 Chinese supervisors are arrested for shooting African mine workers
"Africa is ripe for take-off" is one of the more pleasant of mantras
reiterated by China's Communist Party leaders. To some extent, the
attitude expresses the approach of other Asian powers – from South Korea
to India. But massive Chinese involvement in Africa is likely to be the
most influential factor in shaping the continent's economic take-off
and governance.
The search by Chinese state-owned companies and
other Asian multinationals for raw materials in Africa and Chinese
financing Africa's construction boom contribute to better development
prospects for the world's poorest continent. New South-South
cooperation, or SSC, particularly Asian-African partnerships, are
deepening economic and political relations with African countries and in
turn redrawing Africa's geo-economic boundaries and geopolitical map.
To
sustain their industrialization, Chinese, Indian and Malaysian oil
companies such as Sinopec, Indian Oil Corporation and Petronas are
competing for access to existing and untapped oil reserves, primarily
located in Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan. Holding high
the rhetorical banner of SSC yields a bargaining chip in contrast to
traditionally exploitative Western multinationals. South Korea
increasingly targets African countries for joint exploration of energy
and natural resources. The Koreans have just embarked on a solar-energy
aid program in Mozambique that's set to bring power, about 500 kilowatts
per plant, to the Niassa countryside.
This South-South expanding
corridor was only reinforced in the aftermath of the 2008 global
financial crisis. In 2009 China surpassed the United States as the
African continent's major trading partner. Last year, between January
and 31 November, Sino-African trade reached $114.8 billion as opposed to
US-Africa total trade in 2010 of $113.2 billion. According to the
latest World Bank forecast, economic growth for Africa is projected at
5.3 percent in 2011.
To a large extent, this growth is rooted in
the voracious Asian appetite for natural resources. But China invests in
manufacturing, too. As much as 22 percent of Chinese investment is
directed to this sector. Significant investments and preferential loans
from Chinese banks and sovereign wealth funds go into package deals to
build crucial infrastructure connecting markets and people. Between 2008
and 2010, China provided more loans to the developing world than the
World Bank did – US$110 billion.
These intercontinental
transformations have far-reaching consequences for a world order long
dominated by Euro-Atlantic and Japanese military and economic power. For
Africa, arguably, China's growing role for Africa's development is by
far the biggest game-changer in foreign relations of African countries
since gaining independence and the collapse of the Soviet Union. For
China, Africa holds a special place in terms of political loyalties and
mutual support exchanged in multilateral forums focusing on climate
change and human rights, its abundant natural resources, and emerging
markets for inexpensive goods.
The inroads by China and other
Asian countries today portend a remarkable shift in trade relations and
aid paradigms, triggering a rise in prices for raw materials. Currently,
copper stands at an all-time high, contributing to economic growth and
employment in copper-rich Zambia.
Given the statistics on
economic growth, one would expect African populations to view China
favorably, and indeed, polling figures from Pew Institute studies
conducted in 2007 and 2010 show that a majority in Sub-Saharan Africa is
favorably disposed to China's presence.
Nevertheless, more
qualitative studies show that China's presence does not make everyone
happy. Critics have highlighted how China's foreign aid is directed
toward Chinese construction companies, thus not contributing real job
growth.
Zambia is a case in point, with discontent emerging due
to ongoing labor discord between Chinese managers and Zambian miners. A
2009 study conducted by Zambian labor unions concluded: "Chinese FDI has
had modest impact on national development but with overall negative
impacts on the labor market." Adding to the negative view are violent
accidents and confrontations in the mining sector. The latest incident,
in October 2010, two Chinese company bosses at the Callum mine in Maamba
opened fire on a group of Zambian mine workers who demanded wage
increases. Thirteen people were injured. Out on bail since October, the
managers have yet to appear in court.
Obviously Asian-African
state-to-state relations are asymmetrical in terms of power
distribution. Therefore, relations are bound to have far-reaching
implications for new economic dependency as well as national
sovereignty. The problem is not that China brings an authoritarian
political agenda to Africa. It doesn't, as there's no evidence of a
direct ideological Chinese imperative. Nonetheless, it's evident that
China's principle of non-interference in the affairs of other countries
means that the grip of authoritarian ruling parties over civil society
will strengthen in the short term.
The most intriguing question
is if a more liberal Chinese approach to the principle of
non-interference and state sovereignty is in the making. Reports of how
China has maneuvered to rescue more than 30,000 stranded PRC citizens
from Libya indicate a further, albeit slow, erosion of China's
traditional stance on strict respect of sovereignty ongoing since the
1990s. China took the unusual step to vote for a UN resolution that
included a travel ban and froze assets of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi,
an opening for a charge at the International Criminal Court. This issue
is not just about evacuation of civilians. An interfering China will
not necessarily be viewed favorably by competing Western countries or
local African states.
In fact, it can be argued that Chinese
investments already shape contradictory attitudes at both ends of the
Sino-African spectrum. Take the special economic zone in Chambishi,
Zambia's Copperbelt, operated by NFC Africa Mining, a state-owned
Chinese company. In 2011 the Chinese government's white paper on
economic and trade cooperation with Africa praised its success: "So far
13 companies have moved in; they engage in mining, prospecting,
nonferrous metals processing, chemical engineering, and construction,
having made investment worth US$600 million, and providing more than
6,000 jobs for local people."
I asked ministerial level
officials in the capital Lusaka and local officials in the Copperbelt
region in August about progress of the Chambishi zone, and opinions
ranged from skepticism to despondent irritation. One economist argued:
"On paper the zone looks good, and if implemented it would also be good.
But later on the initial Chinese contractor for the zone, said it was
no longer feasible – it was too expensive. So now they wanted Zambia to
borrow money from China to pay for the buildup."
I put the same
question to a local official in the city of Ndola, capital of the
Copperbelt, and he replied, "I can tell you that in fact everyone is in
the dark. No one seems to be in charge – that's the problem. You know,
even if you are a boss from cabinet office they still won't let you into
their zone! Even when the minister of the Copperbelt was to attend an
enterprise presentation, the Chinese delegation did not care about
translation."
Should such remarks be dismissed as trivial
complaints coming from sidelined local officials? Or do they indicate
that China, commonly perceived as an alternative to the West that
expands policy space in Africa, may contract local policy and harm
states' sovereign authority over their economic and political affairs?
Adding
to political and strategic risks, this issue is likely to top future
agendas. Barring a collapse of Chinese-style authoritarian capitalism,
China will have a particularly heavy impact on both the economic and
political future of African countries in coming decades.
However,
there's room for optimism. After the forced, unfair absorption of
African resources and lives into global processes during the colonial
and Cold War eras, this time Africans are more free to negotiate their
own destinies and take-off.
Johan Lagerkvist is senior
research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. This
is reprinted with permission of YaleGlobal, the Internet site of the
Yale Centerfor the Study of Globalization.
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