By: Our Correspondent

China IndustryChina’s
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) reported today that
unsold inventories of cars rose 50 percent from the beginning of the
year to a four-year high; this suggests that macro challenges in
China have finally reached a crisis point. The future may have
finally caught up with China.

Sharply
rising inventories in such a strategically important industry as
autos suggest that the slowdown in the economy is biting domestic
demand such that corporate investment is likely to slow. If
inflation weren’t already such a problem, the People’s
Bank of China, the nation’s central bank, could ease monetary
policy to boost domestic demand. But with inflation recently spiking
and real interest rates already quite negative, the central bank is
in no position to ease.

Rising
inventories, slowing growth and rising inflation suggests a
self-reinforcing cycle of gloom for the economy and financial sector,
especially when the banking sector inevitably begins to feel the pain
of rising NPLs into a slowing economy.

The
last time Chinese policymakers faced such a daunting challenge in
charting the domestic economy through such treacherous waters was
during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 when capital flight
was of paramount concern. his time the stakes are much higher and the
risks of a crisis are much greater. During the crisis, policymakers
could count on capital flight reversing if temporary measures would
just provide a bridge through turbulent external conditions. Asia
recovered, China hung on and the world exhaled.

This
time around, however, China is, ironically facing the opposite
problem where so called hot money inflows are the problem. Unlike
with the capital flight problem during the Asian crisis, just hanging
on won’t solve the current hot money crisis as nothing short of
a domestic economic crisis seems likely to slow or reverse hot money
inflows into China. The growth rate of foreign exchange accumulation
has gone parabolic, with reserve growth doubling in 2006, 2007 and
set to double again in 2008 judged by inflows in the first half of
2008 already matching total inflows for 2007. Parabolic growth is a
classic symptom of an unsustainable trend in markets.

In
the fall of 2003, I advocated a maxi-revaluation of the Chinese yuan.
At that time I even argued naively that Chinese policymakers might
even consider such an option because they would eventually come to
the logical conclusion that if they didn’t do it now, it would
only get harder and more painful to do it later as foreign capital
continued to pile into the economy in a classic boom–bust
cycle.

By
June of 2004, I finally gave up on the idea that policymakers might
seriously consider a maxi revaluation. All of the rhetoric coming
out of Beijing rationalizing the current account surplus as
temporary, combined with a number of administrative measures aimed at
neutralizing the macro impact of foreign capital inflows, including
the beginning of an aggressive sterilization program finally
convinced me to give up my “radical” notion that Chinese
leaders might actually consider a large adjustment of the yuan.

Since
June 2004, my theme on China has continued to be that nothing the
authorities did would slow (let alone derail) a booming economy thus
as the debate has raged about whether there might be a soft landing
or hard landing for China’s economy, my mantra has been: “no
landing”. As long as capital inflows continued to surge into
the economy – which I didn’t see any reason why they
would slow let along reverse—my view for China’s economy
was full speed ahead. After our latest research trip to China, I
came back with the same bottom line view on China: inevitable crash,
but not yet, and meantime, continued boom.

The
report on rising car inventories, however, has changed my view. One
of the keys to our positive short-term view on China was that as long
as inflation remained relatively contained and inventories weren’t
building up, there was no reason to think the self-reinforcing cycle
of capital inflows, higher investment and growth wouldn’t
continue – short of a trade war or protectionist backlash.
Rising inventories for cars, however, is a huge red flag, especially
with inflation rising into slowing growth.

For
the last several years, I’ve talked about Chinese policymakers
systematically eliminating the usual canaries in the coal mine that
indicate macro stresses, and thus reducing the usual triggers that
derail economic booms in other countries, such as rising inflation,
rising interest rates, an appreciating currency, bankruptcy or a bank
run. Through various administrative measures Chinese leaders have
been able to keep such usual canaries in check. Until recently.
With hot money flows rising and inflation finally breaking the
canaries are finally starting to break their silence.

Rising
inventories has always been a potential canary that we’ve kept
an eye on because it is something the government can’t really
control directly. Until recently, however, rising inventories
haven’t been a problem. As long as that remained the case, it
was hard to see any serious trigger for a financial and/or economic
crunch in China. Rising inventories are potentially the proverbial
straw that breaks the camel’s back because they indicate
falling corporate profits, slowing investment, and slowing growth, in
a self-reinforcing cycle in a downward spiral that is the opposite of
the positive cycle in the boom phase of an investment boom/bust
cycle.

Sam
Baker is director of Asia research for Trans National Research
Corporation, a US-based political and economic consultancy
specializing in global emerging market research.