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Normal doesn't necessarily mean democratic
Thailand's Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva has recently jetted to Hong Kong and South Korea, assuring investors that Thailand's politics are back to normal.
But in Abhisit's Thailand, normality means a depressing slide back to the past political configurations that can be called Thai-style democracy. This is a system where politicians, parties and parliament are made weak and where real power resides with traditional, repressive and hierarchical institutions.
Abhisit's assurances follow several years of political turmoil that began in 2005 with a protest movement to oust then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and was punctuated by the 2006 putsch that sent Thaksin packing, increasing street violence, the occupation of Bangkok's airports by the royalist People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and the army's mid-April crackdown on anti-government protests in Bangkok.
These institutions have provided Thailand's "political stability" in the past: the monarchy, military and the bureaucracy. Each of these institutions came under pressure from a developing parliamentary system.
With Thaksin as premier, the concentration of political and economic power in his hands and his obvious appeal to the poorest and weakest classes challenged the conservative consensus that concentrated political power with the conservative elite.
There is now ample evidence that the conservatives who have long considered themselves the country's rightful rulers are now back in charge. Prime Minister Abhisit and his Democrat Party-led coalition are merely stage-managing this comeback for the conservatives.
The most recent confirmation is last Friday's clearing of all officials involved in the October 25, 2004 Tak Bai incident in the restive South. Ruling that the military and police had acted according to the law and had used sound judgment, the court has approved of the army's suppression of protestors that saw 85 die. Seventy-eight of the dead died in custody after they were piled into military trucks and driven away.
This tragic event occurred during Thaksin's premiership, and he was roundly and rightfully criticized for it. But in the court's decision, what mattered was not Thaksin's role but the protection of the officials and military figures involved.
There are many similar cases. For example, the 2004 massacre at Pattani's Kru Se mosque has never been adequately investigated. The mistreatment of Rohingya refugees by officials, caught on film just a few weeks ago, has been forgotten, with Prime Minister Abhisit claiming misdeeds by security forces. The execution-style murder of two men found floating in the river following April's Bangkok uprising has also been neglected.
Getting back to normal means that the conservative establishment protects its own. Officials continue to operate outside the law, especially those who are part and parcel of the apparatus that protects the establishment and maintains its rule.
Letting the military operate with impunity is not just rewarding it for its service in shoring up the establishment's rule but reflects its burgeoning political power. When Abhisit's government was spawned in December 2008, it had three midwives: the People's Alliance for Democracy, palace-aligned conservatives, and the military.
The PAD street demonstrations destabilized two governments that owed allegiance to Thaksin. The palace-aligned conservatives managed legal cases against Thaksin and those parties. General Anupong Paojinda, the army commander and a member of the 2006 coup junta, allowed PAD demonstrators free reign, and directed or approved the Democrat's coalition that saw several pro-Thaksin politicians suddenly swapping loyalties.
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