies, particularly in the wake of military interventions and shifting strategic priorities. China, meanwhile, has expanded its economic footprint through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, positioning itself as a partner focused on development rather than security dominance

Quiet Gains in Southeast Asia

Nowhere is China’s strategy of strategic absence more consequential than in Southeast Asia. The region sits at the intersection of great power competition, yet its states have consistently resisted binary alignments. China’s approach—combining economic integration with selective restraint—has proven well suited to this environment.

Empirical evidence supports this trend. The ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute’s State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey found that while trust in major powers fluctuates, China remains the most influential economic actor in the region, with 59.5 percent of respondents identifying it as the leading economic power.

While China does have territorial disputes with several states in the region, importantly, Beijing has still achieved this position without assuming a dominant security role. In disputes such as those in the South China Sea, Beijing has pursued incremental gains while avoiding large-scale confrontation. This calibrated assertiveness allows China to advance its interests without provoking the kind of unified regional backlash that might follow more aggressive actions.

The US, meanwhile, continues to emphasize security partnerships and deterrence, particularly with countries like the Philippines. While these ties remain significant, they don’t automatically translate into broader regional alignment. Southeast Asian states have consistently signaled a preference for hedging—engaging both Washington and Beijing to maximize their strategic autonomy.

China’s relative restraint reinforces this dynamic. By not forcing a stark choice between alignment and opposition, Beijing enables regional actors to maintain flexible foreign policies. Over time, this has contributed to a gradual normalization of China’s influence, even in the face of lingering distrust.

The Future of Power Without Presence

China’s strategy raises a deeper question about the evolving nature of global power: can influence be sustained without the burdens of leadership? Thus far, Beijing’s approach suggests that it can—at least under certain conditions. By allowing the United States to remain the primary provider of security while expanding its own economic and diplomatic reach, China has found a way to reshape the balance of influence at relatively low cost.

Yet this model may not be indefinitely sustainable. As China’s overseas interests grow, so too will the pressures to protect them. The expansion of Chinese investments, citizens, and supply chains across volatile regions could eventually necessitate a more active security role. The challenge for Beijing will be to manage this transition without replicating the very patterns of overextension it has thus far avoided.

For the United States, the implications are equally significant. Competing with China may require not only strengthening alliances and capabilities but also reconsidering the scope of its global commitments. If strategic absence proves to be a viable form of power, then constant engagement may no longer be the default path to influence.

The emerging contest between Washington and Beijing is therefore not simply about who acts more decisively, but about who acts more wisely and when. In that contest, China’s refusal to move may turn out to be one of its most consequential moves of all.

Dr Salman Rafi Sheikh is an assistant professor of politics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) in Pakistan. He is a long-time contributor on international affairs to Asia Sentinel.

In February, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto signed a Security Treaty which the two governments have described as a quantum leap, cementing a key bilateral partner to the north, a strengthened alliance framework to the east, and Australia positioning itself as a …

Read more

While we have articles that are widely available, these stories can only be accessed fully by paid subscribers like you:

Read more

Fifty-one years after the April 30, 1975 fall of the Republic of Vietnam, the country is no longer defined primarily by war memory. It is defined by strategic positioning. In the Indo-Pacific of 2026—shaped by intensifying US–China rivalry, contested maritime domains, technological bifurcation, and fragile supply chains—Vietnam has emerg…

Read more

The United States may well have decided that cultivating ties with Cambodia, whose top leaders have been connected to massive cybercrime operations mostly run by Chinese gangsters, may not have been worth it because of the cost to US and other citizens of the world from the scam centers, online investment fraud rings in which victims are cultivated like fattened pigs for slaughter, then deceived into depositing funds into fraudulent investment platforms.

The US blitz may well have dented attempts earlier this year by officials including US War Secretary Pete Hegseth to cozy up to Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet, a son of longtime strongman Hun Sen amid a flailing Cambodian economy, renewed Thai border tensions and a prolonged downturn in real estate. Washington has responded to a move for friendly ties by Hun Manet, reported Asia Sentinel on January 19, in a bid to blunt Chinese interests in Southeast Asia. Cambodia is perhaps China’s closest friend in ASEAN.

“Geopolitical consideration, especially vis-a-vis China, which has a larger-than-life presence in Cambodia, was certainly at the back of the American authorities’ minds, but ultimately they must have felt that the sheer gravity of the harms – ranging from financial frauds to modern slavery – outweighed coddling Hun Sen’s cronies to pry him and them away from China’s sphere of influence,” said a Malaysian analyst who asked to remain nameless.

At the same time, however, the US offensive against scam operations in Myanmar and Cambodia, may not be extensive enough to stem the growth of the scam centers, analysts say.

“The US is using standard law enforcement procedures for criminal activities that require a much more creative approach. Taking out top leaders won’t solve this problem, more junior members step in to take control,” Mark Farmaner, director of Burma Campaign UK, told Asia Sentinel. “Scam centers proliferate in areas controlled by armed groups that have traditionally been allied with the Myanmar military. More support should be given to ethnic administrations in border areas which are trying to stamp out these centers.”

Myanmar is blacklisted by the FATF, the Paris-based financial action task force, because of the risk of money laundering and lack of financial controls, he added. “More should be done to investigate if it how the banking sector in Myanmar is being used to launder scam center money.”

On April 23, the US Department of Justice announced a series of actions by the Scam Center Strike Force against the compounds, which have defrauded Americans of billions of US dollars. The actions include criminal charges against two Chinese nationals who managed a Myanmar cryptocurrency investment fraud compound and attempted to open another in Cambodia, the seizure of a Telegram messaging app channel used to recruit human trafficking in Cambodia to impersonate as US cops, and restrictions on over US$700 million in cryptocurrency alleged to be tied to money laundering from cryptocurrency scams. Huang Xingshan, also known as “Ah Zhe” and “Huang Xing Saan,” and Jiang Wen Jie, also known as “Jiang Nan,” managed cryptocurrency investment fraud operations at the Shunda compound in Min Let Pan, Myanmar.

“Despite ongoing efforts to combat them, scam centers remain highly profitable, leading to the emergence of alternative centers that continue these illegal activities. This shift complicates efforts to apprehend these criminals. It resembles the game Whack-A-Mole; these centers pop up, get shut down, and then reappear elsewhere,” said Matthew Friedman, chief executive officer (CEO) of the Mekong Club.

“That is very likely as this sort of scam centers and will pop up ubiquitously across those parts of Southeast Asia and perhaps even some other parts of the world where local law enforcement is at best cursory and at worst in collusion with the scam perpetrators,” said the Malaysian analyst. He pointed out that scam centers alternated between Myanmar and Cambodia.

The Shunda compound operated from at least January to November 2025, when it was seized by the Karen National Liberation Army of Burma, according to the US Justice Department’s announcement. After it was seized, Huang and Jiang relocated to another scam compound in Cambodia where they attempted to continue their operations, the US Justice Department announcement said. In early 2026, Huang and Jiang decided to return to Burma via Thailand, the US Justice Department added, and were arrested on immigration charges by Thai law enforcement in early 2026.

There is also evidence, recently reported by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, that the notorious scam company Prince Group, shut down in Cambodia earlier this year, may be moving some operations to East Timor.

Geopolitical contest in Cambodia

On April 23, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned a well-connected Cambodian Senator, Kok An, who allegedly controls scam compounds throughout the country, as well as 28 individuals and companies in his network.

“US sanctions against Cambodian Senator Kok An, a close ally of former Prime Minister Hun Sen, go beyond just addressing cybercrime,” said Friedman. “They directly challenge the involvement of the ruling elite in transnational illicit activities. By targeting this inner circle, the US aims to reduce the influence of Chinese-linked criminal networks in Southeast Asia, support regional human rights efforts, and safeguard US national security.”

The sanctioned companies include two of Kok An’s Cambodian companies, Crown Resorts and Anco Brothers. Kok An’s hospitality company, Crown Resorts, owns casinos, resorts and other buildings in Poipet, Sihanoukville, Bavet, and other Cambodian cities been converted into compounds from which criminal organizations conduct digital asset investment fraud and other scams, alleged the US Treasury. Kok An also allegedly provides services and employees including uniformed security guards through his other company, Anco Brothers, which also holds the license for the casinos operating on the properties, nearly all of which are connected to casinos which serve to launder the proceeds of scams.

In July 2025, Thai police raided at least 26 properties in Bangkok and other Thai provinces – most registered under Sok An’s children’s names – seizing assets worth over Bt1.1 billion (US$30 million), which may well have played a role in the brief but bloody border war between Cambodia and Thailand in the middle of 2025. The raids came after the Thai Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant accusing Kok An of involvement in a transnational criminal organization. Thai investigators sought the warrant after discovering that his casinos in Poipet, just across the border from Thailand’s Sa Kaeo province, were hosting scam operations targeting Thai nationals. Thai arrest warrants for Kok An’s three children were issued a week later, namely Juree, Phu Cherin, and Kittisak, according to media reports.

On July 8, 2025, Hun Sen, now president of the Cambodian Senate, said in a social media post, “Regarding recent commentary, several Thai authorities, media outlets, and members of the public have stated that the investigation and crackdown on Kok An is due to his close ties with Hun Sen. Therefore, the Thai court should also launch an investigation into Thaksin, since it is widely known that Thaksin is extremely close to me—so close, in fact, that he even has a reserved room at my home.”

On June 15, 2025, Hun Sen held a telephone call with Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, a daughter of former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, in a bid to defuse tensions along the Thai-Cambodian border. Later that day, Hun Sen confirmed he had posted a recording of the phone call on his Facebook page, which sparked a furor in Thailand and caused Paetongtarn’s resignation.

On April 24, Wang held talks with Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul in Bangkok, where China and Thailand agreed to strengthen collaboration in fighting online scams. During Wang’s visit to Cambodia on April 22, he called for the complete eradication of scam centers in Cambodia, which has enslaved many Chinese citizens. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet replied that Cambodia is willing to strengthen cooperation with China on cracking down on scam centers, reported Xinhua, a Chinese state news agency.

However, Amnesty International is sceptical. Analysis of licensing documents issued by Cambodia’s Commercial Gambling Management Commission (CGMC) shows that casino owners are in control of buildings and sites where human rights abuses have been documented in at least 12 locations in the Southeast Asian nation, said an Amnesty International report on April 2. “The casinos’ plans were recognized by the CGMC in December and January – during the country’s supposed nationwide crackdown on scamming compounds. The approved businesses include three Crown casinos owned by Anco Brothers Co. Ltd., one of the most powerful companies in Cambodia,” the report added.

“At a time when the government says it is dismantling the scamming industry, the evidence shows it is simultaneously recognizing the plans for casino properties where abusive scamming compounds are run,” Amnesty International’s Co-Regional Director Montse Ferrer said. This contradiction raises urgent questions about whether Cambodian regulators are legitimizing companies linked to grave abuses,” said Ferrer.

Toh Han Shih is a Singaporean writer in Hong Kong and a regular contributor to Asia Sentinel.

On March 26, Vietnamese state media announced that all households in Ho Chi Minh’s Thủ Thiêm New Urban Area had “agreed to move,” accepting compensation and resettlement. Domestic media had already announced that vehicles would be restricted in the area so that undisclosed but urgent construction tasks could be carried out.

However, widely circulated videos on social media tell another story. Streets were blocked by police for days as residents protested against low compensation and the coercive eviction from their land. Livestreamed testimonies said the Internet had been disabled, with electricity and water cut off. Despite resistance, the forced eviction was successful, in a way. After decades of lawsuits, residents lost their land.

The project in the central business area has resulted in the eviction of nearly 15,000 households and the demolition of numerous religious and historic monuments, with little say given to the public.

If ever there was an area ripe for redevelopment, however, it is the Thủ Thiêm ward, a massive 657-hectare horseshoe-shaped peninsula directly across the Saigon River from Ho Chi Minh City’s historic District 1. Envisioned as the “Manhattan of Vietnam,” it is designed to be the city’s new modern financial and cultural hub for the 21st century.

Unfortunately, the Thủ Thiêm ward had a thriving population who had lived there perhaps for centuries. 14 to 15,000 households have already been ousted, with 5,000-odd still left. The area is designed to eventually accommodate roughly 130,000 to 145,400 permanent residents once completed, as well as over 217,000 regular employees and up to a million visitors during peak events.

As the country undergoes rapid development, land disputes have increased nationwide. Cases of forced land seizures have been reported across the country. What is presented as compliance is often driven by coercion rather than genuine consensus.

Opposition costs too high

The heavy police presence in Thủ Thiêm evokes painful memories of the deadly, long-running land dispute in Đồng Tâm commune on the outskirts of Hanoi. On Jan. 9, 2020, thousands of police entered the commune and clashes erupted, killing three policemen and a civilian, Lê Đình Kình, a veteran, former local official, Communist Party member, and leading protest figure. He had become a spiritual leader and vowed to defend what villagers considered their ancestral land, but which the government designated as public land for state-defined purposes.

That tragedy demonstrated that earlier promises of dialogue between the state and affected communities were hollow. Under Party General Secretary and President Tô Lâm, the Ministry of Public Security has become unprecedentedly powerful. Four out of 19 Politburo members, including Tô Lâm, have police backgrounds.

Vietnam’s 2013 Constitution says land is collectively owned by the people and administered by the state. In practice, however, this framework – combined with inconsistent and often lax management by local authorities – has created fertile ground for disputes, particularly in cases where historical land-use rights are ambiguous.

In practice, compensation is typically limited to land formally recognized by land-use rights certificates and remains subject to interpretation by local authorities. The amended 2024 Land Law introduced no fundamental change. Land, in effect, remains under state control, with authorities retaining broad powers to reclaim or lease it for self-styled socio-economic development or national defense purposes.

As a result, even those holding land-use rights certificates often find themselves in a precarious position, effectively tenants on their own land, paying taxes on property that can be seized at any time.

It is now common in Hanoi to see large groups of landowners gathered at the central offices of the Communist Party of Vietnam to demand justice. Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City stand out as cities where citizens have been openly dissatisfied with below-market compensation for land confiscation.

Disciplining leaders does not mean justice for victims

The municipal People’s Committee of Ho Chi Minh City has publicly apologized to local residents for shortcomings in the Thủ Thiêm project, acknowledging that it had not “followed what was approved,” particularly in relation to households on approximately 4.3 hectares outside the planning zone. However, the apology didn’t translate into any meaningful redress.

In 2020, government officials in Ho Chi Minh City faced charges for land mismanagement in a massive urban development project that led to the confiscation of land rights for 15,000 people. Lê Thanh Hải, a former member of the Politburo and former Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh City Party Committee, was expelled from the Communist Party. But this did not necessarily mean that justice would be served for the affected citizens.

Thủ Thiêm residents may feel an even deeper sense of injustice. Under the former South Vietnamese regime (1955–1975), citizens were allowed to own land. Private land ownership formally remained in place until 1980, when the new Constitution abolished the right to private land ownership in a unified Vietnam.

Last December, at a national conference reviewing anti-corruption, anti-wastefulness and anti-negativity efforts during the term of the Party’s 13th National Congress, Tô Lâm said that 80-90 percent of misconduct cases lodged against officials were related to land, which speaks volumes about discontent over land issues.

Yet Tô Lâm is also known for championing fast GDP-centric economic growth. Modernization has been equated with mushrooming real estate projects. According to state media, the state is building the largest plaza in Vietnam in Thủ Thiêm, which is to become a landmark of modern Ho Chi Minh City. Yet for thousands of residents, modernization has carried profound and often overlooked costs – chronic insecurity, fractured communities, lost livelihoods and a generation left behind.

Also, the police under Tô Lâm are major law-makers. Last December, in a draft decree on integrating security with socio-economic development, the Ministry of Public Security proposed participating in reviewing national master plans, national land-use planning, socio-economic development plans, and even medium-term and annual public investment plans.

More violence to come

The 2020 violence of the Đồng Tâm clash extended far beyond the death of the spiritual leader Lê Đình Kình. His two sons were sentenced to death, and his grandson received a life sentence, all on murder charges, even though they had been attacked by the police. Several villagers, including Lê Đình Kình’s adopted daughter, were given prison terms of between 12 and 15 years, while others received shorter sentences for “resisting law enforcement officers.”

As of now, local police have reportedly refused to issue a death certificate for Lê Đình Kình on the grounds that his wife must state that he died in the field, not at home. As a result, he has been denied even official recognition of being killed.

The government has branded those who suffered in Đồng Tâm as terrorists and rioters, and forced arrested villagers to confess their alleged crimes on TV. Domestic media accused them of receiving external funding and direction from exiled opposition groups that the government labels terrorist organizations.

Human rights defenders who advocated in the case have also paid a high price. Before rising to the top post, Tô Lâm headed the Ministry of Public Security from 2016 to 2024. As of 2026, he has put more than 70 independent journalists in prison.

To pay respects to Lê Đình Kình and support the residents of Đồng Tâm, activist Nguyễn Thúy Hạnh raised funds on social media platforms. Around $20,000 in local currency was contributed by people across the country. Shortly after, the Ministry of Public Security subsequently froze the bank account, and the funds remain inaccessible.

In April 2021, Nguyễn Thúy Hạnh was sentenced to three and a half years in prison on the concocted charge of “making, storing, or spreading information, materials or items for the purpose of opposing the State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.” Such charges were also brought against the family of prominent land-rights defender Cấn Thị Thêu and her two sons for disseminating information about the Đồng Tâm incident on social media. The three were sentenced to a total of 37 years in prison.

People in Thủ Thiêm are aware of the possible consequences, yet being homeless and jobless on their own land after decades of hard work and hardship leaves many with nothing more to lose.

On several streets in the Thủ Thiêm area, signs of protest remain. Hopefully, the history of Đồng Tâm won’t repeat itself. It is not only a story of the past, but also a test of the future. Monetary compensation could be paid, but public trust has already been lost.

The author’s name is being withheld out of concern for prosecution by the Vietnamese government.

Twelve years after the US Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) designated the notorious FBME Bank Ltd as a “financial institution of primary money‑laundering concern” and the Central Bank of Cyprus put the Cyprus branch out of business, not a single prosecution for money laundering or any other crime has resulted, and creditors in the UK reportedly have taken their own lives out of frustration, jilted depositors say.

“More than 90 percent of FBME depositors were legitimate businesses, most of whom are still waiting for their money back,” said James Sutherland, chairman of Zetland Fiduciary Group, a Hong Kong-based global corporate services provider, which has US$100 million tied up out of the €1.3 billion still frozen in foreign banks abroad, with client funds tied up that could run up to US$300 million. “The Cyprus authorities have grossly mishandled the bank which was perfectly solvent and could have been sold. The depositors are now being milked by the liquidator and lawyers. In short, Cyprus, a member of the EU, is worse than a third world country.”

In a 2022 letter to the Sunday Mail, a group of UK-based depositors who said they wished to remain anonymous, urged the Cyprus central bank to take control of the funds in FBME, owned by Lebanese brothers Ayoub-Farid Saab and Fadi Saab, and return them to their rightful owners, blaming Cyprus for the deaths of several savers who committed suicide.

Instead, Sutherland charged, the Cyprus administrative court has appointed as liquidator Petros Ioannides of BDO Cyprus, a professional services firm, who allegedly has been throwing roadblocks in front of the creditors for the better part of four years, ignoring provisions of the agreement including deducting 1 percent of distributions as an additional fee despite remuneration totalling €1.35 million stipulated in the agreement for the first three years of the liquidation process, potentially producing as much as €13 million in additional fees, and delaying an initial dividend of 45 percent of claims with little allegedly disbursed to date.

Lawyer says charges are false

“Our client strongly denies these allegations,” said Maria Macridou, Ioannides’s lawyer in a broadly-based reply to Sutherland’s charges. “Our client was appointed at a time when the bank had been inactive for approximately 10 years. Upon assuming this role, he was required to undertake the complex task of re-establishing operational systems and gathering the necessary information and records. These were inherently time-consuming and technically demanding processes. At no point did our client delay the procedure, whether intentionally or otherwise. Any time taken was solely attributable to the complexity and circumstances of the matter. This was identified objectively by the court, and relevant extensions have been provided by the Nicosia District Court to the deadlines contained within the LFA, as this was not anticipated at the time of establishing the liquidation plan 10 years ago, when the bank ceased its operations.”

The liquidator hasn’t improperly deducted 1 percent on distributions, Macridou said, including in acceptance letters the specific provision of the 1 percent deduction to accommodate increased costs of the liquidation, “in light of the challenges faced that have not been foreseen in the original plan submitted 10 years ago. The subject provision has been approved by the Inspection Committee and is communicated to every single creditor who has the right to object within a period of 21 days directly to the Liquidator or via the Court, as per the applicable legislation.”

Although Sutherland said many banks have the same kind of dodgy depositors that FBME did, the bank was actually one of the world’s most corrupt. In the middle of the past decade, the Cyprus branch of the bank was the subject of a series of stories by Asia Sentinel that described the alleged laundering of hundreds of millions of US dollars out of the Indonesia-based Bank Mutiara, formerly known as Bank Century, which was looted by its owner, Robert Tantular, during the global financial crisis of 2009. The Cyprus unit of the Tanzania-based bank was described as one of the most infamous money-laundering operations in the world, with depositors allegedly including Russian Mafia suspects, central African satraps, pornographers, internet scam artists and a long list of other outlaws.

Hundreds of millions of dollars, alleged to have been siphoned out of Hermitage Capital, the Moscow-based investment concern headed by William Browder, were said to have been directed into FBME, making it a player in one of the world’s most infamous financial scandals. Sergei Magnitsky, an associate of Browder’s, was said to have been beaten to death in a Moscow jail when he tried to investigate the theft of Browder’s funds. Browder was forced to leave Russia. Eventually, the US Congress passed the Magnitsky Act banning a list of Russian individuals believed complicit in the killing from using the US financial system to move funds around the world, in effect freezing them.

FinCEN bar

In 2017, US district court granted a motion by FinCEN to bar FBME Bank from US operations, effectively barring it from access to the global financial system, sending the decision to the Central Bank of Cyprus and the Central Bank of Tanzania, which were supposed to begin disposing of US$2.6 billion in depositors’ funds. Depositors were given 90 days to file claims for the return of their money although sources told Asia Sentinel at the time that hundreds of millions were likely to go unclaimed because coming forward to do so would identify them.

However, Tanzania and Cyprus became embroiled in a contest for jurisdiction over the dissolution of the bank, with the Cyprus central bank refusing to talk to the authorities in Tanzania, where FBME was headquartered, until pressured by lawyers for depositors. In 2020 the deadline for claiming US$111 million in bonds issued by the International Bank of Azerbaijan was almost missed by the special administrator. Under pressure from depositors, an agreement was quickly reached and portrayed as a “triumph” in the Cyprus press.

In February 2022, the Cyprus administrative court ruled that the Central Bank had acted improperly in placing the branch into administration, which eventually led to the agreement of a Liquidation Framework Agreement appointing a liquidator in 2023. FBME Cyprus Branch was a solvent entity with a capital surplus of over US$130 million with mostly international depositors located outside Cyprus, Zetland’s Sutherland said, up to Ioannides’ appointment.

“Ioannides and the lawyers KKP were appointed without any competitive bidding having taken place and in obscure circumstances,” Sutherland said in an email. “Although Ioannides is qualified as a liquidator in Cyprus, he does not hold either a practicing certificate or insolvency license from the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales and therefore it is questionable as to whether he was sufficiently qualified to undertake liquidation of a sizeable financial institution. KKP is a small Cyprus law firm, lacking in international experience.”

Ioannides and BDO, he charged, “have possibly shown professional negligence in the execution of their duties and may be in breach of the bankruptcy laws of Cyprus and the LFA – notably the length of time taken so far at 33 months is excessive and unreasonable given the limited progress that has been achieved and the fact that FBME was solvent. The Inspection Committee elected in May 2025 has failed to date to make any communication with the creditors they are supposed to represent. The committee consists of five members, three of whom are closely associated with the firm of Hadjihannas & Co. It is clear they are not acting in the interests of the creditors, may be in collusion with PI and are ineffective in performing their responsibilities.

“The fact is that the majority of depositors in FBME are not criminals and have had their funds tied up for almost 12 years,” Sutherland said. “Cyprus – despite being a member of the EU – appears to behave like a third-world country. There was also a fiasco earlier in 2013 regarding the collapse of Laiki Bank and the Bank of Cyprus, but the authorities seem to have learned nothing from this.”

Naval power rarely changes course through headlines. It changes through personnel. The removal of US Navy Secretary John Phelan and the elevation of Hung Cao as Acting Secretary is one such signal, subtle in form, strategic in implication. In the language of great-power competition, this is not about administrative turnover. It is about …

Read more

The global economy doesn’t always shift in obvious ways. One minute it’s business as usual, the next, the rules start to feel different. Lately, those changes have been creeping in across everything—from how prices are set to how money moves and even what people choose to drive.

It doesn’t always come through in big, dramatic moments. More often, it shows up in subtle moves that, taken together, point to something bigger taking shape. And once you start connecting those dots, the picture becomes a lot more interesting.

Here’s a quick look at some of the stories that caught our attention lately.

China is steadily challenging the United States’ long-held grip on global commodities pricing, pushing for a more multipolar system that could redefine how value is set worldwide. It’s not loud, but it’s consequential—and it’s already underway.

At the same time, Beijing faces a critical decision at home: where to direct its economic firepower. Lessons from Japan’s past loom large, with experts warning that misdirected stimulus could trap China in years of stagnation.

Beyond finance, even the cars people drive are telling a bigger story. The global surge of oversized SUVs is reshaping cities, safety standards, and environmental outcomes in ways policymakers are only beginning to grapple with.

And in the background, a quiet revolution is unfolding in money itself. China’s digital yuan—especially through cross-border initiatives like Project mBridge—is building an alternative financial infrastructure that could chip away at the US dollar’s dominance in global trade.

These are just some of the latest stories shaping the economic landscape—part of a much broader set of insights we publish regularly.

While Asia Sentinel makes many of its stories available to the public, pieces like these are reserved for subscribers. If you want full access—and to better understand the shifts redefining the global economy—now’s the time to subscribe.

Subscribe now

Every subscription helps sustain our work. In a world where power and influence are being quietly reshaped, it’s also what allows us to keep delivering the kind of in-depth reporting that connects the dots.

Despite the apparent success of the US Air Force during six weeks of intense operations over Iran which saw much of Iran’s high-end integrated air defense network suppressed or destroyed, the broader implications of the still-ongoing US-Iran War point toward emerging structural weaknesses in American airpower. Far from reinforcing long-held assumptions about US aerial dominance, the war has instead raised serious questions about its sustainability and credibility in future high-end conflicts, particularly in the Asia-Pacific.

Operation Epic Fury can reasonably be described as a “maximum-effort” stress test of the doctrinal logistical, and technological foundations underpinning modern US airpower. While attention has naturally gravitated toward headline losses such as the downing of an F-15E Strike Eagle, the destruction of an E-3 Sentry on the ground, and the loss of an MQ-3 Triton drone, the deeper significance lies not in the losses themselves, but in what they reveal. In total, the US has reportedly lost 39 manned and unmanned aircraft, with an additional 10 damaged. These figures, while notable, are less important than the systemic vulnerabilities they expose. Even against a degraded adversary operating under asymmetric constraints, the US faced friction that would likely be magnified exponentially in a conflict with a peer adversary.

Lesson 1: The growing fragility of US long-range airpower sustainment

The first and perhaps most consequential lesson is the increasingly tenuous nature of America’s ability to sustain prolonged, long-distance air campaigns. At the core of this issue lies the ageing aerial refueling fleet. The backbone of this capability remains the KC-135 Stratotanker, with more than 150 aircraft still in service despite originating from the 1950s and 1960s. Efforts to modernize this fleet have faltered. The retirement of the KC-10 Extender in 2024 created a capability gap that the still-troubled KC-46 Pegasus program has struggled to fill.

The operational strain on this fleet has become increasingly visible. Incidents such as a KC-135 returning to the US visibly damaged by shrapnel, alongside confirmed tanker losses from operational crashes and destruction from Iranian missile strikes, illustrate the vulnerability and overstretch of this critical support system. Aerial refueling is not merely a supplementary function. It is the linchpin of US global airpower projection.

This problem is compounded by the new strategic reality that US access to forward bases is increasingly not guaranteed. In scenarios where allied basing rights are restricted or unavailable for political reasons, US aircraft will be forced to operate directly from the continental United States. Such missions dramatically increase flight durations, reduce sortie generation rates and accelerate wear on already aging airframes. Maintenance demands rise sharply, further constraining operational tempo. Meanwhile, the Next-Generation Air-refueling System program intended to deliver a modern and potentially stealth-capable tanker remains uncertain, leaving a looming future critical capability gap unresolved.

Lesson 2: Erosion of airborne early warning and control capabilities

A second major concern is the growing precarity of US airborne early warning and control (AWACS) capabilities. These systems are indispensable for coordinating both high-intensity air combat and lower-intensity counter-drone operations. The destruction of the E-3 Sentry at Prince Sultan Air Base represents more than a symbolic loss: it highlights the increasingly-strained fragility of a small and ageing AWACS fleet central to the very idea of precision American warfare.

The rushed deployment of US Navy E-2D Hawkeye AWACS to compensate for gaps during Operation Epic Fury underscores both quantitative shortages and qualitative limitations. Compounding the issue is policy uncertainty, with political-military seesawing in Washington DC seeing the initial cancellation of the E-7 Wedgetail program in 2025 partially reversed in 2026 under congressional pressure but without a clear future adoption timeline.

At the same time, maintaining the aging E-3 fleet is becoming increasingly costly and inefficient, as it shares the same legacy airframe lineage as the KC-135 Stratotanker (both based off the Boeing 707 airliner). Transitioning to next-generation systems is further complicated by optimistic punts on ambitious but unproven concepts such as space-based radar networks linked to futuristic homeland missile defense networks. These ideas are reminiscent of the technologically aspirational Strategic Defense Initiative of the 1980s and remain far from operational viability.

Meanwhile, the proliferation of low-cost drone warfare has exposed gaps in current detection and tracking capabilities. Iran’s sustained use of small, low-flying drones across the Persian Gulf region illustrates how even relatively unsophisticated systems can asymmetrically challenge timely tracking by advanced aerial or ground-based air defense radars. The limited deployment of advanced active electronically scanned array radar systems in the present US AWACS fleet (mainly on carrier-borne AWACS like the E-2D Hawkeye, but also on the land-based E-7 Wedgetail) further exacerbates this vulnerability, particularly in cluttered and contested environments.

Lesson 3: Persistent vulnerability of airbase infrastructure

The third lesson concerns the vulnerability of US airbase infrastructure and the shortcomings of current doctrinal debates surrounding base hardening. Iranian missile and drone strikes on regional air bases, most notably at Prince Sultan Air Base, demonstrated the consequences of insufficient protective measures. The destruction and damage of high-value assets, including tankers and airborne early warning aircraft parked in the open, underscore the risks inherent in underestimating the threat.

These incidents lend credence to prior analyses such as the Hudson Institute’s 2025 “Concrete Skies 2.0” report, which warned of the vulnerability of US bases to air and missile attack. This issue is even more acute in the Asia-Pacific, where US power projection relies heavily on a small number of major hubs including Hawaii, Guam, and Okinawa. These bases are central to the hub-and-spoke model of US operations but are increasingly exposed to advanced missile threats.

China’s development of intermediate-range ballistic missiles equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles such as the DF-26 “Guam Killer” and DF-27 “Hawaii Killer” poses a significantly greater threat than anything encountered in the Iran conflict. These systems are explicitly designed to target key US bases and airfields, raising serious doubts about their survivability in a protracted high-intensity conflict.

The viability of emerging US airpower doctrinal concepts such as Agile Combat Employment, which emphasize dispersal and flexibility, ultimately still depends on the resilience of these primary hubs across the vast expanses of the Pacific. Without substantial investment in hardened infrastructure, including reinforced shelters and bunkers, US airpower risks being degraded at the outset of a conflict and tethered by a short leash to the continental US west coast.

Not merely tactical but structural

Taken together, these lessons suggest that the challenges facing US airpower are not merely tactical but structural. Operation Epic Fury, while demonstrating operational effectiveness in the short term, has exposed underlying weaknesses in sustainment, force multiplication, and infrastructure resilience. These vulnerabilities are particularly concerning in the context of potential future conflicts with peer adversaries more substantial than Iran, where the scale, intensity, and technological sophistication of threats would be far greater.

If unaddressed, these issues risk undermining the credibility of US airpower as both a warfighting tool and a political deterrent. In an era defined by contested logistics, proliferating missile technologies, and asymmetric threats, maintaining air dominance will require not just advanced platforms, but a comprehensive rethinking of the systems and assumptions that support them.

Andy Wong Ming Jun writes about defense matters for Asia Sentinel.

Japan’s recent offer of US$10 billion in loans to Southeast Asian countries to secure oil supplies comes at a moment of heightened market anxiety. Oil prices have spiked to multi-year highs amid Middle East tensions and lingering concerns over shipping routes, including the Strait of Hormuz. Global oil benchmark Brent crude prices have increased since the late February start of the US-Iran war, jumping from around US$70/bbl pre-war to peaks near US$120 (again of some +70 percent). Prices are still up about 15–25 percent, hovering around the US$90–95/bbl price point as of April 20–21.

Japan’s move can be read as part of a broader effort to maintain influence in Southeast Asia at a time when competition for economic and strategic alignment is intensifying. Energy financing has become a key lever in that competition. China has used it extensively in infrastructure and resource projects. Western institutions are pushing climate finance, albeit often misaligned, pouring money into renewable projects instead of the energy infrastructure needed to sustain that development. Japan’s approach sits somewhere in between, combining financial support with strategic positioning.

Tokyo’s proposal, framed as financial assistance, is intended to help countries secure supply and stabilize domestic markets. On the surface, it appears to be a pragmatic move. Fair enough. Notably, Japan has long played a crucial role as a regional stabilizer, while it has both the financial capacity and strategic interest to ensure that Southeast Asia avoids acute energy shortages. For import-dependent Southeast Asian economies, the pressure is real: higher fuel costs ripple quickly through power generation, transport, and inflation. But the logic of the response deserves scrutiny.

Yet the structure of this support raises deeper concerns. Loans, even concessional ones, aren’t neutral instruments. They shift risk onto the borrower. In this case, governments facing temporary price volatility may find themselves carrying longer-term financial obligations tied to a problem that could ease within months, not years. In other words, it’s the all too familiar debt trap that has plagued developing nations for decades.

Notably, oil markets are inherently cyclical. Prices spike during geopolitical disruptions and fall when supply routes stabilise or demand softens. The recent price spike will be no different. It’s being driven less by structural scarcity than by uncertainty: conflict risk, shipping insurance costs, and precautionary stockpiling. If those pressures ease, as they often do, today’s emergency borrowing could look excessive in hindsight.

This is the first imbalance: a short-term problem being addressed with long-term debt. The second is more structural. By focusing on securing additional oil supplies, the financing risks reinforcing the very dependency that leaves these economies vulnerable in the first place. Southeast Asia’s energy systems are still heavily exposed to imported fuels, particularly oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG). Price shocks translate quickly into fiscal stress, subsidy burdens, and inflation.

In that context, directing capital toward more imports is a holding action, not a solution. The alternative uses of that same capital are well understood, but persistently underfunded. Strategic petroleum reserves remain limited across much of the region, leaving countries exposed to sudden supply disruptions. Energy efficiency measures, often the cheapest way to reduce exposure to price volatility, continue to lag due to policy fragmentation and limited financing. Grid infrastructure, critical for integrating alternative energy sources and reducing reliance on oil-fired generation, remains a bottleneck in several markets. These aren’t new challenges; they are recurring ones. What is new is the scale of financial resources now being mobilized to address them, resources that, in this case, are being directed toward immediate supply rather than long-term resilience.

For recipient countries, this creates both opportunity and risk. The region remains one of the fastest-growing energy markets in the world, and its stability matters for broader Asian and even global economic performance. Southeast Asia had a population of about 700 million people in 2025, making it one of the world’s most populous regions. ASEAN has been one of the world’s faster-growing regions, with GDP increasing around 4.1 percent in 2023 and 4.7 percent in 2024. It’s expected to sustain growth of roughly 4.5–5 percent through 2026.

Access to financing can provide short-term relief, but it also comes with alignment considerations and, potentially, policy constraints. More importantly, it can shape investment decisions in ways that prioritize immediate stability over long-term system reform. That trade-off is not always explicit, but it’s real. None of this is to suggest that governments should ignore immediate energy pressures. In periods of volatility, securing supply is essential. The question is one of balance. How much capital should be deployed to manage short-term shocks, and how much should be reserved for structural fixes that reduce vulnerability over time? At present, that balance appears skewed.

Taking on debt to secure oil at elevated prices may ease near-term pressure, but it does little to change the underlying exposure. If anything, it risks delaying the investments needed to diversify energy systems and build resilience against future shocks. The next disruption, whether geopolitical, economic, or climate-driven, will then find the region in a similar position, facing the same choices.

There’s a broader lesson to learn about how financial assistance is structured and deployed. Not all capital is equal in its impact. Funding directed toward consumption, even in the form of emergency supply, has a very different effect from funding directed toward infrastructure, efficiency, or system upgrades. The former stabilizes. The latter transforms.

Southeast Asia needs both, but not in equal measure. Japan’s US$10 billion offer highlights the tension between urgency and strategy in energy policy. It provides a timely reminder that the way capital is used matters as much as the amount. For countries already navigating tight fiscal conditions, the decision to borrow should be tied not just to immediate needs, but to longer-term outcomes. Otherwise, the region risks solving today’s problem in a way that compounds tomorrow’s challenges.

Tim Daiss is an energy markets analyst in the Asia-Pacific region and a partner at APAC Energy Consultancy. He is a regular contributor to Asia Sentinel

Japan is suffering a nationwide shortage of surgeons in more than half of its teaching hospitals, even in major urban centers like Tokyo and Osaka. Even as the total number of physicians grows nationwide, the number of surgeons is declining. There are severe shortages in rural areas, especially in Tohoku, where surgical…

Read more

China is attracting international users to its commodities pricing benchmarks, reducing although not replacing the US as the dominant arbiter of commodities prices, according to witnesses at an April 16 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) hearing in Washington. Driven by geopolitical factors like Beijing’s fears of US…

Read more

On April 12, a 53-year-old construction worker named Jhony Lanquino was trying to beat the 38-degree heat by shedding his tee-shirt while mixing cement outside his home in Mandaluyong City in the Manila national capital region when he was surrounded by barangay officials and police officers including SWAT members trained for high-risk operations.

Lanquino was fined ₱500 (US8.33) for violating a local ordinance on public decency by being shirtless, although two days later, Interior Secretary Jonvic Remulla descended on Lanquino at home and personally apologized, returning the ₱500 fine amid public outcry and acknowledging lapses in the initial implementation of his “Safer Metro Manila Plan,” also called the “Safer Cities” initiative.

Jonvic, suspected of being the Marcos camp’s candidate to take on Sara Duterte in the 2028 presidential sweepstakes, rolled out the plan on April 6 with the fanfare of a national event to take on one of the world’s most chaotic, polluted, traffic-choked, slum-ridden cities, which for decades has cheerfully resisted all attempts to redeem or reform it.

While designed to instill discipline, Remulla’s drive has faced criticism for allegedly targeting poor individuals, leading to calls for better police discretion, compassion and refinement in its implementation. Over 72,000 individuals were flagged in Metro Manila alone within the first 10 days, with a daily average of 6,000–7,000 apprehensions.

If there is a certain nostalgia, a balik-tanaw spreading in Metro Manila, something people here have seen before, it is justified. Manila saw it under Imelda Marcos, then first lady, governor of Metro Manila and minister for human settlements and mother of the current President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. She was nicknamed the Steel Butterfly, sometimes the Iron Butterfly for her unique combination of fragile beauty, lavish lifestyle and iron-fisted, unyielding political ambition.

Appointed governor of Metro Manila (1975–1986) by her strongman husband Ferdinand Marcos Sr, she led the Manila Cleanup Crusade” to polish the city’s streets, waterways and public spaces in preparation for major international events, a failing effort to put a shine on the chaotic conurbation of 15 cities, suburbs and slums into a “City of Man” including construction of the Cultural Center of the Philippines and a “Great Wall of Manila” to hide poverty-stricken slums behind white walls from the view of visiting foreign dignitaries.

Alas, Manila, often noted for its high levels of happiness and contentment, cheerfully resisted all attempts to redeem or reform it, lost as she focused on aesthetics to mask deep-seated social issues and ignoring actual sanitation and welfare needs.

Remulla’s new attempt, led by his Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Philippine National Police, aims to bridge the gap between crime statistics and the public’s sense of security through high-visibility policing and strict enforcement of “quality-of-life” ordinances. In short, make police more visible and streets more orderly to fix the feeling of insecurity. His modern echo, flagging shirtless workers and shutting down late-night karaoke parlors amid public outcry, is driven by the Philippines’ hosting the ASEAN Summit. Once again, Manila is being dressed up for the world, and poverty is treated as a public relations problem.

After his apology to Lanquino, he insisted that his initiative would be strictly enforced, albeit with clearer guidelines. Men going shirtless without practical reasons will be fined, he said, even in secluded alleys.

“Working shirtless men are allowed,” Remulla told the Manila Bulletin. “But those just hanging out topless outside, walking that’s prohibited.’’ However, he said, “anything goes, even shirtless men roaming the streets may be allowed during special celebrations like fiestas, as long as no troubles or violent incidents transpire during these festivities.

Where Imelda reshaped what people saw, this policy targets how people behave, which immediately has drawn condemnation from progressive and human rights groups, describing it misdirected and a crackdown against the poor. Critics say the pattern is clear. The plan’s visible targets are not major criminals but minor violations: public drinking, curfew breaches, noise complaints, and “indecent exposure.”

“This is not about safety,” said Secretary General Cristina Palaba of the human rights NGO Karapatan. “This is a crackdown on the poor, plain and simple. We have seen this before. Thousands were rounded up in the name of ‘order,’ yet nothing changed for the better in the lives of the people. Instead, the poor were harassed, detained, some of them even get killed in these operations.”

The irony is hard to miss. In a city where trillion-peso flood control projects disappear into the ether and high-profile fugitives slip through international borders with the grace of Olympic gymnasts, enforcement zeroes in on small, visible offenses. It’s easier to police behavior than dismantle systems that make the city unsafe.

Much like Imelda’s rush to hide “eyesores” before international conferences and beauty pageants, Remulla’s initiative seems less about long-term crime reduction and more about presenting a sanitized, “disciplined” facade to ASEAN delegates.

Enforcement also reveals a class divide. Shirtless laborers are fined, but joggers in gated villages are not. Curfews apply in poorer districts, while nightlife districts run late. Order, it seems, depends on where you live.

The Interior Department plans to expand the program to other cities after its Metro Manila pilot. As it does, the question becomes clearer: do we want a city that is truly safe, or one that simply looks orderly? Until deeper inequalities are addressed, these patrols risk becoming little more than performance—highly visible, tightly enforced, and aimed at those with the least power to resist.