A military
that has run the country for most of its existence may have to go
back to the barracks
In addition to uprooting President Pervez Mursharraf’s
Muslim League-Q Party by opposition parties in Pakistan’s
February national elections, the election has not only created a new
alliance between opposition parties and but raises the possibility of
reorienting the country’s political future.
Asif
Zardari, leader of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Nawaz
Sharif, leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), surprised
everyone by joining together to form the new government in Islamabad
and, it is hoped, will empower elected officials to follow Turkey's
example on the road to democracy. And while many political analysts
are concerned that the coalition will come unstuck within a year to
18 months, others are hopeful.
Both parties’ leaders
have committed publicly to adhere to the charter of democracy that
was signed by former prime ministers Sharif and the late Benazir
Bhutto in London in 2006. The document calls for the restoration of
the 1973 Constitution – in place until the 1999 military coup,
ensures the supremacy of parliament, limits the role of the military
in politics and imposes restrictions on intelligence agencies.
These key issues remain part of both parties’ electoral
manifestoes. Apart from Musharraf supporters, no other political
groups have any objection to implementing these political parameters.
A broader consensus among political parties is emerging to stop
Pakistan’s armed forces from intruding into the country’s
political affairs, hopefully guaranteeing that the parliament retains
political control. Currently, the president enjoys enormous powers –
he can dissolve the National Assembly and appoint military chiefs.
Pakistan’s civil society, led mainly by lawyers, is up
in arms against Musharraf and wants judges that the president deposed
to be reinstated although Musharraf appears neither willing to
restore the judges to their positions nor to quit the presidency.
This stance is likely to continue until Washington and Pakistan’s
military withdraw their support for him.
Pakistan’s
army has become a key power broker in maintaining corporate interests
and has its own benchmarks for measuring Pakistan-India relations,
the Kashmir conflict and Pakistan-US relations. It does not allow
elected officials to have a say in its internal affairs.
Unfortunately, the army’s influence is deep-rooted and
widespread not only amongst the lower classes, but also amongst
certain political officials, making it difficult for it to change its
ways. In order to counter the military’s influence and power,
the opposition needs to work gradually but diligently.
Turkey’s
example is instructive. Incumbent Turkish leaders made sure they
never gave the army an excuse to intervene in government affairs by
safeguarding traditional Turkish priorities both domestically and
internationally, apparent in the cases of Kurdish militancy and EU
accession. Secondly, they made the public’s wellbeing the
government’s top priority and introduced economic reforms to
revitalise the fragile economy.
As was the case in Turkey,
Pakistan’s ruling party has remained close to public
aspirations and kept its contact with the masses. If Pakistan’s
elected leadership can prevent spiralling inflation, it will win
people’s trust. Similarly, by combining negotiation tactics
with military might instead of just the latter, the new leadership
may be able to isolate insurgents in border areas of the country.
The US strategic alliance with Musharraf has created the
impression among Pakistanis that it does not genuinely favour a
democratic Pakistan. Over the years, the US has strengthened the
army’s rule over Pakistan by investing heavily in the military
and by backing the country’s successive military coups. These
kinds of policies, combined with the country’s own actions,
have led to a marginalisation of moderate forces in public life.
If
this marginalization is to be reversed, it will have to be with the
support of the west and the United States in particular of Pakistan’s
newly elected representatives. The west’s encouragement to the
army to respect the public mandate and serve the country within
Pakistan’s constitutional framework is also crucial. Without
it, it will be difficult at best for Pakistan to become truly
democratic, allowing the US and the west to forge a meaningful
relationship with Pakistan’s people.
Ershad Mahmud is
an Islamabad-based researcher focusing on South Asia. This article
was written for the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) and can be
accessed at www.commongroundnews.org.
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