Three
decades of kleptocratic rule are not going to be eradicated easily
 It seems
almost quaint now, but Indonesia’s
longtime president Suharto, who now lies dying, was once praised by the Washington for his strong
anti-Communism, backed by a muscular, US-supplied military. That praise
translated into billions in aid from allies and international institutions
before it all ended badly in the Asian economic crisis of 1997.
Since Suharto’s
resignation his former authoritarian regime has morphed imperfectly into the
world’s third largest democracy. To widespread acclaim, the military forfeited the
parliamentary seats reserved for it under Suharto, taking its apolitical status
so seriously that it prohibits soldiers from voting in presidential elections. Tentara
Nasional Indonesia, the armed forces, have also given up the occupation of East Timor, albeit in a destructive fury, and the futile
but profitable war against a handful of separatists in Aceh.
Indonesia’s economy is humming along at a
respectable 6 percent growth rate. There is another election due next year, the
nation’s second in which the president will be directly elected. In addition,
decentralization is moving power from Jakarta
to the grass roots. In these exciting times, Indonesians have more to think about
than an aged leader who dropped out of sight nearly a decade ago.
That is
what we are supposed to think and this view of Indonesia has powerful promoters.
The Bush administration advertises Indonesia – a secular state with
the world’s largest Muslim population – as a beacon of democratization in the
Islamic world. Although the US
was Suharto’s key benefactor, it has had no problem backing his successors.
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks and Indonesia’s run of Islamist violence beginning
with the Bali bombings of 2002, the US has made Indonesia the East Asian focus
of the war on terror, and the Bush people sure can use a success amid their
many failures. As the primary beneficiary of the American largesse, Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono, the democratically elected president, and his administration
are also anxious to underline how different their Indonesia is from Suharto’s.
It’s a
satisfying narrative of national development, freedom and democracy. There’s just
one problem with the story: it’s largely untrue.
Rather
than a historic relic, Suharto, the bland general who emerged from the shadows to
dominate his country, remains the most influential figure in Indonesian politics
even after a decade of seclusion. The cries of “reformasi” that accompanied his
downfall went largely unheeded. Suharto’s influence will survive his burial and
haunt Indonesia
for years. In truth, Indonesia
now is not so different from Indonesia
under Suharto.
Yudhoyono and
company promote the view that Indonesia
is long past Suharto because, like most members of the ruling class, they have a
long Suharto past. That’s principally because Suharto didn’t tolerate
opposition or develop heirs. His last vice president, BJ Habibie, was chosen
mainly for his wildly unconventional views and was intended to function as an insurance
policy against his boss’s ouster. Nearly all of the politicians available as Suharto’s
successors have been his collaborators.
Despite
the sweeping changes in political language and banquet seating, Indonesia’s
mentality of governing hasn’t changed. Political office is seen as an
opportunity to benefit yourself, your family and your friends – as Suharto
reportedly did to the tune of billions of US dollars – rather than serve the
public.
At least
under Suharto there was order in the corruption: if you paid the right people,
things got done. Today, with decentralization and no strongman at the top, corruption
is more chaotic and widespread and payoffs less effective.
That attitude
of government as a path to personal enrichment goes far beyond simple graft. There’s
also no concept of conflict of interest. The family firm of the Coordinating Minister
for People’s Welfare, Aburizal Bakrie, is a leading conglomerate whose drilling
in East Java two years ago triggered a spectacular
mud volcano that has inundated a huge area with stinking mud. Bakrie has not
only escaped any blame for the incident, but the government wound up footing a
substantial portion of the compensation package for local residents who lost
their homes and cropland in the disaster.
The
military’s tactical retreat from politics to higher ground hasn’t brought the TNI
under civilian control. Instead, the divorce has further insulated the military
from public oversight and let its business empire carry on undisturbed. The one
aspect worth debating, though strictly of academic interest, is whether the
military remains unaccountable despite or because retired general Yudhoyono is
president.
While the
military has abandoned its formal role in politics, seemingly content to leave
the extraordinary difficult task of running the country to others, that doesn’t
mean the security forces have lost interest. The implicit agreement that
emerged under President Megawati Sukarnoputri is mutual noninterference in
vital interests. The government needn’t fear military coups, and the top military
brass has escaped accountability for its human rights and financial abuses
during and after Suharto’s reign.
One result
is that the murder of leading human rights activist Munir, who died of arsenic
poisoning on a flight to Amsterdam
in 2004, remains unsolved. Evidence links the in-flight murder to the national
intelligence agency, but that is a no-go zone for prosecutors.
The
judiciary is largely unreformed a decade after Suharto fell. Judges still look
first to politicians rather than evidence to reach their verdicts. In the
absence of political diktat, courts sell decisions to the highest bidder. Even
without political influence and bribery, courts are arbitrary and
unprofessional. The continuing absence of the rule of law is a major barrier to
attracting the foreign investment Indonesia badly needs to relieve
the devastating poverty that afflicts nearly a quarter of its 230 million
people.
But the
real failure of justice involves Suharto and family, and it bodes ill for Indonesia’s
future. Suharto himself escaped trial due to health issues. His son Tommy is
free after serving a fraction of his 15 year sentence for ordering the murder
of a Supreme Court judge who handed down a corruption verdict against him that
was later overturned. The Suharto clan continues to control a business empire
and wealth estimated at upwards of US$10 billion. The only conviction by
Indonesian courts handed down on corruption allegations related to Suharto was
a defamation verdict last year against Time magazine for its estimate of the
family’s stolen wealth.
Failure to
punish Suharto and his family encourages his successors to behave just as he
did, stealing all they can while they can, confident there won’t be
consequences. It also encourages the culture of impunity that led to the murder
of Munir and threatens a similar fate to any who dare cross the line. That’s
hardly the way to build a tolerant, pluralist democracy.
But the
biggest failure is the Indonesians’ own refusal to confront the Suharto era and
their roles in those three decades of misrule. Culturally, it is more
comfortable to ignore unpleasant issues than to examine them in order to avoid
a repeat. Yet the tale of how the nation allowed this by all accounts
unremarkable military man to successfully create and run an authoritarian state
bears inspection.
There is
no shortage of people who want to be autocrats. The difficulty is finding a
nation ready to play along. Until it proves otherwise by decisively repudiating
and purging the Suharto legacy, Indonesia
remains easy prey for the next aspirant, be it a populist neo-Sukarno, another
brass hat or a charismatic mullah.
Indonesia hasn’t faced up to Suharto during
this lifetime. Perhaps it will prove more willing to finally exorcise his
ghost.
The author is an Indonesia
resident who prefers to remain unnamed
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