Asia Sentinel

And, since the early days of the George W. Bush presidency and its so-called “war on terror,” US officials have vainly exercised continuing pressure on Islamabad’s successive governments to cut the ISI’s militant ties altogether. Over the years, this pressure has grown in strength as it became obvious that rogue elements within Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus were hampering US operations in Afghanistan and making reconciliation with India over the territorial dispute of Kashmir more intractable.

Questions over the ISI and its activities have assumed added urgency with the announcement last Friday by Pakistani military officials who said as many as 20,000 troops are being redeployed close to the Indian border amid rocket-rattling by both nuclear-tipped nations. Recent events such as the July bombing of India’s embassy in Kabul and the November terrorist attacks that hit Mumbai, leaving at least 173 dead, have been assumed by many analysts and officials to be attributable to groups aided, indirectly and in the past at least, by rogue ISI elements acting independently of the Pakistani government, but which nevertheless remain under its official control.

Long-overdue reforms
Because of the tragic consequences of these events and of the political and military risks they entail and are likely to further stir in the region, a long line of US officials of all ranks have quietly visited Islamabad to convey a single, resounding message: Pakistan must reform its intelligence agencies and put an end to the ISI’s underground liaison with several of South Asia’s Islamic militant groups.

In fact, it seems there would be obvious domestic and self-interested stimulus as well for Pakistan’s current civilian government, presided over by President Asif Ali Zardari, to rein in its intelligence apparatus, including risks from the rise of Islamic fundamentalism for Pakistan’s own social and political stability. Zardari publicly demanded in November that the political wing of the ISI be disbanded, something many observers think will do little more than demonstrate the limits of his power.

As Zardari pointed out in a recent op-ed, “[n]early 2,000 Pakistanis have lost their lives to terrorism in this year alone.” Pakistanis are the terrorists’ targets and victims as well. This backlash has been repeatedly evidenced by incidents ranging from the deadly July 2007 siege of Islamabad’s Red Mosque to the bombing of the capital’s Marriott Hotel, just a few months ago in which 40 people died when a dump truck full of explosives detonated as it was being checked by security personnel and sniffer dogs.

In essence, Pakistan has become a victim of its rogue intelligence services, and this conclusion would only be further supported if India takes steps towards a new military confrontation against its conventionally weaker neighbor, with possibly disastrous consequences for both sides.

Hence the question: why won’t Islamabad rein in its intelligence apparatus? Why won’t Zardari’s government move to reform the ISI and push out the agency’s militant-friendly loners? After all, it can be assumed, doing so would make Pakistan safer, partly quell India’s wrath, and ensure the continued support of the US. Yet, for the most part, the reform has yet to come. Why?

An impotent civilian government
In reality, as an analyst with the US-based country risk analysis provider Stratfor put it, “it is important to keep in mind that the civilian government would love to bring the ISI directorate under its control and has even tried to do so but doesn’t have the power to effect such changes” because of its weak position in relation to the Pakistani military, which has ruled over the country for much of its history.

“The military is a Punjabi institution, with its personnel drawn mainly from the Punjab state, Pakistan's largest and richest,” Nick Jones, an Asia editor at Oxford Analytica added. “It's an efficient and strong institution that sees itself as the nation's protector in a context where civilian administrations generally prove corrupt and inept.”

In this context, even at times when civilian governments have been at Pakistan’s helm, as is now the case, they have for the most part been weak in their reforms, particularly with regards to security matters.

This shortcoming, Raghav Sharma, a research officer at New Delhi’s International Centre for Peace Studies, added, has been compounded by the fact that “civilian control has often been short-lived and fragile” and that “politicians of all hues have in fact patronized the military at some stage of their political career.”

The current timing, one of economic and political crises, also appears to be of no help to President Zardari and his team. As Jones put it, “The economy will slow to 3.5 percent in 2009, the International Monetary Fund has said; Taliban militants are spreading their influence eastwards out of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), getting quite close to heartland areas; and more people will be poor and out of work next year.”

"If you were Zardari, would you take on the Army right now?"

Despite fearing the consequences of a stand-off against the country’s military, however, several Pakistani civilian leaders have nevertheless tried to pressure Islamabad’s main intelligence agency into reform. They range from former and late stateswoman Benazir Bhutto in 1989-90 to the current Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani as well as Zardari himself.

Just this summer, for instance, the newly-elected Pakistani People’s Party (PPP) government announced that it would place the ISI under the full control of the Interior Ministry, thereby taking it away from the military’s purview. The consequences of this move were “humiliating,” one observer said, as the government was forced to withdraw its statement less than a day later under pressure by the country’s generals.

Another such mishap came when Prime Minister Gilani had to renege on a promise he made to send the ISI’s chief, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, to India as a sign of goodwill following the recent Mumbai terror attacks.

Miscommunications between Pakistan’s military and civilian leaderships have repeatedly been put forth to explain these reversals, but most analysts are prompt to explain that the situation is merely due to the fact that the government has had no choice, in each case, but to swallow the pill put before it by an uncompromising Army.

Hence the claim that “if the ISI is to be reformed then it will be done by the Army’s leadership alone.”